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ABSTRACT 
SOCIAL TRUST IN CONTEMPORARY RURAL CHINA: 
ITS SOURCES AND IMPACTS ON PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION 
Narisong Huhe 
Old Dominion University, 2011 
Director: Dr. Jie Chen 
Social trust, as an essential element of political culture, is assumed to strongly 
affect the effectiveness of political institution. However, such studies in non-democratic 
settings are scarce, and even scarcer in the Chinese context. This dissertation, using data 
drawn from an original survey in rural China, examines the extent, sociopolitical origins, 
and political consequences of social trust in China. The results suggest that China has a 
unique pattern of social trust owing to its dual Confucian and Communist heritages. 
While trusts in relatives, neighbors, kinsman, and other villagers (i.e., particularized trust) 
are extensive, trust in strangers (generalized trust) is scarce. Using multilevel level 
analysis, this dissertation finds that both personal traits and village attributes help to 
explain the distributions of social trust in rural China. Finally, contrary to the common 
beliefs, this dissertation finds that variations in public goods provision in rural China can 
be best explained by particularized trust, but not generalized trust. 
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Social trust (or interpersonal trust), as individuals' basic mutual faith, is one of the 
fundamental essential elements—perhaps the fundamental essential element—of human 
society. Not only required in basic social interactions and daily economic transactions, 
social trust is also widely considered to be indispensable for effective governance at 
various levels. Given its crucial importance in various aspects of our life, social trust has 
been occupying a key position in modern political studies ever since Gabriel Almond and 
Sidney Verba's seminal work The Civic Culture} In recent years, especially after the 
publication of Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work, 2 the study of social trust has 
regained its momentum, attracting intense interest from not only political scientists, but 
also economists and sociologists. 
However, a cursory survey will reveal the regrettable fact that, notwithstanding 
the massive and ever-increasing bulk of the literature, political scientists know very little 
about social trust in non-democratic countries. Most contemporary studies of social 
trust, including both theoretical and empirical, focus mainly on how social trust emerges 
and operates in democratic societies; research of social trust in non-democracies appear 
1
 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963). However, if we consider the writings of 
political philosopers, the studies of social trust can be even traced back to Hobbes' Leviathan, in which 
mutual distrust is depicted as a defining characteristic of the state of nature. 
2
 See, Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1993). 
3
 Amaney Jamal, "When Is Social Trust a Desirable Outcome?: Examining Levels of Trust in the Arab 
World," Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 11 (2007); Amaney Jamal and Irfan Nooruddin, "The 
Democratic Utility of Trust: A Cross-National Analysis," The Journal of Politics 72, no. 1 (2010). 
to be the "residuals" of the studies of social trust in democracy, remaining gravely 
underdeveloped. 
This neglect in both theoretical inquiries and empirical investigations leaves a 
series of important questions unanswered: Are the levels of social trust generally lower 
in non-democracies as commonly assumed? What are the most important forms of social 
trust in non-democracies? In non-democratic settings, what are the major determinants of 
social trust? Can social trust also make governments in non-democracies, which tend to 
be weak and ineffective, more responsive to citizens' needs? More specifically, in non-
democratic settings can social trust bring about desirable sociopolitical outcomes such as 
public goods provision when the governments have failed to do so? The answers to these 
questions are of critical importance not only for our understanding of the nature of social 
trust, but also for our assessment of the state-society relationship in non-democratic 
regimes. 
Unfortunately, studies of social trust in non-democratic settings are regrettably 
scarce, and even scarcer where survey-based studies are concerned.4 In order to fill this 
gap, this study empirically explores the extent, determinants, and consequences of social 
trust in nondemocratic settings. Specifically, this research, drawing upon data collected 
in a nation-wide representative survey conducted in rural China, attempts to clarify the 
forms and magnitudes of social trust, and to explore its origins and impacts on rural 
public goods provision in the Chinese context. 
In this chapter, after a brief review of the existing literature, I will present my 
theoretical approach and working hypotheses, explain why China is a critical case, and 
4
 For examples of the few exceptions, see, Wenfang Tang, Public Opinion and Political Change in China 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
3 
then describe the empirical data employed in this study. Finally, an overview of the 
organization of this study will be presented. 
STUDY OF SOCIAL TRUST IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 
Ever since students of political science diverted their attention from the long-
dominating formal-legalism to political behavior from the latel950s,5 such subjective 
attitudes as social trust have increasingly attracted attentions of political scientists.6 The 
question of how social trust shapes various political activities, or using Rosenberg's 
words, "the principles, practices, and policies of a political system," has become one of 
the most important topics in the study of politics.7 As Lucian Pye once noted, social trust 
is not only "of overriding importance" in structuring political behaviors, but is also one of 
the most important themes threading through comparative political studies.8 
However, since the late 1950s the development of research on social trust is 
highly skewed towards the ways in which social trust and democracy reinforce each other, 
leaving non-democracies as a residual category. Such a biased research agenda not only 
constrains the theory-building of social trust in political science, but also significantly 
undermines our ability to understand the dynamic roles played by social trust in non-
5
 See, Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and 
Structure, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Almond and Verba, The Civic 
Culture. 
6
 The earlier studies of social trust largely treat it as an integrative component of political culture. See, 
Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture; Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and 
Political Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965); Lucian W. Pye, "Political Culture 
Revisited," Political Psychology 12, no. 3 (1991). 
6
 Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," American Sociological Review 21, no. 6 (1956), 
690. 
8
 Pye identifies four themes in cross-cultural comparisons: trust-distrust, hierarchy-equality, liberty-
coercion, and loyalty-commitment. According to him, the interplay of these four sets of values can 
profoundly affect political development. See, Lucian W. Pye, "Introduction: Political Culture and Political 
Development," in Political Culture and Political Development, ed. Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 8, 21-3. 
4 
democracies. Before I present my approach to social trust, I will briefly describe the 
dominant democratic theory of social trust in political science and discuss its limitations 
in accounting for the roles of social trust in non-democratic settings. 
A. Democratic Theory of Social Trust 
The democratic theory of social trust discussed here is by no means a single 
monolithic theory. Instead, it refers to a group of theories focusing the mutually 
reinforcing relationship between social trust and democracy. Specifically, although there 
is no general theory of trust in political science,9 "the existing literature," as Barbara 
Misztal noted, "is united in its vision of the preferable democratic order as one rooted in 
trust relations and as capable of ensuring trust among citizens."10 In other words, most 
political scientists tend to agree that social trust (or, at least, certain types of trust) is 
consistently and intrinsically pro-democratic. 
There are three pillars of the democratic theory of social trust: (1) civic 
participation, (2) consensual politics, and (3) political trust. As first formulated by 
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, social trust, in facilitating civic participation, is of 
essential importance to democracy. Specifically, upon comparing the various mass 
attitudes across five nations, Almond and Verba have demonstrated that the preferable 
9
 See, Jan Delhey and Kenneth Newton, "Who Trusts? The Origins of Social Trust in Seven Societies," 
European Societies 5, no. 2 (2003); Idem, "Predicting Cross-National Levels of Social Trust: Global 
Pattern or Nordic Exceptionalism?," European Sociological Review 21, no. 4 (2005); Peter Nannestad, 
"What Have We Learned About Generalized Trust, If Anything?," Annual Review of Political Science 11, 
no. (2008); Michael Woolcock, "The Rise and Routinization of Social Capital, 1988-2008," Annual Review 
of Political Science 13, no. (2010). 
10
 Barbara A. Misztal, "Trust and Cooperation: The Democratic Public Sphere," Journal of Sociology 37, 
no. 4 (2001), 372; Idem, Trust in Modern Societies: The Search for the Bases of Social Order (Cambridge, 
UK: Polity Press, 1996); Mark E. Warren, "Democratic Theory and Trust," in Democracy and Trust, ed. 
Mark E. Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
11
 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. 
5 
democratic order only exists in societies with a large reservoir of social trust.12 Their key 
argument, therefore, can be stated as: "no trust, no secondary associations, no genuine 
political participation, and no democracy."13 Since their seminal work, social trust has 
been accepted by most students as an indispensible psychological underpinning of 
democracy. In recent years, conceptualized as one of the most important components 
of social capital,15 social trust has been an object of a new surge of studies, particularly 
with respect to its role in fostering voluntary participation and strengthening the 
performance of democratic institutions.16 
Second, social trust appears to strengthen democracy by inducing consensual 




 Mitchell A. Seligson, "The Renaissance of Political Culture or the Renaissance of the Ecological 
Fallacy?," Comparative Politics 34, no. 3 (2002), 273. 
14
 John L. Sullivan and John E. Transue, "The Psychological Underpinnings of Democracy: A Selective 
Review of Research on Political Tolerance, Interpersonal Trust, and Social Capital," Annual Review of 
Psychology 50, no. 1 (1999); Also see, Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural 
Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values," American Sociological Review 65, no. 1 (2000); 
Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, "Changing Mass Priorities: The Link between Modernization and 
Democracy," Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 2 (2010); Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart, "The Role of 
Ordinary People in Democratization," Journal of Democracy 19, no. 1 (2008); Christian Welzel, Ronald 
Inglehart, and Franziska Deutsch, "Social Capital, Voluntary Associations and Collective Action: Which 
Aspects of Social Capital Have the Greatest 'Civic' Payoff?," Journal of Civil Society 1, no. 2 (2005). 
15
 Considering the role of social trust in social capital thesis, Todd Kunioka and Gary Woller argue that 
"[i]f one needed to define social capital in a single word, that word would probably be 'trust,'" see, Todd 
Kunioka and Gary M. Woller, "In (a) Democracy We Trust: Social and Economic Determinants of Support 
for Democratic Procedures in Central and Eastern Europe," Journal ofSocio-Economics 28, no. 5 (1999), 
579. Also see, Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York, 
NY: Penguim Books, 1995); Peter Nannestad, "What Have We Learned About Generalized Trust, If 
Anything?"; Eric M. Uslaner, "Democracy and Social Capital," in Democracy and Trust, ed. Mark E. 
Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Idem, The Moral Foundations of Trust (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Michael R. Welch et al, "Determinants and Consequences of 
Social Trust," Sociological Inquiry 75, no. 4 (2005). 
16
 For some good review articles on this topic, see Margaret Levi and Laura Stoker, "Political Trust and 
Trustworthiness," Annual Review of Political Science 3, no. 1 (2000); Marc Hooghe, "Social Capital and 
Diversity: Generalized Trust, Social Cohesion and Regimes of Diversity," Canadian Journal of Political 
Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 40, no. 03 (2007), 714. 
6 
public contestation while extreme distrust favors hegemony."17 Dahl's arguments rest on 
his belief that the prevalence of faith in fellow citizens will not only reduce potential 
political conflicts across subcultural groups, but also prevent political disputes from 
becoming a source of severe enmity.18 Similarly, Ronald Inglehart also suggests that 
social trust warrants creditability to the notion of a "loyal opposition."19 More recently, 
this argument has undergirded the bourgeoning and heated discussion on the relationship 
between social trust and increased social diversity in democratic countries. 
Third, social trust serves as an important source of political trust (ox political 
support, as preferred by some political scientists),21 which in turn is vital to the stability 
17
 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1971), 151. For a thorough discussion on the relationship between trust and public consensus, see Geraint 
Parry, "Trust, Distrust and Consensus," British Journal of Political Science 6, no. 2 (1976). 
18
 Dahl, Polyarchy. 
19
 Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," The American Political Science Review 82, no. 
(1988), 1203-4; Also see, idem, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1990); Idem, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political 
Change in 43 Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Idem, "Trust, Welling-Being and 
Democracy," in Democracy and Trust, ed. Mark E. Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, "The Mindsets of Political Compromise," Perspectives on 
Politics?,, no. 4(2010). 
20
 See, for example, Marc Hooghe, "Social Capital and Diversity"; Marcus Alexander, "Determinants of 
Social Capital: New Evidence on Religion, Diversity and Structural Change," British Journal of Political 
Science 37, no. 2 (2007); Christopher J. Anderson and Aida Paskeviciute, "How Ethnic and Linguistic 
Heterogeneity Influence the Prospects for Civil Society: A Comparative Study of Citizenship Behavior," 
The Journal of Politics 68, no. 4 (2006); Hilde Coffe and Benny Geys, "Community Heterogeneity: A 
Burden for the Creation of Social Capital?," Social Science Quarterly 87, no. 5 (2006); Dora L. Costa and 
Matthew E. Kahn, "Civic Engagement and Community Heterogeneity: An Economist's Perspective," 
Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 01 (2003); Edward Fieldhouse and David Cutts, "Does Diversity Damage 
Social Capital? A Comparative Study of Neighbourhood Diversity and Social Capital in the Us and Britain," 
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 43, no. 02 (2010); Marc 
Hooghe et al., "Ethnic Diversity and Generalized Trust in Europe: A Cross-National Multilevel Study," 
Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 2 (2009); Christel Kesler and Irene Bloemraad, "Does Immigration 
Erode Social Capital? The Conditional Effects of Immigration-Generated Diversity on Trust, Membership, 
and Participation across 19 Countries, 1981-2000," Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue 
canadienne de science politique 43, no. 02 (2010); Robert D. Putnam, "£ Pluribus Unum: Diversity and 
Community in the Twenty-First Century," Scandinavian Political Studies 30, no. 2 (2007). 
21
 Arthur H. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970," The American Political 
Science Review 68, no. 3 (1974); Paul R. Abramson and Ada W. Finifter, "On the Meaning of Political 
Trust: New Evidence from Items Introduced in 1978," American Journal of Political Science 25, no. 2 
(1981); Marc J. Hetherington, "The Political Relevance of Political Trust," The American Political Science 
Review 92, no. 4 (1998); Idem, Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American 
Liberalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
and viability of democratic regimes. According to Lucian Pye, political trust, understood 
• * 99 
as ordinary citizens' basic faith in public officials, is an epiphenomenon of social trust. 
In other words, political trust is embedded in a more pervasive trust in society at large. 
Without basic social trust among citizens, it is difficult, if not impossible, to cultivate 
political trust. As revealed in studies of newly democratized countries, particularly 
countries of the post-Soviet bloc, a lack of basic social trust appears to be the major 
hindrance to the installation and consolidation of effective democratic institutions.24 
From different angles, these three lines of argument testify to the critical roles of 
social trust in installing, maintaining, and perfecting democracy. In other words, social 
trust and democracy seems to occur in tandem. Hence, it is not surprising that Inglehart 
and Christian Welzel conclude that social trust—not, as is commonly believed, 
democratic values—seems to be the best indicator of healthy and stable democracy.25 
22
 Pye, "Introduction." 
23
 Pye, "Introduction." Also see, for example, Pippa Norris, ed. Critical Citizens: Global Support for 
Democratic Government (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999); Max Kaase, "Interpersonal 
Trust, Political Trust and Non-Institutionalised Political Participation in Western Europe," West European 
Politics 22, no. 3 (1999); William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?: 
Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-Communist Societies," Comparative Political Studies 34, 
no. 1 (2001). 
24
 Martin Aberg and Mikael Sandberg, Social Capital and Democratization: Roots of Trust in Post-
Communist Poland and Ukraine (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003); Jan Fidrmuc and Klarita Gerxhani, 
"Mind the Gap! Social Capital, East and West," Journal of Comparative Economics 36, no. 2 (2008); 
Natalia Letki, "Socialization for Participation? Trust, Membership, and Democratization in East-Central 
Europe," Political Research Quarterly 57, no. 4 (2004); Natalia Letki and Geoffrey Evans, "Endogenizing 
Social Trust: Democratization in East-Central Europe," British Journal of Political Science 35, no. 3 (2005); 
Christopher Marsh, "Social Capital and Democracy in Russia," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 33, 
no. 2 (2000); Richard Rose, "Postcommunism and the Problem of Trust," Journal of Democracy 5, no. 3 
(1994); Piotr Sztompka, "Trust and Emerging Democracy: Lessons from Poland," International Sociology 
11, no. 1 (1996); Idem, "Trust, Distrust and Two Paradoxes of Democracy," European Journal of Social 
Theory l,no. 1 (1998). 
25
 Ronald Inglehart, "How Solid Is Mass Support for Democracy: And How Can We Measure It?," PS: 
Political Science and Politics 36, no. 1 (2003); Inglehart and Welzel, "Changing Mass Priorities." 
8 
B The Poverty of Democratic Theory of Social Trust 
What does the democratic theory of trust tell us about social trust in non-
democracies? This question, as elaborated in the following part of this section, has not 
been adequately answered. For a long time most political scientists, guided by the 
democratic theory, have agreed that not only the levels of social trust are considerably 
lower, but social trust itself is less important in nondemocracies, where there is less 
meaningful participation and regimes are far less sensitive to the presence of 
96 
sociopolitical divides and the absence of political trust. Therefore, according to the 
democratic theory of social trust, in nondemocracies social trust seems to be irrelevant to 
or only play a trivial role in shaping various sociopolitical outcomes. This understanding 
of social trust in non-democracies is, however, being increasingly challenged by 
inconsistent and "abnormal" empirical evidence and new developments in social trust 
theories in various disciplines. 
First, there is no conclusive and decisive evidence in support of democratic 
theory's depiction that social trust and democracy come in tandem, and that non-
97 
democracies are necessarily low in the level of social trust. For instance, many stable 
9 R 
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East possess a very high level of social trust. 
Moreover, the level of social trust in Russia exceeds, despite its stagnant democracy, 
26
 For example, see Dahl, Polyarchy, Pye, "Introduction", Parry, "Trust, Distrust and Consensus", Richard 
Rose and Doh Chull Shin, "Democratization Backwards The Problem of Third-Wave Democracies," 
British Journal of Political Science 31, no 2 (2001) 
27
 For examples of the projection about trust and democracy, see, Ronald Inglehart, "Trust, Wellmg-Being 
and Democracy", Pamela M Paxton, "Social Capital and Democracy An Interdependent Relationship," 
American Sociological Review 67, no 2 (2002) 
28
 M Steven Fish, "Islam and Authoritarianism," World Politics 55, no 1 (2002), 20, Sabn Ciftci, 
"Modernization, Islam, or Social Capital What Explains Attitudes toward Democracy in the Muslim 
World'?," Comparative Political Studies 43, no 11 (2010), Jamal, "When Is Social Trust a Desirable 
Outcome'7" 
9 
those in established democracies like France, Italy, Belgium, and Germany. After a 
carefully conducted cross-national comparison, Mitchell Seligson concludes that: 
[MJacro-level data measuring trust and democracy do not seem to fit most cases 
throughout the world, except for a small group of highly industrialized, advanced 
democracies in northern Europe and North America. The linear association 
between interpersonal trust and level of democracy disappears when a control is 
introduced for per capita income. At the micro level the expected association 
between the civic culture attitudes and preference for democracy did not emerge 
(emphasis added). 
In other words, even if we take into account the potential errors of "ecological fallacies" 
caused by cross-national studies at aggregate level, the democratic theory of social trust 
holds only across a very limited number of countries (i.e., northern Europe and North 
America), leaving vast non-Western regions uncharted. 
Second, besides the above-mentioned "abnormal" empirical findings, the 
democratic theory of social trust has been increasingly challenged by insights from 
disciplines other than political science and from newly emerged middle-range theories. 
Specifically, as a consequence of its vital importance to almost every aspect of human 
society, social trust has attracted an enormous amount of attentions from students in the 
^9 "^ ^4 * 
fields of economics, sociology, and anthropology, among others. Despite their 
William M. Reisinger et al., "Political Values in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania: Sources and 
Implications for Democracy," British Journal of Political Science 24, no. 2 (1994), 207. 
j0
 Seligson, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," 287. 
31
 Seligson, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," 273-4; John L. Hammond, "Two Sources of Error in 
Ecological Correlations," American Sociological Review 38, no. 6 (1973); William S. Robinson, 
"Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," American Sociological Review 15, no. 3 (1950). 
32
 For example, see, Kenneth J. Arrow, "Gifts and Exchanges," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 4 
(1972); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Limits of Organization (New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1974); Joyce Berg, 
John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe, "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic 
Behavior 10, no. 1 (1995); Abigail Barr, "Trust and Expected Trustworthiness: Experimental Evidence 
from Zimbabwean Villages," The Economic Journal 113, no. 489 (2003); James C. Cox, "How to Identify 
Trust and Reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior 46, no. 2 (2004); Fei Song, "Trust and Reciprocity 
Behavior and Behavioral Forecasts: Individuals Versus Group-Representatives," Games and Economic 
Behavior 62, no. 2 (2008). 
j3
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different backgrounds, most of these scholars tend to argue that individuals and their 
economic and political activities are deeply embedded in various trust relations. As the 
"social glue" in society, social trust not only plays a critical role in democracies, but 
might be of even greater importance in non-democracies. This is because the formal 
institutions are generally weak and irresponsible in non-democracies, which in turn 
forces people to rely more upon trust relations in order to "get things done."38 
Moreover, the recent proliferation of middle-range theories also suggests that 
social trust is, if not more important, at least of equal importance in non-democracies. 
Specifically, political scientists, dissatisfied with broad and vague causal arguments 
presented by democratic theory of social trust, have started to direct their attention to the 
specific mechanisms linking social trust and various desirable socioeconomic and 
sociopolitical outcomes, such as the ways in which social trust can help reduce 
University Press, 1990); Niklas Luhmann, "Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives," in 
Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, ed. Diego Gambetta (New York, NY: Basil Blackwell, 
1988); Piotr Sztompka, Trust: A Sociological Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); 
James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1990); Bernard 
Barber, The Logic and Limits of Trust (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983); Barbara Misztal, 
Trust in Modern Societies; Adam B. Seligman, The Problem of Trust (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1997). 
34
 Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds., Explaining Social Institutions (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of 
Michigan Press, 1995). 
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 For example, Arrow, "Gifts and Exchanges"; Mark S. Granovetter, "Problems of Explanation in 
Economic Sociology," in Networks and Organizations: Structure, Form, and Action, ed. Nitin Nohria and 
Robert G. Eccles (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992); Idem, "The Impact of Social 
Structure on Economic Outcomes," The Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 1 (2005). 
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 Georg Simmel, The Sociology ofGeorgSimmel (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1950). 
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 See, for example, Steven Levitsky and Maria Murillo argues that in non-Western countries, "strong 
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transaction costs,39 and the ways in which collective actions are fueled by trust4 Those 
mechanisms not only exist and work in democracies, but also appears to be common in 
non-democracies. 
From the above discussion, it is evident that the democratic theory of social trust, 
notwithstanding its valuable insights regarding the relationships between trust and 
democracy, fails to account for the levels of and the dynamic roles played by social trust 
in non-democracies. This failure requires us to pay more attention to social trust in non-
democracies, exploring its magnitude, origins, and consequences in non-democratic 
settings. More fundamentally, it also suggests that we need a new approach to the 
analysis of social trust in non-democracies. 
AN ECLECTIC APPROACH: A RELATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
In this study, recognizing the problems associated with the democratic theory of 
social trust, I adopted a pragmatic approach to social trust, in which social trust is 
conceptualized as a relational concept. This relational conceptualization is flexible 
enough to incorporate the insights of political scientists and scholars from other 
disciplines, and also allows us to include many middle-range theories pertaining to the 
origins and functions of social trust. Therefore, I argue that the relational approach 
presented in this study is a more useful framework for the empirical and systematical 
exploration of social trust in non-democratic settings. I will elaborate on the ways in 
39
 Gaute Torsvik, "Social Capital and Economic Development: A Plea for the Mechanisms," Rationality 
and Society 12, no. 4 (2000); Paul J. Zak and Stephen Knack, "Trust and Growth," The Economic Journal 
111, no. 470(2001). 
40
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which this relational framework can help us understand the nature, forms, determinants, 
and functions of social trust. 
A. Defining Social Trust and Its Two Sub-dimensions 
Across various disciplines, numerous attempts have been made to clarify the 
nature of social trust. While well-defined concepts and a shared understanding of 
categories are routinely viewed as a foundation of any research enterprise,41 students of 
social trust neither agree upon a common understanding of what the term "social trust" 
designates, nor accept a unified categorization of the various types of social trust. 
In this study, I argue that social trust can be best understood as a relational 
concept. This relational conceptualization of social trust can serve as common ground for 
scholars with different theoretical interests, and help us systematically categorize 
different types of social trust. As such, it is not surprising that Michael Welch and his 
associates argue that "trust makes most logical sense when it is treated as a relational 
concept."44 Specifically, I use the following working definition: 
Trust is the willingness to accept vulnerability in ongoing social interactions 
based on one's positive expectations as regards others' intentions or behaviors. 
41
 David Collier and James E. Mahon, Jr., "Conceptual 'Stretching' Revisited: Adapting Categories in 
Comparative Analysis," The American Political Science Review 87, no. 4 (1993), 845. 
42
 Delhey and Newton, "Who Trusts?"; Idem, "Predicting Cross-National Levels of Social Trust"; 
Nannestad, "What Have We Learned about Generalized Trust, If Anything?" 
43
 For example, see, Mark E. Warren, "Conclusion," in Democracy and Trust, ed. Mark E. Warren 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1999). 
44
 Welch et al., "Determinants and Consequences of Social Trust," 457. 
45
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vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another," see, Denise M. 
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By situating social trust in ongoing social interactions, this relational concept can help to: 
(1) mitigate the debate about the nature of social trust; (2) bridge micro- and macro-
analysis of social trust; and (3) provide a viable way to distinguish different types of 
social trust. 
First, by emphasizing that social trust is based on people's positive expectations, 
this relational definition presents us an alternative view about the nature of social trust 
beyond the current debate between cultural school and rational school. As mentioned 
above, the democratic theory of social trust in political science is far from being a 
monolithic theory, and has long been plagued by various internal divides and debates. 
One of the fiercest among them is the debate between the cultural school and the rational 
school on the nature of social trust.46 The cultural school asserts that social trust is driven 
by long-term and durable cultural norms.47 As the "long-standing and [deeply-seated] 
beliefs about people," social trust is "rooted in cultural norms and communicated through 
early life socialization." The rational school, by contrast, treats social trust as rational 
calculation. Resting on the rational expectations of and choices made by individuals, 
when needed, reciprocally beneficial behavior in their interactions with others," see Welch et al., 
"Determinants and Consequences of Social Trust," 457. 
46
 For example, see Robert W. Jackman and Ross A. Miller, "Social Capital and Politics," Annual Review 
of Political Science 1, no. (1998); William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: 
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48
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49
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social trust is determined by a variety of social and political factors, ranging from 
personal experience to income inequality.5 
Although this divide has yielded a heated debate on which school is theoretically 
superior, increasingly students find that the boundary between the two is far more porous 
than they originally assumed, particularly at the empirical level. For instance, Mark 
Warren argues that trust, as a judgment of potential risks in social interactions, can be 
either "tacit or habitual." Furthermore, some students state that more efforts should be 
made to combine these two approaches. For instance, Bo Rothstein once noted, "in order 
to explain why social dilemmas can sometimes be solved, rationalistic theories must be 
combined with theories about how the agents come to embrace norms, ideas or a culture 
that make them refrain from self-defeating myopic instrumental behaviors."52 Myriads of 
studies from sociology and economics have confirmed that trust can be either norms- or 
rationality-driven or both. 
My relational definition in this study—assuming the positive expectations derived 
from either personal experiences or moral convictions, or both—encompasses both the 
rational and cultural approaches to social trust. According to this definition, individuals' 
For example, see Perre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," in Handbook of Theory and Research for the 
Sociology of Education, ed. John G Richardson (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986); James S. Coleman 
and Thomas J. Fararo, Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique (Newbury Park, CA: Sage 
Publications, 1992); Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," The American Journal of 
Sociology 78, no. 6 (1973); Marc Hooghe and Dietlind Stolle, eds., Generating Social Capital: Civil 
Society and Institutions in Comparative Perspective (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Laura 
Macdonald, "Generating Social Capital: Civil Society and Institutions in Comparative Perspective," 
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 37, no. 03 (2004); Elinor 
Ostrom, "A Behavioral" Dietlind Stolle, "The Sources of Social Capital," in Generating Social Capital: 
Civil Society and Institutions in Comparative Perspective, ed. Marc Hooghe and Dietlind Stolle (New York, 
NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
51
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trusting proclivity can be influenced by both cultural norms and instrumental 
calculations. 
Second, by highlighting social interactions, this relational definition suggests 
social trust is a meso-level concept, integrating individual psychologies at the micro level 
and group dynamics at the macro level. Besides the above-mentioned divide between 
the cultural and rational schools, many students still disagree with each other on the 
question of the proper level of the analysis of social trust. While some scholars, focusing 
on micro mechanisms, theorize social trust as a property of individuals,55 many others 
perceive social trust as an attribute possessed by collectives, instead of by individuals. 
On the basis of my relational definition of social trust, however, I do not assume 
that these two perspectives are incompatible. On the contrary, since social trust is 
essentially a meso-level (or a multilevel concept),57 the insights from the micro and 
macro perspectives actually complement each other, which in turn can greatly advance 
our understanding of social trust. "One of the intellectual attractions of thinking about 
the phenomenon of social trust," as stated by Claus Offe, "is the apparent potential this 
C O 
phenomenon to bridge the micro-macro-gap in social theory." 
For example, see Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy. 
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Finally, the relational definition of social trust offers us a way to systematically 
categorize different types of social trust, by suggesting that social trust varies with 
according to the social categories of "the others." As students from various disciplines 
have started to explore the issue of social trust in recent years, the literature has become 
increasingly fragmented and specialized.59 The concept of social trust accordingly has 
been overstretched to denote various forms of social trust, including trust in organization, 
and even trust in institutions. The chaotic categorization of social trust severely 
undermines our knowledge accumulation of social trust. 
Just as the term political trust can refer to trust in political community, regime, or 
authority, so the use of the term social trust depends on the identities of participants in 
the trust relationship. Therefore, in this study I argue that we can effectively distinguish 
various types of social trust by specifying the relational categories of the trustees. In 
addition, I argue that there are two forms of social trust that are paramount: trust in 
people we know (i.e., particularized trust) and trust in strangers (i.e., generalized trust). 
Indeed, most scholars have already agreed on the qualitative difference between 
particularized trust and generalized trust, although they use different concepts to describe 
this difference. Fukuyama uses the term radius of trust to characterize the "circle of 
people among whom co-operative norms are operative," whose scope varies across 
groups.61 Similarly, Misztal argues that a continuum of trust exists, moving from "thick" 
5y
 Delhey and Newton, "Who Trusts'?" 
60
 David Easton, "Theoretical Approaches to Political Support," Canadian Journal of Political Science / 
Revue canadienne de science politique 9, no 3 (1976), Pippa Norm, "Introduction The Growth of Critical 
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61
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to "thin"; while thick trust originates from close personal relations, thin trust results from 
the secondary relations of voluntary associations. 
On the basis of this conceptualization, Uslaner also divides people into two 
groups, generalized trusters and particularized trusters. With a larger radius of trust, the 
former believe that "most people share common values," and so these generalized trusters 
"are willing to trust strangers who may outwardly seem quite different from 
themselves." Particularized trusters, on the other hand, are averse to the risks and 
uncertainty embedded in general reciprocity. With a smaller radius of trust, they only 
trust people on the basis of close and intensive personal interaction, such as family, close 
friends, or members of the same lineage, ethnic, and religious groups. 
It seems that the most important forms of social trust are particularized trust and 
generalized trust. Therefore, following this distinction implied by both the relational 
definition of social trust and earlier studies, this study chooses to focus on the origins and 
impacts of these two types of trust. 
In this section, I present a relational definition of social trust, which entails three 
important implications: (1) social trust is a multifaceted concept, driven by both cultural 
norms and individual rationality; (2) social trust is a meso-level concept, encompassing 
both individual psychologies and contextual dynamics; and (3) social trust can be divided 
into two fundamental categories—particularized trust (i.e., trust in people we personally 
know) and generalized trust (i.e., trust in strangers). These three points link useful 
insights that I draw from other general and middle-range theories, and unite the 
components of this study. 
62
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63
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B. The Relationships between Generalized Trust and Particularized Trust 
Since generalized trust and particularized trust are the two basic components of 
social trust, it is imperative for us to examine the relationship between the two. This 
relationship involves at least two critical questions: Is generalized trust related to 
particularized trust? If they are interconnected, what is the nature of the relationship? Or 
to put it differently: are particularized trust and generalized trust intertwined in the minds 
of people, or do they differentiate between types of social trust? Are people with higher 
levels of particularized trust less willing to expand their trust to strangers, or in the 
opposite case, or are these two types of social trust independent from each other? The 
answers to these questions are of the utmost importance to our understanding of the 
internal dynamics of social trust, and consequently the impact of such dynamics on 
various socioeconomic and sociopolitical outcomes. 
Although most scholars of social trust have agreed upon the qualitative distinction 
between particularized trust and generalized trust, there is virtually no consensus on 
whether or how particularized trust and generalized trust are related. As for the 
question whether particularized and generalized trust are related, some students argue that 
all types of trust share certain psychological foundations. 5 Accordingly, we should 
expect that the two are closely related. But there are also some scholars rejecting any 
close relationship between particularized trust and generalized trust. For instance, Karen 
Cook, Russell Hardin, and Margaret Levi point out, our knowledge about surrounding 
Dietlind Stolle, "Bowling Together, Bowling Alone: The Development of Generalized Trust in 
Voluntary Associations," Political Psychology 19, no. 3 (1998). 
65
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people is of but little help in our attempts to predict strangers' intentions. Therefore, 
from their theorization a reasonable inference is that the two are not related. 
If we assume the two kinds of trust are related, there is an even more heated 
debate on how the two are related.67 One perspective holds that particularized trust can 
transfer at some point to a trust that also encompasses people not personally known. As 
Fukuyama suggests, the only difference between generalized trust and particularized trust 
is the "radius" of trust.68 Under some circumstances, it is so short that it would only 
covers acquaintances (i.e., particularized trust), while in other contexts the radius of trust 
may extend beyond families and friends to strangers (i.e., generalized trusters). 
Generalized trusters tend to have a larger radius of trust, yet they place no less trust in 
people whom they are familiar with. In the same vein, Uslaner argues that "people who 
believe that 'most people can be trusted' place greater faith in friends and family, 
strangers, and government for every specific trust question." Therefore personalized 
trust and generalized trust would be positively correlated. 
The second perspective, by contrast, sees the existence of strong in-group trust 
and bonds as a result of parochial social networks that limits and undercuts bridging 
social exchanges beyond group boundaries, leading to overall fragmentation and 
underdevelopment of generalized trust. According to Granovetter, strong in-group bonds 
do not necessarily create payoffs, but weaker bonds do. Strong group bonds prohibit the 
development of generalized trust; these strong ties and attachments do not foster an open 
66
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and welcoming view about the outside world.70 Hence, particularized trust would be 
negatively correlated to generalized trust. 
Unfortunately, given these controversies associated with the relationship between 
generalized trust and particularized trust, empirical studies, particularly survey-based 
researches, are scarce, making our evaluation and assessment of these competing claims 
even more difficult. A potential reason for such underdevelopment is scarcity of valid 
data. The most popular datasets used by scholars of social trust are created by the World 
Value Survey (WVS) and the General Social Survey (GSS), ' but these datasets contain 
no survey item gauging particularized trust. In this study drawing on a unique set of trust 
measurements covering both generalized trust and particularized trust, I will test the 
aforementioned competing claims regarding the relationship between generalized trust 
and particularized trust in order to fill the gap in our understanding of the nature of social 
trust. 
C. The Determinants of Generalized Trust and Particularized Trust 
In order to systematically explore social trust in contemporary rural China, one 
must have a grasp of the origins of social trust. As established earlier, social trust is 
essentially a relational concept, subject to the influences of both the cultural norms and 
rational calculation. Moreover, social trust, embedded in ongoing social relations, is 
shaped by factors at both the individual level and the aggregate level. As such, I focus on 
five principal categories of the determinants, encompassing both cultural and rational 
70
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arguments at two different analytical levels: sociodemographic factors, subjective 
orientations, and informal social interactions at individual level, and sociogeographic 
factors and community heterogeneity at village level. Table 1.1 summarizes the expected 
impacts of the five categories of determinants on social trust. More details of the 
expected relationships between each of the determinants and social trust will be presented 
in Chapter IV. In the following part, I will briefly explain these categories in terms of 
their expected influences. 
Table 1. The Expected Relationships between Social Trust and the Five Categories of 
Determinants 
Relational Approach 
















Note: The sign of "+" represents the strength of the expected relationship. 
Sociodemographic Factors This category includes such determinants as gender, 
age, education, marital status, income, and party membership. In this study, I expect that 
there should be strong relationships between most sociodemographic attributes of our 
respondents and their levels of social trust in others. Earlier studies have, from both 
22 
cultural and rational perspectives, argued that these attributes can strongly shape people's 
trust in each other, since they may capture some of the impacts of family, generations, 
79 
social class, and socialization on the formation of social trust. As argued by Pamela 
Paxton,"[i]n the absence of specific information about the trustee, individual 
characteristics of the trustor become more important in the assessment of the 
trustworthiness of generalized others."73 
Subjective Orientations As mentioned above, the cultural explanations of social 
trust suggest that certain cultural norms and subjective values can strongly shape 
individuals' proclivity for trusting. In this study, I include subjective wellbeing, 
perception of equality, and norms of civility. I expect that most, if not all, determinants 
of subjective orientations are robustly correlated with social trust. These attitudes are a 
set of normative and subjective values and beliefs related closely to one's assessment of 
the outside world and others in general, and they therefore fundamentally shape her or his 
willingness to take the risk of trusting. Earlier cross-national studies also confirm that the 
influences of these subjective attitudes are prevalent across national borders.74 
Informal Social Interactions The category of informal social interactions 
encompasses such items as intimacy with relatives and friends, familiarity with neighbors, 
and intensity of informal cooperation. For most rationalist scholars, this category of 
Lucian W. Pye, "Civility, Social Capital, and Civil Society: Three Powerful Concepts for Explaining 
Asia," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 29, no. 4 (1999). 
73
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determinants tends to be the most potent. Specifically, at least two strands of 
explanations are presented. The first and most commonly cited explanation points out 
that trust is "learned" through various social exchanges. People learn to trust and develop 
"habits of heart" through participation in voluntary associations and other forms of civic 
7S 
interactions. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that informal social interactions have 
similar effects. Some earlier studies also find that there is a robust connection between 
informal social interactions and trust. 
The second school builds their explanations on experimental researches that 
reveal how a trust relationship can emerge spontaneously among otherwise uncooperative 
and distrustful actors when they play various social dilemma games in a repeatedly. As 
Ostrom once illustrated, in iterated games trust is a valuable asset, because "trustworthy 
individuals who trust others with a reputation for being trustworthy (and try to avoid 
those who have a reputation for being untrustworthy) can engage in mutually productive 
social exchanges, even though they are dilemmas, so long as they can limit their 
interactions primarily to those with a reputation for keeping promises." Given these 
reasons, in this research I expect that the determinants of informal social interactions are 
significantly correlated with levels of social trust. 
Sociogeographic Factors This category tackles such village-level determinants as 
population, territory, level of economic development, and distance from local political 
and economic centers. As mentioned above, social trust is essentially a meso concept. 
Under different socioeconomic and sociopolitical contexts, the same person can make 
different decisions on whether or not to trust. Although some earlier studies have already 
Putnam, Making Democracy Work. 
Elinor Ostrom, "A Behavioral Approach," 12. 
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incorporated certain macro-level determinants, their research stops at the national level. 
In this study, I expect that the sociogeographic attributes of a village can strongly 
influence residents' willingness to trust. 
Community Heterogeneity In recent years, there has been an upsurge of studies 
on the relationship between the heterogeneity and social trust at various levels. In 
general, it is postulated that heterogeneity of a political collective ranging from local 
communities to nation states has a strong impact on the levels of social trust. Therefore. I 
expect the village heterogeneity—including lineage fragmentation and types of 
lineages—is closely related to social trust. 
However, it should be noted that there are conflicting views on the exact impacts 
of heterogeneity. Some scholars argue that heterogeneity exerts a negative impact on 
generalized trust and encourages the formation of particularized trust. Specifically, many 
scholars argue that by increasing the social distance between individuals within a 
community, heterogeneity is potentially detrimental to generalized trust. Alternatively, 
a second group of scholars argues that heterogeneity may positively affect generalized 
trust by creating opportunities for inter-group interactions. More inter-group interactions, 
as suggested by Marschall and Stolle. may "lead to greater tolerance and more favorable 
perceptions of out-group," which will eventually helps to cultivate generalized trust 
within a community.7 
77
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In summary, in this research I expect that the aforementioned five categories of 
determinants will likely exert strong impacts on the formation of social trust. While these 
five categories do not represent all of the possible determinants of social trust, as 
indicated in the previous discussion, they do encompass the major explanations of the 
formation of social trust. 
D. Social Trust and Public Goods Provision 
Scholars have long agreed that social trust is closely associated with various 
socioeconomic and sociopolitical outcomes. In this research, I focus on how social trust 
affects public good provisions at the local level: Does social trust affect the general 
socio-political outcomes? Is public goods provision variably influenced by particularized 
trust and generalized trust? If so, how? 
The answers to these questions are very important in contemporary China for both 
practical and theoretical reasons. Practically speaking, public goods such as functioning 
irrigation systems, good schools, access to electricity, and bridges and roads strongly 
affect ordinary Chinese rural residents' well-being. Theoretically speaking, the earlier 
literature has mainly focused on the role of formal democratic institutions in providing 
public goods. Specifically, this institutional theory postulates that effective democratic 
institutions are the key to adequate public goods provision, since only under democratic 
institutions can ordinary citizens effectively monitor and sanctions public officials. 
However, in countries like China, where democratic institutions are apparently absent, 
how can we explain the variations regarding public goods provision? 
For example, see Dahl, Polyarchy. 
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Increasingly, scholars have found that in developing countries where democratic 
institutions are weak or simply nonexistent, social trust plays a deterministic role in the 
Q 1 
provision of basic public goods and services. However, scholars differ as to how 
particularized trust and generalized trust variably influence local public goods provision. 
Basically, there are two theses that are heuristic for the inquiry into the impacts of social 
trust on public goods provision. 
One is the social capital thesis, which emphasizes the importance of generalized 
trust in facilitating civic cooperation and participation, arguing that generalized trust is 
positively associated with public goods provision, whereas a large reservoir of 
particularized trust is detrimental to local public goods provisions by hindering 
cooperation across various social divides. Specifically, the thesis postulates that 
generalized trust not only facilitates cooperation among and contributions by individuals, 
but also helps to strengthen the accountability of government officials. 
The other is the solidary group thesis, which holds a very nuanced view on the 
impacts of social trust on public goods provision. Lily Tsai, for instance, finds that there 
is no universal formula to express the impacts of social trust. Particularized-trust-based 
social networks (i.e., solidary groups) can positively influence public goods provision 
when there is a match between the administrative boundaries and social boundaries of 
81
 For example, see Elinor Ostrom, "Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action," Journal of 
Theoretical Politics 6, no. 4 (1994). 
82
 For example, see Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, "Social Capital and Community Governance," The 
Economic Journal 112, no. 483 (2002); Stephen Knack, "Social Capital and the Quality of Government: 
Evidence from the States," American Journal of Political Science 46, no. 4 (2002); Anirudh Krishna, Active 
Social Capital Tracing the Roots of Development and Democracy (New York, NY. Columbia University 
Press, 2002). 
8j
 Lily L. Tsai, "Cadres, Temple and Lineage Institutions, and Governance in Rural China," The China 
Journal 48, no. July (2002), Idem, Accountability without Democracy Solidary Groups and Public Goods 
Provision in Rural China (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Idem, "Solidary Groups, 
Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China," American Political Science 
Review 101, no. 2 (2007). 
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these networks. In other words, this thesis suggests that particularized trust is 
contingently conducive to local public goods provision. 
However, close scrutiny reveals that both of the two theses are flawed: The social 
capital thesis, by postulating generalized trust simply as "good" and particularized trust 
as "bad," tends to be too stylized; the solidary group thesis appears to overplay intra-
community conflicts entailed by particularized trust when there are multiple solidary 
groups. 
More specifically, the social capital thesis overlooks the way in which cooperative 
relations are maintained in the long run. As mentioned in the discussion of our relational 
framework, generalized trust concerns trust in strangers, which in turn only affects the 
initiation of cooperation, and thus has little to do with the continuation of cooperation. 
Particularized trust, on the other hand, is based on intensive and close interactions among 
acquaintances, which significantly reduces the costs of monitoring and enforcement. 
Accordingly, it is plausible to expect that it is particularized trust that plays the pivotal 
role in local public goods provision, in which cooperation tends to be persistent. 
As for the solidary group thesis, I argue that it is flawed by overstating the 
impacts of solidary groups. Specifically, an important characteristic of public goods (as 
opposed to "private" goods) is its inclusiveness. The existence of multiple solidary 
groups does not necessarily invoke intra-village tensions. There should be little conflict 
across different social groups over the receiving of public goods such as public order, 
schools, roads, and clinics. Therefore, the positive effects of particularized trust are not 
contingent on the types of solidary groups. In light of these observations concerning the 
solidary group thesis and the social capital thesis, I expect that particularized trust is 
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significantly and positively correlated with local public goods provision, while 
generalized trust has little or no effect. 
CHINA AS A CRITICAL CASE 
For at least three important reasons, contemporary China provides us with an 
ideal laboratory in which to explore social trust in nondemocratic settings. First, owing 
to its non-democratic regime and political culture, China is commonly assumed to be a 
low-trust society, particularly in the works of China and Asia specialists.84 However, this 
belief is in sharp contradiction to the empirical findings that have emerged from many 
cross-national surveys such as WVS and the East Asian Barometer (EAB), in which 
China occupies a very high rank in terms of social trust.85 Unfortunately, until now there 
is virtually no study that has tackled this disparity. Some scholars, troubled with this 
"Chinese outlier," have even excluded China from their analyses.86 This kind of 
practices has, notwithstanding its convenience, fundamentally hindered our 
understanding of the nature of social trust, and leaves a series of important questions 
unanswered: Is social trust actually high in China? If it is not, then how can we explain 
this disparity? Drawing on data collected from a representative nationwide survey in 
Fukuyama, Trust; Idem, "Social Capital, Civil Society and Development," Third World Quarterly 22, no. 
1 (2001); Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures (Ann Arbor, MI: Center 
for Chinese Studies, 1988); Idem, "Civility, Social Capital, and Civil Society"; Richard H. Solomon, Mao's 
Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971). 
85
 Inglehart, "Trust, Welling-Being and Democracy"; Delhey and Newton, "Predicting Cross-National 
Levels of Social Trust"; Soo Jiuan Tan and Siok Kuan Tambyah, "Generalized Trust and Trust in 
Institutions in Confucian Asia," Social Indicators Research (2010). 
86
 For instance, in one of her cross-country studies, Bjornskov has noted: "it should be stressed that China 
is excluded in all but one of the following regressions as it is a strong outlier in all analyses, not only those 
presented in this paper." See, Bjornskov, "Determinants of Generalized Trust," 10; Also see Uslaner, The 
Moral Foundations of Trust. 
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China, this study attempts to empirically explore these important yet unresolved 
questions. 
Second, since the onset of post-Mao reform, China—particularly in its rural 
areas—has witnessed tremendous economic development and the de facto retreat of the 
state. In this process, new spaces have been opened for various trust-based social 
networks, and the trust relations in rural China have also been undergoing rapid and 
fundamental changes. While some scholars have reported revivals of close-knit, 
particularized-trust-based groups like clans, lineages, and even secret societies, some 
others have found a proliferation of bridging and generalized-trust-based networks and 
associations. Given these facts, contemporary China seems to be a perfect case for us 
to improve our understanding of social trust in developing as well as non-democratic 
societies. 
Finally, China scholars and specialists have always emphasized the impacts of 
extreme regional differences (e.g., coastal vs. inland) on sociopolitical developments in 
China.90 Social trust and trust-related phenomena, therefore, can vary dramatically with 
the sociopolitical and demographic differences between regions in China. An 
investigation based on a nationwide representative survey will thus lead us to more 
generalizable and valid fieldwork observations and analyses on social trust. 
Kevin J. O'Brien, "Implementing Political Reform in China's Villages," The Australian Journal of 
Chinese Affairs 32 (1994); Kevin J. O'Brien and Liangjiang Li, "Accommodating 'Democracy' in a One-
Party State: Introducing Village Elections in China," The China Quarterly 162, no. Jun. (2000); Elizabeth J. 
Perry, "Trends in the Study of Chinese Politics: State-Society Relations," The China Quarterly 139 (1994). 
88
 Myron L. Cohen, "Lineage Organization in North China," The Journal of Asian Studies 49, no. 3 (1990); 
Tsai, "Solidary Groups"; Rui Wen and Guohe Jiang, "20 Shiji 90 Niandai Yilai Dangdai Zhongguo 
Nongcun Zongzu Wenti Yanjiu Guankui [Lineage Group Study in Contemporary Rural China since 
1990s]," Fujian Shifan Daxue Xuebao [Journal ofFujian Normal University] 4, no. (2004). 
89
 Ian Johnson, "The Death and Life of China's Civil Society," Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 3 (2003). 
90
 C.W. Kenneth Keng, "China's Unbalanced Economic Growth," Journal of Contemporary China 15, no. 
46 (2006); Qingshan Tan, "Growth Disparity in China: Provincial Causes," Journal of Contemporary 
China 11, no. 33 (2002); Yehua Dennis Wei, "Multiscale and Multimechanisms of Regional Inequality in 
China: Implications for Regional Policy," Journal of Contemporary China 11, no. 30 (2002). 
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DATA 
In general, this research is based on a quantitative inquiry of the extent, 
determinants, and consequences of social trust in contemporary rural China. Specifically, 
I try to explore social trust in China by using the data from a nation-wide survey 
conducted in rural China in 2005. In this section, I briefly explain how the survey was 
conducted, and then evaluate its reliability and generalizability. 
A. The Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS), 2005 
The data in this study was primarily drawn from a survey of rural residents and 
village governments, carried out in twenty-four provincial units of China in 2005. It was 
conducted by one of the most reputable academic survey research organizations in China, 
the Public Opinion Research Institute (PORI) of Renmin University of China. Pursuing 
on a myriad of research purposes, the survey i captures a comprehensive picture of rural 
China (excluding only the two minority regions, Tibet and Uyghur). 
In this survey, two sets of questionnaires are used simultaneously at the individual 
and village levels. The samples were selected with a combination of probability 
proportional to size (PPS) and multistage sampling techniques. In the first stage, county-
level units (xian, "-H") were selected within each of 24 surveyed provincial units using 
the PPS technique (see Table 1.2), in which the probability of selection is proportional to 
the population size of the province based on China's 2000 census data. As demonstrated 
in Table 1.2, in this sampling step a total of 76 county-level units were randomly chosen. 
In the second stage, a total number of 205 township-level units (zhen, "^E") were 
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randomly selected from the 92 country-level units. In the third stage, within each 
township-level unit, two villages (cun, " ^ " ) were randomly selected, and a total of 410 
villages were randomly selected. 
In the fourth stage, one village official of each selected village was interviewed 
using the village level questionnaire. Among 408 completed questionnaires at the village 
level, 152 (37.9%) were finished by village party secretaries (cunzhishu, "^j"^-^"), 103 
(25.7%) by chairs of VCs (cunzhuren, " ^ i i i " ) , 82 (20.4%) by village heads {cunzhang, 
"tj~fe"), and 58 (14.5%) by members of village committee (cunweihui chengyuan, "^Tlt 
zs'^cM"). In the same stage, from the 410 selected villages, 4800 ordinary rural 
residents were randomly chosen. A total of 4,274 individual-level questionnaires were 
completed, with a response rate of 88.6%. 
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Table 2. The Distribution of Sampled Counties, Villages, and Respondents 






















































































































































































Source: The 2005 China General Social Survey. 
Both the village-level and individual-level questionnaires were administered in 
the form of face-to-face interviews. Undergraduate and graduate college students were 
trained by project personnel to conduct the interviews. To assess the quality of the 
responses, interviewers were also asked to evaluate each respondent. The results of the 
evaluations indicated that nearly all respondents were perceived to be cooperative (98.6%) 
and open (98.2%). 
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B. Reliability of 2005 CGSS Data 
A key challenge for scholars in conducting fieldwork and survey research in non-
democratic countries like China is that of ensuring the respondents respond to survey 
questions truthfully.91 After examining the specific items in the two sets of 
questionnaires and the method by which the survey was conducted, I argue that the data 
is reliable, for at least three reasons. First, compared to many other surveys conducted in 
China on the topic of democratic values or political support, the two sets of 
questionnaires used in 2005 CGSS were by and large not political sensitive. Therefore, 
the respondents did not have any motive to hide their true opinions. Second, all the 
questionnaires were collected in a confidential manner by a non-government agency, 
PORI of Renmin University of China. Thus, individual respondents should have had no 
reason to worry about political persecution. Finally, our confidence in the reliability of 
the2005 CGSS can also be confirmed by the low ratios of "Don't-Know" answers. As 
many survey researchers point out, when asked the questions that they perceive to be 
politically sensitive, or when they fear political persecution, many Chinese respondents 
will choose to say "I don't know," "I have no opinion," or simply refuse to answer the 
question.92 In the 2005 CGSS, in regard to almost all of the questions, the "Don't-Know" 
answers were lower than 1 percent. Hence, we can confidently assume the reliability of 
the data used in this study. 
91
 See Jie Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2004), 34-5. Also see, Melanie Manion, "Survey Research in the Study of Contemporary China: Learning 
from Local Samples," The China Quarterly 139 (1994); Jian-Hua Zhu, '"1 Don't Know' in Public Opinion 
Surveys in China: Individual and Contextual Causes of Item Non-Response," Journal of Contemporary 
China 5, no. 12 (1996); Tianjian Shi, Political Participation in Beijing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1997); Lily L. Tsai, "Quantitative Research and Issues of Political Sensitivity in Rural 
China," in Contemporary Chinese Politics: New Sources, Methods, and Field Strategies, ed. Allen Carlson 
et al.(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
92
 Zhu, '"I Don't Know' in Public Opinion Surveys in China." 
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C. Generalizability of 2005 CGSS Data 
Similar to other empirical studies, our analyses of this survey will produce two 
kinds of results: descriptive and relational.93 I believe we can draw at least two general 
implications from these two kinds of results. First, the descriptive results from this 
survey—such as those about the magnitudes of particularized trust and generalized 
trust—can help establish important statistical baselines against which the findings from 
urban China and other countries with similar sociopolitical conditions can be compared. 
These baselines are particularly important to subsequent comparative studies on trust, not 
only between urban and rural China, but also between China and other countries. 
Secondly, the relational findings from this survey on the relationship between 
particularized trust and generalized trust, as well as the findings on the determinants, and 
consequences of social trust will lead us to generalizable knowledge about social trust. 
As many scholars point out, these kinds of relationships are generic in nature.94 
Therefore, our findings about the relationship between variables may be properly 
generalized to countries with sociopolitical conditions similar to those found in China. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY 
The findings of this research will make important contributions to the study of 
social trust on at least four grounds. First, this study, as one of the few survey-based 
studies of social trust in non-democratic settings, will significantly supplement our 
understanding of social trust in non-democracies. As mentioned above, the democratic 
93
 Manion, "Survey Research in the Study of Contemporary China"; Chen, Popular Political Support in 
Urban China. 
94
 For a detailed discussion, see Manion, "Survey Research in the Study of Contemporary China." Also 
see, Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China. 
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theory of social trust, though powerful in democracies, tells us little about the actual level 
of social trust and how it emerges and functions in non-democracies. By systematically 
exploring the extents, the origins, and the consequences of particularized trust and 
generalized trust in China, this study will present us with a more complete picture of 
social trust. 
Second, the relational approach employed in this study will help us bridge the 
divides between (1) the rational and cultural explanations of social trust; and (2) the 
micro and macro theories of social trust. Specifically, by conceptualizing social trust as a 
relational concept, I argue that rational and cultural explanations actually are not only 
compatible but also complementary to each other. In addition, a relational approach also 
implies that social trust is a "meso" concept, correlated with phenomena at both micro 
(individual) and macro (village) level. Furthermore, by introducing multilevel analysis, I 
am able to empirically demonstrate the meso nature of social trust. Thus, the relational 
framework adopted in this study offers us a new approach to the analysis of social trust. 
Third, in regard to methodological significance, the empirical results from this 
study will help us to answer a critical question: How can social trust be accurately 
measured in cross-national comparative studies? Specifically, this study introduces a 
new set of measures of social trust based on the relational conceptualization of trust. As 
demonstrated later (in Chapter II), this set of measurements appears to more reliably 
gauge people's trust in each other. This new set of trust measures, therefore, will 
significantly help scholars refine and advance their operationalization of social trust in 
cross-national comparative studies. 
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Finally and with more relevance to policies, the findings from this study, 
particularly those concerning the relationship between the two types of trust and public 
goods provision, will aid us in our efforts to achieve better local governance in 
nondemocratic societies. In many non-democratic and non-Western countries, the formal 
institutions tend to be ineffective and weak in providing basic public goods and services. 
Therefore, a better understanding of how social trust can affect public goods provision is 
of great importance to the goal of achievement of to achieve a better life for ordinary 
people. 
AN OVERVIEW 
Following this chapter, Chapter II intends to answer the critical research question: 
how can we accurately measure social trust? Specifically, I consider the following two 
questions: What are the most important forms of social trust in rural China? What is the 
magnitude of each type of social trust? I begin Chapter II with a general discussion of 
the measurement issue that has long plagued the research of social trust. Recognizing the 
problems associated with the popular measurements of social trust, I introduce a new set 
of measurements by distinguishing the identities of trustees. Using these measurements, I 
gauge the extent of six forms of trust in rural China. Subsequently, I find that these six 
forms of social trust converge into two basic forms of trust: particularized trust and 
generalized trust. 
Chapter III is devoted to the exploration of the relationship between particularized 
trust and generalized trust. As mentioned above, there is no consensus about the 
relationship between the two. In Chapter III, I empirically test those disparate arguments 
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about their relationship. Specifically, I conduct bivariate analyses of the two types of 
social trust. Then I examine the impacts of sociopolitical factors at the individual level 
and sociogeographic factors at the village level on the relationships between 
particularized trust and generalized trust. This chapter is designed to address several 
critical questions, such as: Are particularized trust and generalized trust related? If so, 
what is the strength of their interconnection? Does particularized trust hinder or facilitate 
the development of generalized trust? Does the relationship between particularized trust 
and generalized trust vary across different social categories and localities? 
In Chapter IV, I examine the determinants of particularized trust and generalized 
trust. As mentioned above, I concentrate on five categories of correlates at both the 
individual level and the village level: sociodemographic factors, subjective values, and 
informal social interactions at the individual level, and sociogeographic factors and 
village heterogeneity at the village level. Specifically, I specify and test the relationship 
between each explanatory variable and the two types of social trust. Moreover, some 
general inferences about the determinants of social trust in contemporary rural China 
have been drawn. The analyses in this chapter may help us to answer the following 
crucial questions: Who is more likely to trust surrounding people and strangers in rural 
China? What personal traits and community contexts can affect people's trusting 
attitude? Are informal social interactions an indispensible part of creation of social trust? 
Do subjective values affect people's proclivity for trusting? 
Chapter V discusses how particularized trust and generalized trust affect public 
goods provision in rural China. Although earlier studies based on the social capital thesis 
and the solidary group thesis have already tackled the same question, I find their 
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arguments are flawed, due to an oversimplification of the patterns of cooperative 
activities at the local level. Specifically, I find particularized trust is more important to 
rural public goods provision given its decisive role in maintaining persistent cooperation. 
Generalized trust, in initiating cooperation among strangers, is less relevant to public 
goods provision at local level. After I examine and test how particularized trust and 
generalized trust affect the provision of various public goods in rural China, some 
important general implications will be drawn from the empirical findings. 
Finally, I will summarize my major findings in Chapter VI, and illuminate the key 
political and theoretical implications that we can learn from these findings. The summary 
is structured around the three themes in this study, that is, the magnitude, origins, and 
impacts of social trust in contemporary rural China. The findings from this study 
significantly supplement our understanding of social trust, particularly in non-democratic 
settings. In addition, I discuss the limitations and drawbacks of this studies and possible 
directions for future studies. 
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CHAPTER II 
MEASURING SOCIAL TRUST IN RURAL CHINA: 
WHOM DOES CHINESE VILLAGERS TRUST, AND TO WHAT EXTENT 
This chapter intends to answer three questions of critical importance: What are the 
most important forms of social trust in the Chinese setting? How can we accurately 
measure social trust in the Chinese society? To what extent do Chinese residents trust 
each other? The answers to these questions will not only advance our understanding of 
the forms and magnitudes of social trust in China, but also have important and direct 
implications for cross-cultural studies of social trust. I begin with a general discussion of 
the problem that has long plagued the empirical research of social trust: the cross-cultural 
validity of the measurement social trust. 
Comparative politics, albeit the only discipline in political science defined by the 
method of study, is far from being methodologically sophisticated. "Too many students 
of the field," noted Arend Lijphart, "have been ... 'unconscious thinkers,'"1 unaware of 
the basal methodological question—how do comparativists ensure that they are actually 
comparing the same phenomena in the different sociopolitical contexts? Indeed, without 
confirming the validity of the measurements of interests in the different sociopolitical 
contexts, empirical studies can only result in "misinformation"; facts gathered under 
indefinite and blurred concepts rarely lead to meaningful accumulation of substantive 
knowledge.2 
1
 Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," The American Political Science 
Review 65, no 3(1971), 682. 
2
 Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," The American Political Science 
Review 64, no 4 (1970), 1039; Also see, idem, "Guidelines for Concept Analysis," in Social Science 
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This problem is, unfortunately, particularly acute in the studies of social trust. 
Poorly designed measurements of social trust severely thwart our understanding of its 
magnitude, origins, and consequences. In this chapter, I first review the earlier studies of 
the extent of social trust in China, in which a sharp cleavage exists between area 
specialists and general comparativists. Subsequently, I find the contradiction can be 
traced back to the problematic measurements of social trust. In order to accurately 
measure social trust, I propose a new set of measurements based the relational approach 
established in Chapter I. Finally, using the unique data collected in rural China, I 
empirically explore whom Chinese residents trust, and to what extent. 
Only when these objectives are achieved can I explore the relationships between 
the different types of social trust and examine how social trust emerges and functions in 
rural China. I believe my efforts to explore this measurement issue in the research of 
social trust are not only of critical importance to this study, but also of significance in 
regard to the cross-cultural study of social trust in general. 
CONFLICTING VIEWS ON SOCIAL TRUST IN CHINA 
What does the existing literature tell about the forms and magnitudes of social 
trust in China? As a consequence of its vital importance, there has been a panoply of 
efforts to map and explain cross-national difference in the allocation of social trust. 
Generally, there are two approaches—area studies based on interpretive researches, and 
Concepts: A Systematic Analysis, ed. Giovanni Sartori (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984). For more discussion, 
see Simon Jackman, "Measurement," in The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, ed. Janet M. Box-
Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
3
 I borrow the term of "interpretative works" from Lucian Pye, and Andrew Nathan and Tianjian Shi to 
describe the studies "that are characteristically based on documentary sources, interviews, and field 
observation." See, Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures (Ann Arbor, 
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comparative works drawn from the data of cross-national surveys. In accounting for the 
level of social trust in China, however, these two approaches present antithetical findings. 
Among scholars interpretively analyzing social trust in China, one of most 
frequently cited contemporary thinkers is Francis Fukuyama. In his monograph Trust: 
The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity and many other articles, Fukuyama 
argues that, owing to China's traditional Confucian culture, trust in China circulates only 
among relatives and close friends; distrust of non-kin and strangers is pervasive. In 
addition, Fukuyama argues that, China appears to be the least trusting society, compared 
to other Confucian countries in East Asia such as Japan and other industrialized countries 
like Germany and the United States. Specifically, he notes that: 
[t]he primary (and often only) avenue to sociability is family and broader forms of 
kinship, like clans or tribes. Familistic societies frequently have week voluntary 
associations because unrelated people have no basis for trusting on another. 
Chinese societies like Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the People's Republic of China 
itself are examples; the essence of Chinese Confucianism is the elevation of 
family bonds above all other social loyalties.5 
Although well-endorsed by students of China and Asian studies, Fukuyama's 
argument seems to be in sharp contradiction to conclusions reached by general 
Ml: Center for Chinese Studies, 1988); Andrew J. Nathan and Tianjian Shi, "Cultural Requisites for 
Democracy in China: Findings from a Survey," Daedalus 122, no. 2 (1993), 95. 
4
 See Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York, NY: 
Penguim Books, 1995); Also see, idem, "Social Capital and the Global Economy," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 
5(1995). 
5
 Fukuyama, Trust, 28-9. 
6
 Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures; Idem, Asian Power and Politics: The 
Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989); Max Weber, The Religion 
of China: Confucianism and Taoism (New York, NY: Free Press, 1951 [1920]); Idem, The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York, NY: Routledge, 2001 [1903]); Wei-ming Tu, "Cultural China: The 
Periphery as the Center," Daedalus 134, no. 4 (2005); Ming-cheng M. Lo and Eileen M. Otis, "Guanxi 
Civility: Processes, Potentials, and Contingencies," Politics and Society 31, no. 1 (2003); Snejina 
Michailova and Verner Worm, "Personal Networking in Russia and China: Blat and Guanxi," European 
Management Journal'21, no. 4 (2003); Alan Smart, "Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi: A Reconsideration of 
Bourdieu's Social Capital," Cultural Anthropology 8, no. 3 (1993); Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, "The Resilience 
of Guanxi and Its New Deployments: A Critique of Some New Guanxi Scholarship," The China Quarterly 
170(2002). 
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comparativists, whose findings are primarily based on data collected from cross-national 
surveys.7 In the project of the World Value Survey (WVS), for instance, Ronald 
Inglehart and his colleagues employ the canonical question—"generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with 
people?" —to gauge social trust. Their findings show that, contrary to Fukuyama's 
argument, the level of social trust in China is not only the highest among Confucian 
societies, but also considerably higher than the industrialized countries like Germany and 
the United States (see bolded in Table 3).9 Table 3 summarizes the trust scores of 
selected countries in the recent wave of WVS. 
7
 For example, see Ronald Inglehart, "Trust, Welling-Being and Democracy," in Democracy and Trust, ed. 
Mark E. Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Jan Delhey and Kenneth Newton, 
"Predicting Cross-National Levels of Social Trust: Global Pattern or Nordic Exceptionalism?," European 
Sociological Review 21, no. 4 (2005); Soo Jiuan Tan and Siok Kuan Tambyah, "Generalized Trust and 
Trust in Institutions in Confucian Asia," Social Indicators Research (2010). 
8
 See, Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change 





Table 3. Social Trust: The Rankings of Selected Countries 
Country Rank Survey_Year Trust Score 
Norway 1 WVS_2007 148.0 
Sweden 2 WVS_2006 134.5 
Denmark 3 EVS/WVS1999 131.9 
China 4 EAB2008 120.9 
Finland 5 WVS2005 117.5 
Switzerland 6 WVS_2007 107.4 
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Hong Kong 17 _  82.4 
Japan  _  79.6 
United States  _  78.8 
Germany   75.8 
Taiwan _ 70.0 
Source: WVS, the European Value Survey (EVS) and the East Asian Barometer (EAB), 1990-
2008. 
As shown in Table 3, of the 117 surveyed countries considered, China ranks, 
surprisingly, the forth place, alongside the traditionally high-trust Nordic bloc. These 
results cause Inglehart to conclude that "[although we agree with most of what 
Fukuyama says about the importance of trust, he may be mistaken in characterizing 
China as a low-trust society."10 In another survey-based study covering 55 countries, Jan 
Delhey and Kenneth Newton also find that with respect to the magnitude of social trust, 
China not only ranks more highly than any other Asian country, but also is one of the few 
countries that can be categorized as a high-trust society Specifically, Delhey and 
Newton conclude that "[i]n only six countries does as much as half the population 
express trust, these being Scandinavian nations (Norway, Sweden, and Denmark), and the 
10
 Ibid, 93. 
11
 Delhey and Newton, "Predicting Cross-National Levels of Social Trust." 
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Netherlands, Canada, and China."12 Furthermore, Soo Jiuan Tan and Siok Kuan 
Tambyah find that even when a two-item trust scale was used, China still ranks more 
highly than any other Asian country.13 
Table 4. Social Trust in China: "Do you think most people can be trusted," WVS/EAB 
(1990-2008) 
1990 1995 2001 2008 
N. (%) N. (%) N. (%) N. (%) 
Most people can be
 ? 5 1 5 3 Q ^^ 
trusted 
Can't be too careful 394 40.0 694 48.0 433 45.0 899 48.0 
Total 985 100.0 1445 100.0 963 100.0 1873 100.0 
Source: The World Value Survey and the East Asian Barometer Survey, 1990-2008. 
In addition, longitudinal survey data also shows that social trust in China not only 
was remarkably high, but also remained relatively stable in the past two decades. Table 4 
shows the levels of social trust in China, measured from 1990 to 2008. In all the four 
waves of WVS/EAB, more than half of the Chinese respondents reported that most 
people can be trusted, slighting fluctuating between 60 percent in 1990 and 52 percent in 
1998 and 2008. 
12
 Ibid, 315. 
13
 Tan et al., "Generalized Trust and Trust in Institutions in Confucian Asia." 
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PROBLEMATIC CONCEPTUALIZATION AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF 
SOCIAL TRUST 
How can we explain the contradiction between China specialists and general 
comparativists regarding the magnitude of social trust in China? Are Fukuyama and 
other area specialists mistakenly characterizing Chinese society? Or does the survey 
instrument used by Inglehart and other general comparativists fail to gauge the actual 
level of social trust in China? Unfortunately, few efforts have been made by political 
scientists to solve the puzzle.14 Some students, treating China as an "outlier case," even 
exclude it from their analyses,15 Even worse, such a problem is not unique to China. 
Studies of social trust in countries such as the Arab nations and Russia have also been 
plagued by the same problem.16 
Closer scrutiny reveals that the above-mentioned contradiction reflects the 
problem that has long been embedded in empirical political studies— the challenge of 
enhancing the validity and comparability of the measurements of social trust used in 
survey research. As emphasized by Gary King and his associates, without properly and 
adequately measured variables, it is "virtually impossible to achieve the goals of 
theoretical and causal goals of our field and all empirical fields."17 
14
 For an exception, see Wenfang Tang, Public Opinion and Political Change in China (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2005). Although he does introduce an new set of trust questions, Tang does not 
directly tackle the contadiction between the China specialists and general comparativists. 
15
 See Christian Bjornskov, "Determinants of Generalized Trust: A Cross-Country Comparison," Public 
Choice 130, no. 1 (2007), 10. For another example, see Eric M. Uslaner, "Producing and Consuming Trust," 
Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 4 (2000). 
16
 For Arabic countries, see Sabri Ciftci, "Modernization, Islam, or Social Capital: What Explains 
Attitudes toward Democracy in the Muslim World?," Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 11 (2010); M. 
Steven Fish, "Islam and Authoritarianism," World Politics 55, no. 1 (2002). For Russia and some other 
post-Communist countries, see, for example, William M. Reisinger et al., "Political Values in Russia, 
Ukraine and Lithuania: Sources and Implications for Democracy," British Journal of Political Science 24, 
no. 2(1994). 
17
 Gary King et al., "Enhancing the Validity and Cross-Cultural Comparability of Measurement in Survey 
Research," The American Political Science Review 98, no. 1 (2004), 191. 
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With respect to the studies of social trust, the problem can be traced back to both 
the conceptualization and the operationalization of social trust. As noted by Patrick 
Sturgis and his colleagues, "empirical scholars [of social trust] have paid insufficient 
attention to distinctions drawn in theoretical accounts between different kinds of 
interpersonal trust and how these should be measured empirically'^ (emphasis added). 
Many researchers do not make a clear distinction between different types of social 
trust. As addressed in Chapter I, social trust essentially is a multifaceted concept, 
encompassing at least two major conceptually discernible components: trust in people we 
personally know (i.e., particularized trust) and trust invested in strangers (i.e., generalized 
trust). These two types of social trust have dramatically different roles in the initiation 
and continuation of trust relations. Unfortunately, many studies do not make a distinction 
between these two types of trusts, treating social trust as a monolithic concept. 
Such neglect in theoretical construction inevitably leads to error in the 
operationalization of social trust. Most studies simply employ the "most people can be 
trusted" question to gauge social trust in general, overlooking the important distinction 
between different types of social trust. Given this, it is not surprising that Andrew 
Mitchell and Thomas Bossert would question "how well one item on trust can 
simultaneously represent everything."1 
Furthermore, even when some students have recognized the necessity to 
distinguish between particularized trust and generalized trust, they mistakenly assume the 
"most people can be trusted" survey questioncan accurately measure one's trust in 
18
 Patrick Sturgis et al., "Does Ethnic Diversity Erode Trust? Putnam's 'Hunkering Down' Thesis 
Reconsidered," British Journal of Political Science 41, no. 1 (2010), 58. 
19
 Adrew David Mitchell and Thomas J. Bossert, "Measuring Dimensions of Social Capital: Evidence from 
Surveys in Poor Communities in Nicaragua," Social Science & Medicine 64, no. 1 (2007), 50. 
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strangers (i.e. generalized trust). As a matter of fact, the validity of the "most people can 
be trust" question is highly doubtful. This question was first introduced by Morris 
Rosenberg in 1952, not to gauge social trust but rather to quantitatively investigate 
misanthropy in individuals. Later, in 1972, this question was incorporated into the 
National Opinion Research Center's General Social Survey (GSS) as an inversing 
") 1 
cynicism scale. Since then, Rosenberg's misanthropy measurement has been asked 
almost continually across various large-scale public opinion surveys as an indicator of 
generalized trust. In the recent burgeoning empirical studies of social trust, most 
scholars simply assume the measurement is reliable, failing to question its validity and 
comparability. 
Notwithstanding its popularity in empirical studies, some scholars have raised 
concerns about the extent to which this measurement actually captures generalized trust.2 
As Cook, Hardin, and Levi point out, the term "most people" is too vague to be 
interpreted uniformly by respondents.24 People with different socioeconomic 
backgrounds and life experiences may interpret "most people" in dramatically different 
ways. Generational change, for instance, can exert a strong influence on the content of 
"most people." Given changes of demography, due to the influx of immigrants and civil 
See, Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," American Sociological Review 21, no. 6 
(1956). 
21
 For a detailed discussion on development and usage of this question, see Karen S. Cook, Russell Hardin, 
and Margaret Levi, Cooperation without Trust? (New York, NY: Russessll Sage, 2005); Also see Tim 
Reeskens and Marc Hooghe, "Cross-Cultural Measurement Equivalence of Generalized Trust: Evidence 
from the European Social Survey (2002 and 2004)," Social Indicators Research 85, no. 3 (2008). 
22
 Cook et al., Cooperation without Trust?; Patrick Sturgis and Patten Smith, "Assessing the Validity of 
Generalized Trust Questions: What Kind of Trust Are We Measuring?," International Journal of Public 
Opinion Research 22, no. 1 (2010). 
23
 For example, see Bo Rothstein, "Trust, Social Dilemmas and Collective Memories," Journal of 
Theoretical Politics 12, no. 4 (2000); Lars Torpe and Henrik Lolle, "Identifying Social Trust in Cross-
country Analysis: Do We Really Measure the Same?," Social Indicators Research (2010). 
4
 Cook et al., Cooperation without Trust? 
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rights movement, "for current generation," as by Cook, Hardin and Levi observe, the 
term represents "a much larger category than for respondents forty or fifty year ago." 
Patrick Sturgis and Patten Smith further suggest that the issue of non-uniform 
interpretations to the "most people can be trusted" question occurs among not only 
respondents, but also researchers, which in turn appears to be even more detrimental to 
the study of social trust. Specifically, they argue that scholars should be cautious in 
dealing with the following two assumptions: 
[a] key, though usually implicit, assumption underlying the validity of any'survey 
question is that all respondents interpret its intended meaning in a consistent 
manner. ... An equally important assumption is, of course, that respondents 
should interpret and respond to a survey question in a manner which corresponds 
97 
to the conceptual definition of the researcher analyzing the data. 
Their carefully designed survey study reveals that, unfortunately, these two assumptions 
are constantly violated when the "most people can be trusted" question is asked. 
Given its inherent vagueness, the "most people can be trusted" question cannot 
help us to accurately gauge generalized trust. As Sturgis and Smith conclude, "[cjounter 
to the widespread assumption that these questions measure generalized trust, we find that 
a substantial number of respondents report having thought about people who are known 
to them personally." In other words, the measurement tends to reflect particularized 
trust. As a consequence, since people tend place more trust in people they know, the 
question is likely to over-estimate the true level of generalized trust. Hence, we cannot 
confidently say that the "most people can be trusted" question is measuring generalized 
trust. 
25
 Ibid, 14. 
26
 Sturgis and Smith, "Assessing the Validity of Generalized Trust Questions." 
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 Ibid, 74. 
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Recognizing these problems associated with the measurement of social trust, 
some students have proposed a multiple-item approach to fathoming social trust. Tim 
Reeskens and Marc Hooghe, for example, argue that the current single-item measurement 
of social trust is unreliable because (1) people may not produce consistent responses over 
time; (2) limited answering categories lack precision and undercut statistical power, and 
(3) the single-item measurement lacks sufficient scope to encompass all the 
characteristics of the measured object. Accordingly, they use the following three 
different statements to measure social trust: 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you 
can't be too careful in dealing with people? (variable 'cantrusf) 
Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the 
chance, or would they try to be fair? (variable 'peoplefair') 
Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are 
mostly looking out for themselves? (variable 'peoplehelp') 
Although it has gained popularity in recent years, this approach to measuring 
social trust is not flawless. Specifically, this approach still fails to solve the problem of 
vagueness discussed above, not to mention the need to distinguish between particularized 
trust and generalized trust. In other words, rather than tackling the question of whether 
we are actually measuring what we believe we are measuring, they focus on how to 
Reeskens and Hooghe, "Cross-Cultural Measurement Equivalence of Generalized Trust," 522. 
j l
 In recent years, increasing number of political scientists has adopted this approach. For instance, Natalia 
Letki uses a four-itemed trust measurement, including questions: "(1) Most people can be trusted. (2) If 
someone is in serious trouble, no one else cares about it. (3) If you are not always on your guard other 
people will take advantage of you. (4) A person cooperates with other people only when he or she sees it is 
in his or her own interest." See, Natalia Letki, "Socialization for Participation? Trust, Membership, and 
Democratization in East-Central Europe," Political Research Quarterly 57, no. 4 (2004), 670. In another 
study, Tarja Nieminen and his colleagues use a different set of questions: "Feeling safe in neighborhood 
(no. 24); Feeling safe walking out alone after 10 p.m. (no. 25); Cynical mistrust (nos. 32-39); Been 
surprised by the behavior of people you thought you knew well (no. 30); Has it happened that people whom 
you counted on disappointed you (no. 31)." See, Tarja Nieminen et al., "Measurement and Socio-
Demographic Variation of Social Capital in a Large Population-Based Survey," Social Indicators Research 
85, no. (2008), 414. 
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increase the precision of the theoretically ill-constructed concept, which contributes little 
to our understanding of the actual levels of generalized trust and particularized trust. 
The current studies of social trust are fundamentally constrained by ill-designed 
measurements. Without a combination of theoretical clarification and measurement 
refinement, it is impossible for us to gauge social trust. In the following section, I 
explain how we can accurately measure social trust using a relational approach. 
A NEW APPROACH TO MEASURING SOCIAL TRUST 
As discussed in Chapter I, social trust should be understood in a more eclectic 
way. The identities of "others" can strongly shape one's willingness to trust. Therefore, 
in this research, I adopted a set of measurements of social trust based on the different 
identities of "most people." Specifically, I asked respondents to report their trust in 
people belonging to different relational categories respectively. When the identities of 
"most people" are specified as relatives, close friends, classmates, colleagues, or 
strangers, the problem of misinterpretation will be reduced to a minimum level. 
Therefore, compared to the canonical "most people" approach or the multi-item approach, 
this approach allows us to gauge whom an individual trusts and to what extent, in a more 
accurate way. 
Indeed, a handful of students have already used this relational approach to 
measure different types of social trust, and found it to be valid and reliable. For example, 
Christiaan Grootaert and her colleagues have designed a comprehensive questionnaire of 
social capital, SC-IQ. Focusing "both on generalized trust (the extent to which one trusts 
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people overall) and on the extent of trust in specific types of people,"32 they find that 
respondents' trusting scores change substantially when measured across different 
relational categories. Similarly, in a study in Uganda, Deepa Narayan and Michael 
Cassidy asked their respondents to report their levels of trust with respect to various 
categories of people.33 After analysis, three types of relational trust stand out: trust in 
agencies, trust in members of one's immediate environment, and trust in the business 
community. 
However, it should be noted that the specific measurements of this relational 
approach are highly sensitive to the sociopolitical contexts. Although some relational 
categories, such as relatives and strangers appear to be universal, many others are not. 
For example, while Radnitz and his associates could use relational categories like urug 
(i.e., local kin groups) to measure social trust in Central Asian countries,34 the same 
social category cannot be used in the Chinese context. Therefore, in order to accurately 
measure social trust in rural China, we need to ascertain the identities of the most relevant 
social categories in the Chinese setting. In the follow section, drawing on earlier 
interpretive works, I try to identify the principal relational categories in rural China. 
WHOM DOES CHINESE VILLAGERS TRUST? 
As noted above, the body of empirical research on social trust in China is not 
sufficient to provide a reliable source from which to develop new measurements of social 
j2
 Christiaan Grootaert et al., Measuring Social Capital: An Integrated Questionnaire (Washington, DC: 
The World Bank, 2004), 12. 
•
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 Deepa Narayan and Michael F. Cassidy, "A Dimensional Approach to Measuring Social Capital: 
Development and Validation of a Social Capital Inventory," Current Sociology 49, no. 2 (2001). 
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 Scott Radnitz, Jonathan Wheatley, and Christoph ZuClrcher, "The Origins of Social Capital: Evidence 
from a Survey of Post-Soviet Central Asia," Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 6 (2009). 
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trust.35 Consequently, in this dissertation I develop the measurements of social trust 
primarily from two other sources: (1) findings from non-survey-based or interpretive 
works by China observers, and (2) theoretical justifications and empirical findings from 
studies in non-Chinese settings. There are three schools of thoughts on the possible 
principal social categories in rural China: the cultural thesis, the statist thesis, and the 
social distance thesis. 
A. Cultural Thesis: Clans and the Others 
The cultural thesis appears to be the earliest school of thoughts regarding the 
effort to account for social trust in China. Ever since the work of Max Weber, China 
scholars have emphasized the deterministic role played by the Confucian tradition in 
shaping trust relations in China.36 Generally, the cultural thesis suggests that in rural 
China clans and lineages are the most important social category, and ordinary Chinese 
villagers only trust people from the same lineages or clans, and are not willing to extend 
their trust to people outside this category. 
Specifically, the cultural thesis suggests that social life China is fundamentally 
shaped by Confucianism. Unlike western cultures, Confucian culture is, in its essence, a 
familistic culture, emphasizing family lines and mutual obligations among clan 
members.37 Therefore, bonded by familistic values, villagers from same clans or lineages 
tend to place great trust in one another. As Lucian Pye once noted, "people [under 
35
 For an example of the few exceptions, see Tang, Public Opinion and Political Change in China. 
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 For example, see Weber, The Religion of China; Tdem, The Protestant Ethic; Pye, The Mandarin and 
the Cadre; Idem, "Civility, Social Capital, and Civil Society"; Fukuyama, Trust. 
53 
Confucian influences] are expected to be honest and helpful mainly with family and 
members of clans."38 
While investing enormous trust in peers of the same clans or lineages, Chinese 
rural residents generally are suspicious of other villagers and strangers. As observed by 
the prominent China specialist Richard Solomon, 
[ajctually, social transactions between people of equal or near-equal social status 
were relatively 'underdeveloped' in the Chinese tradition. ... From the time 
children begin to have contact with nonfamily peers, they are led to acquire a 
distrust of other people's motives ... The legacy of these early life images of 
social relations beyond the family is a limited sense of interpersonal trust. 
In other words, since people outside clans or lineages are excluded from such family 
networks and are not governed by shared familistic values, they are considered not 
trustworthy. Even today, such clan and lineage networks are well organized in some part 
of China, and villages in many areas have built their own temples where they worship 
their ancestors together and make important decisions for their clans and lineages. 
Therefore, according to the cultural thesis, the most important social category 
pertaining to trust in rural China is clan and lineage: while people from the same clans or 
lineages can be trusted, other villagers and strangers cannot. 
B. Statist Thesis: Relatives and the Others 
This line of thinking emphasizes the impacts of Communist rule in Chinese 
society. According to this approach, long-term Communist rule has led to social 
atomization and pervasive distrust in China. People could only trust people with whom 
38
 Pye, "Civility, Social Capital, and Civil Society," 770. 
39
 Richard H. Solomon, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1971), 125-6. 
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they had direct family ties, and so relatives seem to represent the most important social 
category in determining who can be trusted and who cannot. 
Specifically, as many scholars have pointed out, a defining characteristic of 
Communist rule is the "organizational compulsion," that is, the compulsion "to absorb or 
destroy all social groups that might even constitute passive obstructions to the 
movement's dynamic need to subordinate society totally to its power." Torn from their 
traditional social groups (clans and lineages, in the case of China), the atomized masses 
would become the subjects of mobilization by the party-state.41 
After the CCP had consolidated its grip on the state, in the mid-1950s, the CCP 
regime launched multiple social movements intended to destroy various social groups in 
order to atomize Chinese society. As noted by Thomas Gold, 
the state or party controlled mass, compulsory-membership organizations of 
peasants, workers, students, women, writers, scientists, and so on, all of which 
monitored and propagandized their members. ... The party even sowed distrust 
in hopes that they would break former ties and submit themselves instead to CCP 
leadership in all things ... In sum, the CCP erected a multilayered system 
designed to transform China's social structure, supervise as many aspects of 
everyone's life as possible, remove alternatives, make people dependent on party-
led entities for their livelihood and status, and curtail geographical and 
occupational mobility (emphasis added). 
Since after several waves of these political campaigns there was virtually no social group 
remaining outside of direct relatives, the statist thesis implies that under the CCP rule 
ordinary Chinese can only trust their relatives. 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Nature of the Soviet System," Slavic Review 20, no. 3 (1961), 353; Also see 
Hannah Arendt, The Origin of Totalitarianism (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973). 
41
 Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and Political Institutionalization," American Behavioral Scientist 40, no. 5 
(1997); Idem, :Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic," World Politics 49, no. 3 (1997); 
James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's 
Democratic Transition," American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 1 (2001) 
42
 Thomas B. Gold, "The Resurgence of Civil Society in China," Journal of Democracy 1, no. 1 (1990), 24; 
Also see Ian Johnson, "The Death and Life of China's Civil Society," Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 3 
(2003). 
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Indeed, this projection of the statist thesis has already been confirmed by many 
studies conducted in the post-Soviet bloc. Even after the collapses of the Communist 
regimes, these societies are still suffering from social atomization and pervasive 
distrust.43 In Poland, for instance, Piotr Sztompka uses the term, "culture of distrust," to 
describe the lack of trust resulting from the prior Communist rule. 
Therefore, if we focus on the impacts of the CCP rule, it is reasonable to assume 
that the only trustworthy category is relative. Beyond that, no one can be trusted. 
C. Social Distance Thesis: Neighbors and the Others 
This thesis focuses on the impacts of social exchange on the formation of social 
trust. In general, the social distance thesis suggests that social trust in rural China is 
strongly affected by social interactions among villagers. The more frequently they 
interact with each other, the more likely they are to develop trust in each other. 
One of most influential advocates of the social distance thesis is Fei Xiaotong. In 
his From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society, Fei argues that in rural China 
"trust derives from familiarity,"45 and that the only way to achieve familiarity is through 
intensive social interactions. This familiarity-based view of trust is echoed in the 
writings of many other sociologists.46 Niklas Luhmann, for instance, argues that "[tjrust 
4-3
 Richard Rose, "Postcommunism and the Problem of Trust," Journal of Democracy 5, no. 3 (1994); 
Martin and Sandberg. Social Capital and Democratization; Christopher Marsh, "Social Capital and 
Democracy in Russia," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 33, no. 2 (2000). 
44
 See Piotr Sztompka, "Trust and Emerging Democracy: Lessons from Poland," International Sociology 
11, no. 1 (1996); Idem, "Trust, Distrust and Two Paradoxes of Democracy," European Journal of Social 
Theory l,no. 1 (1998). 
45
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Zheng (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 43. 
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of Sociology 37, no. 4 (2001); Adam B. Seligman, The Problem of Trust (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
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is a solution for specific problems of risk. But trust has to be achieved within a familiar 
world."47 
According to this line of arguments, neighbors can also qualify as an important 
social category pertaining to social trust in rural China. Specifically, owing to the 
physical proximity, Chinese ordinary villagers are commonly engaged in more social 
interactions with their neighbors, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that neighbors 
are more likely to develop trust in each other. Moreover, as the old Chinese proverb goes, 
"near neighbors are much better than remote relatives." 
In sum, the earlier interpretative studies of social trust suggest that there are at 
least three potentially important social categories related to trust. In the next section, I 
will describe my specific measurements of social trust, and empirically explore the 
critical questions that I have raised at the very beginning of this chapter: Whom do 
Chinese rural residents trust? And to what extent do they trust them? 
HOW MUCH SOCIAL TRUST IS THERE IN RURAL CHINA? 
A. Measurements of Social Trust 
By reviewing the interpretive works on social trust in rural China, I have 
established that there are three important social categories pertaining to trust: 
clans/lineages, relatives, and neighbors. On the basis of these three categories, I 
constructed six survey items to gauge ordinary Chinese rural residents' trust in different 
University Press, 1997); Idem, "Trust and Sociability: On the Limits of Confidence and Role Expectations," 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology 57, no. 4 (1998). 
47
 Niklas Luhmann, "Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives," in Trust: Making and 
Breaking Cooperative Relations, ed. Diego Gambetta (New York, NY: Basil Blackwell, 1988, 95. 
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types of people: relatives, villagers of same surname, villagers of different surnames, 
neighboring villagers, non-neighboring villagers, and strangers. It should be noted that in 
rural China, several expressions—such as daxing, zongzu, jiazu, or zong—are used 
interchangeably to describe a clan/lineage group. In this survey, I use the term "xing" 
(which literally means "surnames"), since it commonly refers to the major clan or lineage 
group in a village. Table 5 presents the ways in which these six relational categories fit 
into the above-mentioned three theses. 
Table 5. Relational Categories of Social Trust in China by Different Approaches 




Relatives, Kinsmen > 
Non-Kinsmen, Neighbors, Non-Neighbors > 
Strangers 
Relatives > 
Kinsmen, Non-Kinsmen, Neighbors, Non-Neighbors, Strangers 
Relatives, Kinsmen, Neighbors > 
Non-Kinsmen, Non-Neighbors > 
Strangers 
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The respondents in this nation-wide survey were asked to answer the question, 
"Generally speaking, if there are no direct economic concerns, would you please tell me 
how trustworthy these categories of people are?" For each category of people, 
respondents were asked to assess their levels of trustworthiness on a 5-point scale, where 
" 1 " stands for "most of them cannot be trusted," "2" for "more than a half cannot be 
trusted," "3" for "Half can be trusted, but half cannot be trusted," "4" for "More than a 
half can be trusted," and "5" for "most of them can be trusted." 
A. The Extent of Different Types of Social Trust 
Table 2.4 presents the distributions of all the items of social trust on the basis of 
the six relational categories in rural China. We can draw three important findings from 
the distribution. First, the overall results of the distribution tend to confirm the views 
held by the China specialists: the majority of our Chinese rural respondents apparently 
trusted people they know personally, which is a clear indication of a high degree of 
particularized trust.4 Specifically, the number of respondents who indicate that either 
more than half or most of the members of the five non-stranger relational categories can 
be trusted ranges from a low of 67 percent for trust in non-neighboring villagers to a high 
of 91 percent for trust in relatives. This finding is further reinforced by the fact that the 
mean scores of all the five items of social trust in non-stranger categories are well above 
"3" (which indicates that half of the members with a specific relational category can be 
trusted), ranging from a low of 3.83 for trust in villagers of different surnames to a high 
of 4.47 for trust in relatives. Together these findings suggest that in general the 
For example, Fukuyama, Trust; Pye, "Civility, Social Capital, and Civil Society." 
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respondents in rural China have very strong levels of trust in people of non-stranger 
categories, encompassing relatives and all the other villagers. 
A second important finding that we can draw from the results presented in Table 6 
is that rural residents in China are generally suspicious of people they do not know 
personally, and are reluctant to extend their trust to strangers. Specifically, the mean 
score of the item of trust in strangers was only 1.88, well below "2" (which indicates 
more than half of the strangers cannot be trusted). Moreover, the survey also reveals that 
only less than 6 percent of all respondent agreed that either more than half or most of the 
strangers can be trusted. Such a finding implies that distrust in strangers is prevalent in 
rural China; most rural residents are not willing to extend their radius of trust to people 
whom they do not know personally. 
Table 6. The Distribution of Different Types of Social Trust in Rural China 
Most of them can be 
trusted (5) 
More than half of them 
can be trusted (4) 
Half of them can be 
trusted (3) 
More than half cannot be 
trusted (2) 
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Third, a juxtaposition of the above two findings clearly reveals a sharp contrast 
between the measurements of the five items of trust with respect to people whom 
respondents know personally and the measurements with respect to trust in strangers. 
Specifically, while reporting high scores for the five items of non-stranger relational 
categories (i.e., relative, villagers of same/different surnames, and non-/neighboring 
villagers), our respondents gave low scores for the item of trust in strangers. This 
confirms our earlier suggestion regarding the internal complexity of social trust. Instead 
of being a monolithic whole, social trust differentiates into a variety of specific instances 
of trusts in the course of daily social interactions. The levels of social trust vary across 
different relational categories. Therefore it is misleading to describe the level of social 
trust without making reference to the specific relational categories. The conceptual 
differences between the different types of social trust are not only theoretically coherent, 
but also empirically concrete. 
To a certain degree, these findings can help us resolve the contradiction 
mentioned at the start of this chapter, that is, the contrary descriptions presented by area 
specialists and general comparativists. Generally, the overall results of the distribution of 
different types of social trusts tend to confirm the propositions made by the area 
specialists, that is, that Chinese society is a society processing high levels of 
particularized trust and low levels of generalized trust. Accordingly, a possible 
explanation to the reported high trust score in cross-national surveys such as the WVS 
and the EAB is that most Chinese respondents might be interpreting the term "most 
people" in such a way as to include people they personally know, but not strangers. In 
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other words, the commonly used generalized-trust measure (i.e., the "most people can be 
trusted" question) might be contaminated by individuals' particularized trust. 
The study conducted by Sturgis and Smith provides a strong support to our 
speculation. Specifically, to explore the issue of whom people are thinking of when they 
are responding to the "most people can be trusted" question, they asked the following two 
questions in sequence: 
Ql: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that 
you can't be too careful in dealing with people?"50 
Q2: "In answering the last question, who came to mind when you were thinking 
about'most people'?"51 
Upon examining the respondents to these two questions, Sturgis and Smith found 
that only 22 percent of respondents were thinking of strangers when they were asked the 
first questions. Therefore, the "most people can be trusted" question is not always 
measuring people's trust in strangers. Given the relatively lower openness and mobility 
in China, it is reasonable to assume that the percentage of people who are thinking of 
strangers when they are asked the "most people can be trusted" question is even smaller. 
Therefore, it would be quite misleading to use data collected on the basis of the "most 
people can be trusted" question to declare that China is a high (generalized) trust society. 
B. The Two Dimensions of Social Trust 
A closer look at the distribution of the six types of trust reveals that, besides the 
apparent difference between trust in people we know and trust in strangers, there was a 
50
 Sturgis and Smith, "Assessing the Validity of Generalized Trust Questions." 
51
 Idem, 79-80. 
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certain degree of variations in respondents' assessments with respect to the five items of 
trust in the non-stranger categories. Specifically, the respondents gave substantially 
higher scores of trust for relatives and neighbors than they did for other groups (i.e., non-
neighbors, and villagers of different surnames): the mean scores of trust for relatives, 
neighbors, and villagers of same surnames were all above "4," while those for non-
neighbors and villagers of different surnames were below "4." 
How can we explain such variations within the respondents' assessment of the 
five particularized trust items? Are there new conceptual components of social trust 
other than particularized trust and generalized trust? The answers to these questions are 
of great importance to our understanding of the different dimensions of social trust, and 
hence the evaluations of the uniqueness of the forms of social trust in China. 
To provide some initial answers to these questions, I will first try to identify the 
most important conceptual components of social trust in the Chinese setting. In survey-
based public opinions studies, a well-accepted approach to the categorization of the sub-
dimensions of certain general attitudes (e.g., democratic values), is to employ factor 
analysis to sort out the "naturally occurring clusters." Resting on "socially or 
psychologically defined standards of consistency," factor analysis can help determine the 
consistent sub-dimensions of social trust in rural China. In this dissertation, I conducted 
an exploratory factor analysis with all the six items regarding trust in different social 
categories. The results are reported in Table 7. 
See Arthur H. Miller, Vicki L. Hesli, and William M. Reisinger, "Comparing Citizen and Elite Belief 
Systems in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine," The Public Opinion Quarterly 59, no. 1 (1995), 8; Also see 
Robert C. MacCallum, "Factor Analysis," in The Sage Handbook of Quantitative Methods in Psychology 
(London, UK: Sage, 2009). For similar practices in the studies of social trust, see Mitchell and Bossert, 
"Measuring Dimensions of Social Capital." 
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Table 7. Factor Analysis of Social Trust Items in Rural China 
Trust in Neighbors Trust in Strangers 
Items Factor 1 Factor 2 
Trust in villagers of the same 
surnames 
Trust in non-neighboring villagers 
Trust in neighboring villagers 
Trust in villagers of different 
surnames 
Trust in relatives 
Trust in strangers 
Source: The 2005 China General Social Survey. 
Note: Figures in this table are factor loadings of .25 or larger from the varimax rotated matrix for 
all factors with eighenvalues greater than 1.0. 
As presented in Table 7, two factors, composed of all the six trust items, emerge 
from the factor analysis. These two factors neatly deal with pariticularized trust and 
generalized trust respectively: the factor of particularized trust encompasses the five 
items of trust in non-strangers (relatives, non-/neighbors, and villagers of same/different 
surnames); only trust in strangers loaded in the factor of generalized trust. Together, the 
two factors explain two thirds (68.4 percent) of the item variance among all the six items 
of social trust. 
From the results of this factors analysis, we can reach at least two conclusions of 
considerable importance. First, the results presented in Table 7 confirm our expectation 
that the most important distinction between different types of social trust is the one 
between particularized trust and generalized trust. Specifically, although in this 
dissertation we employ six trust items encompassing various relational categories in rural 








reasonable to assume that ordinary Chinese rural residents markedly differentiate 
between trust in fellow villagers and trust in strangers. 
A second and even more important conclusion that we can draw from this finding 
is that particularized trust in rural China seems to be far less particularistic than many 
scholars have suggested. Specifically, although the average of Chinese villagers' trust in 
relatives was slightly higher than the other four categories of particularized trust (i.e., 
villagers of same surname, villagers of different surnames, neighboring villagers, and 
non-neighboring villagers), the gap is neither substantive nor statistically significant. In 
other words, the ordinary Chinese villagers generally trust their fellow villagers equally, 
regardless of their clan or lineage identities or whether or not the villagers are their 
neighbors. Therefore, the results from this nation-wide survey contradict the view held 
by many Chinese specialists that social trust in China only circulates only within a small 
circle. Instead, social trust in rural China extends well beyond the boundaries of direct 
family, clans or lineages, and neighbors, encompassing all members of village 
communities. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter seeks to investigate three basic questions: What are the principal 
forms of social trust in China? How can we accurately measure the different variants of 
social trust? To what extent do Chinese rural residents trust people of different social 
categories? So as to answer these three questions, this chapter has achieved the following 
tasks. 
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First, I have explored the key methodological problem associated with the study 
of social trust: the underdevelopment of the measurements. The discrepancy between 
area specialists and general comparativists in depicting the extent of social trust in China 
is the best example. The validity of the commonly used "most be people can trusted" 
question is, given its inherent vagueness highly questionable. After comparing the 
strengths and weaknesses of different approaches to improving the measurements of 
social trust, I have argued that the most reliable approach is to specify the relational 
categories of the trustees. 
Second, in order to ascertain the principal relational categories in the Chinese 
context, I have explored the earlier interpretative works on social trust in China. On the 
basis of these works, I have established the measurement of social trust with reference to 
six social categories: relatives, neighbors, non-neighbors, villagers of same surnames, 
villagers of different surnames, and strangers. The validity of these relational categories 
in the Chinese context has been thoroughly discussed with reference to earlier 
interpretive works. The indexes not only have been used as indicators in this chapter to 
determine the extent of social trust in China, but will serve as dependent variables in the 
analysis of the relationship between the different types of social trust and various 
socioeconomic and sociopolitical factors in the following chapters. 
Third, using the relation-based measurement I constructed, I have examined 
Chinese villagers' trust in people from each social category. The results indicated that 
our respondent in rural China have quite strong trust in their surrounding people, such as 
relatives, neighbors, non-neighbors, villagers of same surname and villagers of different 
surnames. However, compared to the great trust in people they personally know, the 
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Chinese villagers demonstrated deep distrust in strangers. A majority of our respondents 
suggest that most strangers could not be trusted. 
Fourth, to further explore the Chinese rural residents' undergirding 
conceptualization of social trust, I have conducted a factor analysis on the basis of the six 
survey items of trust. The results of the factor analysis clearly indicate that there were 
only two discernible components of social trust in the minds of ordinary Chinese 
villagers—particularized trust and generalized trust. While our respondents did not 
differentiate between people they personally know, such as relatives, neighbors or non-
neighbors, and villagers of same or different surname(s), they did made a clear distinction 
between strangers and their fellow villagers. 
From these findings about the forms and levels of social trust in rural China, we 
can draw at least two important conclusions. One is that Chinese society is abundant in 
particularized trust but lacks generalized trust. Consequently, it would be misleading to 
simply declare that China is a high- or low-trust society. Without specifying the types of 
social trust under scrutiny, the exploration of social trust can lead only to inconsistent or 
even contradictory findings. Moreover, the findings presented in this chapter indicate 
that since the current "most people can be trusted" question cannot effectively distinguish 
between particularized trust and generalized trust, it cannot serve as a reliable 
measurement in cross-national studies. 
Second, although there is abundant particularized trust in rural China, it is not as 
particularistic as many China specialists have postulated. On the contrary, our 
respondents did not reduce their trust substantially when the trustees were not their 
relative or neighbors, or were not from the same lineage/clan group. It seems that neither 
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traditional Confucian culture nor Mao's totalitarian rule has constrained trust formation 
within village communities; the ordinary villagers still were able to develop strong bonds 
of trust in each other. 
However, the above two conclusions raise another important question: given rural 
China's high levels of particularized trust and low generalized trust, is it the case that 
particularized trust hinders the development of generalized trust? In the following 
chapter, I will respond to this question by systematically examining the relationship 
between particularized trust and generalized trust. 
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CHAPTER III 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENERALIZED AND PARTICULARIZED TRUST 
The analysis in the previous chapter has successfully established and validated 
our approach to the measurements of social trust in the context of rural China. After 
exploring the variability across the six survey items, two latent sub-dimensions of trust— 
particularized trust and generalized trust—have emerged. This confirms our expectation, 
stated in Chapter I, that the most important distinction between different types of social 
trust is whether the participants possess prior information about each other (i.e., strangers 
vs. non-strangers). These findings about the two principal components of social trust 
raise a series of questions of great importance. Specifically, granted there are significant 
differences between particularized trust and generalized trust, but is there also a 
relationship between the two? If so, what are the relationships? Does the ordinary 
Chinese rural residents' trust in people they know erode or foster their trust in strangers? 
However, little attention has been paid to these questions. Students of social trust 
know surprisingly little about the relationship between different types of trust, not to 
mention how the two types of trust are associated in China. As noted by Mark Warren, 
the relationship between particularized trust and generalized trust still remain "uncharted 
territory."1 
This chapter, therefore, is devoted to the investigation of these critical questions, 
empirically examining and testing the competing arguments about the relationship 
1
 Mark E. Warren, "Conclusion," in Democracy and Trust, ed. Mark E. Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Unviersity Press, 1999), 357. For a similar concern, see Marc Hooghe, "Social Capital and Diversity: 
Generalized Trust, Social Cohesion and Regimes of Diversity," Canadian Journal of Political 
Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 40, no. 3 (2007), 714-5. 
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between particularized trust and generalized trust against the data collected in rural China. 
To this end, this chapter begins with a brief review of the theoretical discussion about the 
differences between these two types of social trust, and then turns to an overview of the 
disparate arguments on the strength and nature of their relationship. Subsequently, 
empirical analysis is introduced to test the relationship between these two types of social 
trust. Finally, a brief discussion on the implications of the relationship between 
particularized trust and generalized trust in rural China is presented. 
THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
As discussed in Chapter I, although most scholars of social trust have agreed upon 
the basic distinction between particularized trust and generalized trust, their reasons are 
varied. Consequently, there is virtually no consensus on whether and how particularized 
trust and generalized trust are related. So as to systematically explore the relationship 
between particularized trust and generalized trust, I start my analysis with a review of the 
literature pertaining to the theoretical and political importance of the distinction between 
particularized trust and generalized trust, which will help us to understand importance 
and necessity of this exploration of the relationship between the two. 
A. The Difference between Particularized Trust and Generalized Trust 
Although agreeing upon the importance of the distinction between particularized 
trust and generalized trust, scholars interpret this distinction in different ways. Some 
2
 For instance, Peter Nannestad once commented that "[s]o far, research on generalized trust—or other 
types of trust for that matter—does (still) not proceed from a common understanding of what the term 'trust' 
designates. There is not even agreement on the category to which trust belongs." See Peter Nannestad, 
"What Have We Learned About Generalized Trust, If Anything?," Annual Review of Political Science 11, 
no. (2008), 414. 
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early studies argue that the importance of this distinction lies in its utility to democracy at 
the macro level. Recent studies, influenced by many middle-range theories, focus more 
on how particularized trust and generalized trust variably shape cooperation at the micro 
level. Jointly, these two perspectives necessitate the exploration of the relationship 
between particularized trust and generalized trust. 
Trusts Differentiated by Democratic Utility As discussed in Chapter I, the very 
early studies of social trust in political science stemmed, by and large, from political 
scientists' interests in its relationship to democracy. Specifically, many democratic 
theorists have argued that for democracy to survive and work, citizens must "have trust 
and confidence in their fellow political actors." With the further development of 
research on trust and democracy, scholars have noted that social trust does not have a 
uniform impact on the stability and viability of democracy. While some kinds of trust 
strengthen these civic virtues, others apparently do not.5 
Recognizing the differing impacts of social trust on democracy, political scientists 
have introduced the distinction between generalized trust and particularized trust, 
3
 For example, see Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations (Newbury Part: Sage Publications, 1963); Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, 
eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965). 
4
 Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Political Culture and Political Development, ed. 
Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 535. Also see, Robert 
A. Dahl, Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), 150; 
Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," The American Political Science Review 82, no 
(1988). 
5
 Warren, "Conclusion," 356. Also see Eric M. Uslaner, "Producing and Consuming Trust," Political 
Science Quarterly 115, no 4 (2000); Idem, The Moral Foundations of Trust (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002); Eric M. Uslaner and Richard S Conley, "Civic Engagement and Particularized 
Trust: The Ties That Bind People to Their Ethnic Communities," American Politics Research 31, no. 4 
(2003). 
6
 Ibid. It should be noted that such this kind of terminology is a very political one, only observable in the 
writings of political scientists. Occasionally, students of political science also use other terms such as 
"bonding/bridging,""thick/thin," and "parochial/general." 
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arguing that generalized trust is an attitude that entails desirable consequences for 
democracy, and that particularized trust tends to be detrimental to the health of 
democratic institutions. Specifically, it is argued that generalized trusters are more active 
in civic participation, more tolerant, and more likely to make compromises in the public 
sphere.7 By contrast, particularized trusters are regarded as the parochials in the 
society—less active, less tolerant, and less compatible with pluralist democracy. Given 
this, it is not surprising that, in referring to these two types of trust, many scholars use the 
expressions "good trust" and "bad trust."9 
Hence, from the perspective of the roles of trust in affecting democracy, it is of 
critical importance to explore the relationship between particularized trust and 
generalized trust, or, in the words of Mark Warren suggested, "the 'convertibility' of trust 
relations—from forms of trust that are bad for democracy to those are good."10 
Trusts Differentiated by Cooperative Utility Not only perceived to be important 
for the viability and stability of democracy at the macro level, the distinction between 
particularized trust and generalized trust is also found consequential for social 
cooperation at the micro level. Specifically, political scientists, sociologists, and 
economists have all agreed that social trust, understood as people's basic expectations 
regarding social interactions, can fundamentally shape their decision as to whether or not 
7
 For example, see John L. Sullivan and John E. Transue, "The Psychological Underpinnings of 
Democracy: A Selective Review of Research on Political Tolerance, Interpersonal Trust, and Social 
Capital," Annual Review of Psychology 50, no. 1 (1999). 
8
 Uslaner and Conley, "Civic Engagement and Particularized Trust." For similar arguments, see Gema M. 
Garcia Albacete, "The Saliency of Political Cleavages and the 'Dark Sides' of Social Capital: Evidence 
from Spain," American Behavioral Scientist 53, no. 5 (2010). 
9
 Warren, "Conclusion," 356-7. 
10
 Ibid, 357. 
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they participate in cooperative activities. Yet close scrutiny reveals that particularized 
trust and generalized trust tend to play dramatically different roles. 
On the one hand, trust in strangers is widely perceived to be the key to the 
initiation of spontaneous cooperation. Without generalized trust, individuals acting in a 
rational manner can never escape from the collective action problem.12 As such, 
generalized trust is "a booster rocket that helps one to engage in broader social 
cooperation." Therefore, generalized trust significantly reduces opportunity cost for 
individuals, since the generalized truster can harvest more opportunities.14 
On the other hand, the impacts of particularized trust on social cooperation seem 
to be mixed. While strong trust within close-knit networks is conducive to in-group 
cooperation by sustaining secure and committed relations and by reducing such 
transaction costs as monitoring and enforcement, 5 many scholars have argued that strong 
norms of particularized trust may obstruct intergroup cooperation, substantially 
increasing opportunity costs for individuals.16 
For three thorough reviews, see Denise M. Rousseau and others, "Not So Different after All: A Cross-
Discipline View of Trust," The Academy of Management Review 23, no. 3 (1998); Paul S. Adler and Seok-
Woo Kwon, "Social Capital: Prospects for a New Concept," The Academy of Management Review 27, no. 1 
(2002); Frane Adam and Borut Roncevic, "Social Capital: Recent Debates and Research Trends," Social 
Science Information 42, no. 2 (2003); . 
12
 For example, see Bo Rothstein and Daniel Eek, "Political Corruption and Social Trust," Rationality and 
Society 21, no. 1 (2009). 
13
 Toshio Yamagishi and Midori Yamagishi, "Trust and Commitment in the United States and Japan," 




 See, for example, Michael W. Macy and John Skvoretz, "The Evolution of Trust and Cooperation 
between Strangers: A Computational Model," American Sociological Review 63, no. 5 (1998); Toshio 
Yamagishi, "Seriousness of Social Dilemmas and the Provision of a Sanctioning System," Social 
Psychology Quarterly 51, no. 1 (1988); Toshio Yamagishi, Karen S. Cook, and Motoki Watabe, 
"Uncertainty, Trust, and Commitment Formation in the United States and Japan," The American Journal of 
Sociology 104, no. 1 (1998); Toshio Yamagishi and Toko Kiyonari, "The Group as the Container of 
Generalized Reciprocity," Social Psychology Quarterly 63, no. 2 (2000) 
15
 Yamagishi and Yamagishi, "Trust and Commitment"; Yamagishi et al., "Uncertainty, Trust, and 
Commitment Formation." 
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In sum, both generalized trust and particularized trust are closely intertwined in 
people's social cooperation. Without clarifying the relationship between the two types of 
trust, it is difficult for us to disentangle the dynamic relationship between social trust and 
cooperation in general. 
In the following part of this section, I will examine the current literature on 
whether and how particularized trust and generalized trust are related. 
B. Are Particularized Trust and Generalized Trust Related? 
With regard to whether the two types of social trust are related, the answer offered 
by most students of social trust would be yes. Indeed, as many scholars have already 
pointed out, both particularized trust and generalized trust are developed based on 
individual personality, life experiences or/and cultural backgrounds.17 As summarized by 
Jan Delhey and Kenneth Newton, trust, in general, is "part of a broader syndrome of 
personality characteristics that includes optimism, a belief in co-operation, and 
confidence in that individuals can resolve their differences and live a satisfactory social 
life together."18 Therefore, one's trust in surrounding people and trust in stranger are not 
developed independently, and therefore the two should be robustly correlated. 
However, some scholars have postulated an antithetical argument, suggesting that 
particularized trust and generalized trust are actually only weakly associated, if not 
completely unrelated. Karen Cook, Russell Hardin, and Levi Margaret, for instance, 
17
 For example, Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture; Ronald Inglehart, "Trust, Welling-Being and 
Democracy," in Democracy and Trust, ed. Mark E. Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999); Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1993); Idem, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000). 
18
 Jan Delhey and Kenneth Newton, "Who Trusts? The Origins of Social Trust in Seven Societies," 
European Societies 5, no. 2 (2003), 95. 
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argue that persons' trust in surrounding people is grounded in their prior knowledge of 
each other.19 Only when equipped with previous records of social exchanges, can 
individuals decide whether or not to trust. As for trust in complete strangers, the situation 
is problematic, since ordinary people do not have prior information about general others. 
Moreover, one's knowledge of surrounding people cannot be used to determine the 
trustworthiness of strangers, and therefore it is questionable to state that one can trust 
strangers. In particular, Cook, Hardin, and Levi assert that: 
[i]t is true that in our various limited contexts of family, neighborhood, work 
group, and so forth, we depend on some shared values and probably prosper much 
better in these relationships if we have relatively good trust relations. That is 
because being able to rely on each other enables us to benefit from cooperative 
endeavors more readily and at lower costs. It is hard to say what could be the 
cooperative endeavors that a whole society wishes to share in ... Hence, some of 
the concern with so-called social or generalized trust—meaning universal trust in 
the random other person in our society—is surely misplaced. It would be 
pointless for us even to assess the trustworthiness of most people, and it often 
clearly would not benefit us to trust the general other.20 
Therefore, according to Cook et al., there should be no strong association between 
particularized trust and generalized trust. 
C. How Are Particularized Trust and Generalized Trust Related? 
Among those scholars who assume that particularized trust and generalized trust 
are closely related, there is an even more heated debate regarding the ways in which the 
two types of trust are related. 
One group of scholars suggests that particularized trust and generalized trust are 
actually positively associated. They argue that individuals' trust in general others is an 
Karen S. Cook, Russell Hardin, and Margaret Levi, Cooperation without Trust? (New York, NY: 
Russessll Sage, 2005). 
20
 Ibid, 68. 
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extension of their trust in their relatives, friends, and other people they personally know. 
Accordingly, particularized trust may transfer or "spill-over" to trust in general others. 
Francis Fukuyama, for instance, suggests that the only difference between 
generalized trust and particularized trust is the "radius" of trust.22 While under some 
circumstances, it is so short that it covers only acquaintances (i.e., particularized trusters), 
in other contexts the radius of trust may extend beyond families and friends to strangers 
(i.e., generalized trusters). Generalized trusters tend to have a larger radius of trust, yet 
they place no less trust in people whom they are familiar with. In other words, people 
who are willing to trust strangers are also trust their relatives, friends, and acquaintances 
more, and vice versa. If a person cannot trust even his family or close friends, it is hardly 
possible for her orhim to trust strangers. 
In the same vein, William Mishler and Richard Rose introduce the concept of a 
"trust hierarchy" to elaborate how particularized trust can be transferred to generalized 
trust. Specifically, they argue in this hierarchy of trust 
[fjhe base of [trust hierarchy] consists of the strong interpersonal bonds of trust 
[i.e., particularized trust] among family members and members of face-to-face 
groups originating in socialization experiences linked to the individual's position 
in society. A second level of'impersonal trust' [i.e., generalized trust] extends to 
individuals who are not known personally and results from the generalization of 
personal trust discounted by the psychological distance of impersonal 'others.' A 
third level of trust extends to political institutions, reflecting the spill-over of 
interpersonal trust. 
21
 See, William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?: Testing Institutional 
and Cultural Theories in Post-Communist Societies," Comparative Political Studies 34, no. 1 (2001), 31; 
Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. 
22
 Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York, NY: Penguim 
Books, 1995). 
23
 Mishler and Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?" 
24
 Ibid, 1053. 
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Therefore, it would be reasonable to say that particularized trust serves as the "foundation" 
of generalized trust (and institutional trust). Without strong particularized trust, it is 
difficult to form trust between strangers. 
In sharp contrast to the above-mentioned spillover view, a second group of 
scholars argues that strong norms of particularized trust would hinder the development of 
people's trust in strangers, and therefore that the relationship between the two types of 
trust should be negative. Specifically, according to this line of argument, when locked in 
bonding and close-knit trust relations, individuals are less likely to extend their trust to 
strangers. 
Toshio Yamagishi, Karen Cook, and Motoki Watabe summarize their view of this 
kind of relationship as follows: 
intense group ties, often observed in collectivist cultures, prevent trust from 
developing beyond group boundaries. ... strong and stable social relations (such 
as family ties and group ties) promote a sense of security within such relations but 
endanger trust that extends beyond these relations. 5 
Therefore, as Mark Granovetter observes, particularized trusters, relying on "strong 
ties,"26 avoid strangers and base their social circles on family, close friends, and members 
of their own kinds.27 In this sense, particularized trust fosters group identities at the 
expense of the larger community, and hence individuals' trust in members of their own 
group bears a robust but negative correlation with their trust in general strangers. 
Up to this point, I have explored the intellectual debate about the relationship 
between the two different types of social trust. Specifically, there are competing views 
25
 Yamagishi et al., "Uncertainty, Trust, and Commitment Formation," 116. 
26
 See Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," The American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 
(1973). 
27
 Uslaner and Conley, "Civic Engagement and Particularized Trust," 335. 
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on whether particularized trust and generalized trust are connected, and the strength of 
any such interconnections. 
Unfortunately, the paucity of comparable data on particularized trust and 
generalized trust undermines our efforts to understand how these two types of social trust 
are interconnected. In particular, most popular cross-national surveys like the World 
Value Survey do not include questions for particularized trust. Certainly, scholars were 
doing their best to gain a better understanding of the interrelationship between 
particularize trust and generalized trust. For instance, Eric Uslaner has constructed 
indices of in-group and out-group affects to gauge particularized trust.30 However, as he 
himself admitted, "[fjhere are no good questions on particularized trust," and the indices 
he employed were merely "the closest [he could] get."31 Thus, our ability to understand 
this interrelationship is fundamentally constrained by the absence of reliable 
measurements of particularized trust and generalized trust. 
As established in Chapter II, this study solves the measurement problem by 
creating relation-based measurements of social trust. Therefore, in the following section 
I will empirically examine and test the precise relationship between particularized trust 
and generalized trust using our data from the 2005 rural China survey. The findings will 
significantly contribute to our understanding of the relationship between the two types of 
trust in rural China, and comparative studies of social trust in general. 
For a few exceptions, see Eric M. Uslaner, "Democracy and Social Capital," in Democracy and Trust, 
ed. Mark E. Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Michael R. Welch, David Sikkink, 
and Matthew T. Loveland, "The Radius of Trust: Religion, Social Embeddedness and Trust in Strangers," 
Social Forces 86, no. 1 (2007). 
29
 See Chapter II for detailed discussion. 
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 Uslaner, "Democracy and Social Capital." 
31
 Ibid, 126. 
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO TYPES OF SOCIAL TRUST 
A key goal of this chapter is to assess the interrelationship between pariticularized 
trust and generalized trust. Are particularized trust and generalized trust intertwined in 
the minds of ordinary Chinese rural residents, or do they differentiate between types of 
social trust? Or to put it differently, what is the connection between the two types of 
trust? Are people who have higher particularized trust less willing to expand their trust to 
strangers, or is the opposite the case, or are these two types of social trust independent of 
each other? As I noted in the previous section, there is a heated debate about the 
interrelationship between particularized trust and generalized trust, and there is rationale 
for each of the possible interconnections. 
A. Correlation between Generalized Trust and Particularized Trust 
To test these disparate arguments discussed earlier, I have run both cross-
tabulations between the particularized trust and generalized trust indexes and correlations 
of all specific trust items. 
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Source: The 2005 China General Social Survey. 
Note: The original particularized trust and generalized trust indexes are trichotomized into high, 
medium, and low levels, with p < .05, and p < .01. 
Table 8 presents the results of the cross-tabulations, and there are at least two 
important findings that stand out. The first thing to note about these results is that 
particularized trust and generalized trust are indeed related, albeit not strongly. 
Specifically, the Gamma value for the relationship between the two types of social trust, 
though statistically significant, was not high in this survey. Respondents' particularized 
trust and generalized trust were only weakly or moderately correlated. 
Such a moderate association is further confirmed by the Spearman correlations 
between all the trust items, as presented in Table 9. Specifically, while there were strong 
and significant correlations between five items of particularized trust—the bivariate 
Spearman correlation coefficient range from .33 to .71—the associations between trust in 
strangers and other types of trust were only moderate at best, with the highest Spearman 
coefficient being .16. Jointly, these results suggest that in rural China people's 
particularized trust only moderately influences their disposition to trust strangers. 
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Source: The 2005 China General Social Survey. 
Note: All entries are the Spearman correlation (r,), with p < .05, and p < .01. 
Second, and more interestingly, the results in Table 8 indicate that particularized 
trust and generalized trust are positively correlated. Specifically, while 31.6 percent of 
those who demonstrated high levels of particularized trust reported high levels of 
generalized trust, only 19.5 percent of those having low levels of particularized trust 
registered high generalized trust. Moreover, as the level of particularized trust increased, 
the percentage of high-generalized trusters grew consistently. 
The same positive association between particularized trust and generalized trust is 
also evident in the Spearman correlations between all the trust items. As demonstrated in 
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Table 9, all five items of particularized trust were positively correlated with trust in 
strangers, and four of the bivariate correlations were statistically significant (the only 
exception being the one between trust in relatives and trust in strangers). Thus, the 
results indicate that in rural China those who trust their relatives, kinsmen, neighbors, and 
the like more are also more likely to trust strangers. 
From these two findings, we can reach the preliminary conclusion that in rural 
China ordinary residents' particularized trust was positively, albeit moderately associated 
with their trust in strangers. More importantly, and contrary to many China specialists' 
and trust theorists' projections, Chinese rural residents' high levels of trust in people 
whom they personally know was far from being a hindrance to the development of 
generalized trust. Instead, strong particularized trust seems to be a necessary, albeit not 
robustly correlated, condition for the formation of trust in strangers. Such a preliminary 
conclusion prompts us to ask, what are the origins of particularized trust and generalized 
trust? What are the factors affecting the formation of particularized trust and generalized 
trust in rural China? I will return to these important questions in Chapter IV, where the 
potential determinants of the two types of social trust will be systematically examined. 
B. Impacts of Sociodemographic and Contextual Factors on the Correlation between 
Generalized Trust and Particularized Trust 
Throughout the above discussion, we have found that across rural China there was 
a positive, albeit weak or moderate, relationship between particularized trust and 
generalized trust. This finding raises a further question of critical importance: Does the 
relationship between particularized trust and generalized trust persist across different 
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groups and localities with different contextual profiles? Or to put it somewhat differently, 
is the relationship between particularized trust and generalized trust that we find above 
prevalent across both social categories and geographical boundaries! 
The answer to this question not only helps us to gain a better understanding of the 
complex relationship between particularized trust and generalized trust, but also has 
direct implications for this study. Specifically, if the relationship is prevalent across all 
the important sociodemographic categories and localities with different sociogeographic 
profiles, it is reasonable for us to conclude that the relationship between particularized 
trust and generalized trust is universal and generalizable. However, if the relationship 
between particularized trust and generalized trust varied across different 
sociodemographic groups and localities of different sociogeographic conditions, then it is 
imperative for us to explore the interactions between particularized trust and generalized 
trust in a more systematic way. 
In the following parts, I will empirically examine the impacts of 
sociodemographic factors at the individual level and contextual factors at the village level 
on the relationship between particularized trust and generalized trust respectively. 
Impacts of Sociodemographic Factors In order to understand the impacts of 
sociodemographic factors on the relationship between particularized trust and generalized 
trust, we need to answer the following questions: Do various sociodemographic factors 
affect the relationship between particularized trust and generalized trust? Does this kind 
relationship persist across different sociodemographic categories? More specifically, in 
rural China, is our finding concerning the positive relationship between particularized 
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trust and generalized trust representative of all rural residents with various 
sociodemographic profiles? 
As I discussed earlier in this chapter, there is virtually no systematic study on the 
relationship between particularized trust and generalized trust, not to mention the way in 
which sociodemographic attributes could affect this kind of relationship. However, many 
earlier studies of social trust have suggested that certain sociodemographic attributes— 
such as sex, age, marital status, education, and income level—could strongly influence 
people's trust in others, as measured by the question of "most-people can be trusted". 
For instance, drawing on data collected from a large population-based survey in Europe, 
Tarja Niemine and his associates have explored the variation of individual social trust 
according to sociodemographic factors. Their findings suggest that the levels of social 
trust vary significantly across different sociodemographic categories. In particular, they 
find that "people who are young, married, educated, and well-off are more likely to trust 
others. Thus, sociodemographic factors seem to be strongly associated with people's 
trust in each other. 
These earlier studies of social trust do not directly examine the relationship 
between particularized trust and generalized trust. However, these studies do suggest that 
people of different sociodemographic categories demonstrate different dispositions of 
trusting, which in turn might be reflected in the relationship between particularized trust 
and generalized trust. Hence, it is plausible to expect that the above-mentioned major 
sociodemographic attributes may affect this relationship. 
32
 For example, see Delhey and Newton, "Who Trusts?"; Robert D. Putnam, "Tuning in, Tuning Out: The 
Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America," PS: Political Science and Politics 28, no. 4 (1995). 
33
 Tarja Nieminen et al , "Measurement and Socio-Demographic Variation of Social Capital in a Large 
Population-Based Survey," Social Indicators Research 85, no. (2008). 
34
 Ibid, 406. 
85 
To empirically test whether the relationship between particularized trust and 
generalized trust varies across major sociodemographic categories, I have examined the 
correlations between the indexes of particularized trust and generalized trust, controlling 
for individual respondents' sociodemographic attributes, such as sex, age, marital status, 
education,, and income. Specifically, I have compared the correlations before and after 
controlling for these sociodemographic factors, the results are presented in Table 10. 
Table 10. The Relationship between Generalized Trust and Particularized Trust by Partial 
Correlation Controlling for Sex, Age, Marital Status, Education, and Income 
AT? 
(4148) (1) Correlation Coefficient: 




Marital status (0-1) 
Education " 
Income 













Source: The 2005 China General Social Survey. 
Note: "p < .05, and **p < .01. 
a
 "Elementary school or lower" = 1; "Middle school" = 2; "High school" = 3; and "College or 
higher" = 4. 
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As shown in Table 10, the correlation between particularized trust and generalized 
trust did not change substantially after we controlled for the major sociodemographic 
factors. Specifically, the largest change (0.021, a very low number) occurred after 
personal income has been controlled for. The results, therefore, indicate that the 
sociodemographic factors examined in this study have virtually no substantial impact on 
the relationship between particularized trust and generalized trust. In other words, in 
rural China the positive albeit weak association between particularized trust and 
generalized trust was prevalent across all major sociodemographic categories. 
Such a finding has an important implication for our understanding of the nature of 
social trust and the relationship between different types of social trust. Although 
sociodemographic factors tend be robust predictors of individuals' trust in others 
(measured as particularized trust and generalized trust in this study), these attributes 
appear to be irrelevant to the relationships between different types of social trust. 
Impacts of Contextual Factors As discussed in Chapter I, social trust in its 
essence is a meso-level concept, and is closely related to various factors at both the 
individual level and the aggregate level. "Trust," Jan Delhey and Kenneth Newton note, 
"is the product of experience, and we constantly modify and update our trustful and 
distrustful feelings in response to changing circumstances."35 Therefore, it seems that 
social trust is also shaped by people's surrounding environment, and it is plausible to 
assume that the certain contextual factors at the aggregate level may play an important 
role in shaping the relationship. 
Delhey and Newton, "Who Trust?," 97. 
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Specifically, in this dissertation I use sociogeographic attributes of villages to 
explore the potential impacts of contextual factors. In doing so, I intend to answer the 
following questions of critical importance: Do various contextual factors affect the 
relationship between particularized trust and generalized trust? Does the positive 
relationship between particularized trust and generalized trust persist across villages with 
different sociogeographic profiles? More specifically, in rural China, is our finding about 
the relationship between particularized trust and generalized trust representative of all 
localities? 
Although earlier studies of social trust have failed to systematically and directly 
examine the impacts of various contextual factors on the relationship between 
particularized trust and generalized trust, many have argued that certain attributes of 
communities such as population size, territory size, level of economic development, and 
heterogeneity may strongly affect people's trust in each other. For instance, Putnam 
finds that the size of a community is robustly correlated with the level of social trust in 
the United States. In particular, he concludes, "residents of small towns and rural areas 
are more altruistic, honest, and trusting than other Americans. In fact, even among 
suburbs, smaller is better from the social capital point of view." In addition, many 
earlier studies suggest that the ethnic, linguistic, and religious heterogeneity of a 
For example, Markus Freitag and Marc BuDhlmann, "Crafting Trust: The Role of Political Institutions 
in a Comparative Perspective," Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 12 (2009); Marc Hooghe et al., 
"Ethnic Diversity and Generalized Trust in Europe: A Cross-National Multilevel Study," Comparative 
Political Studies 42, no. 2 (2009); Pamela M. Paxton, "Association Memberships and Generalized Trust: A 
Multilevel Model across 31 Countries," Social Forces 86, no. 1 (2007); Robert D. Putnam, "£ Pluribus 
Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century," Scandinavian Political Studies 30, no. 2 
(2007). 
37
 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 205. 
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community plays a deterministic role in shaping individuals' trust, particularly trust in 
strangers. 
Given the pivotal role of contextual factors with respect to the level of social trust, 
it is reasonable to assume that certain attributes of village may influence the relationship 
between particularized trust and generalized trust. After all, this kind of relationship is 
essentially determined by levels of the two types of trust. To empirically examine the 
impacts of various contextual factors, I have examined the correlations between the 
aggregate values of particularized trust and generalized trust at the village level, after 
controlling for the major contextual factors, such as village population, territory size, 
economic development, geographic isolation, and surname fragmentation. The results 
are presented in Table 11. 
38
 For example, see Putnam, "£ Pluribus Unum." 
39
 This measure has been used in a study of elections in rural China by Manion. Specifically, in this 
dissertation, the following formula has been used, 
1 
Frag. Index = —= ~ (1) 
where, p, stands for the percentage of fth largest surname group in a given village. See, Manion, 
"Democracy, Community, Trust," 306-7. 
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Table 11. The Relationship between Generalized Trust and Particularized Trust by Partial 
Correlation Controlling for Contextual Factors 
(1) Correlation Coefficient (r): .198 (410) 
(2) Partial Correlation Coefficient (r): 
Controlling for 









Distance for the nearest fair .203** 
(in kilometer) (392) 
Distance for the seat of Xiang/Zhen .204 
Government (in kilometer) (392) 
Territory (log) 
Income per capita (log) 
Village-owned enterprise (0-1) 
Surname Fragmentation 
All of the above .209 (360) 
Source: The 2005 China General Social Survey. 
Note: "p < .05, and **p < .01. 
As shown in Table 11,1 compared two kinds of correlations between 
particularized trust and generalized trust at the village level: the correlations before and 
after controlling for the key contextual variables. Overall, the comparison indicates that 
the relationship between particularized trust and generalized trust is largely independent 
of the major sociogeographic attributes of villages. Specifically, even when all the 
contextual factors were controlled for, the correlation score between particularized trust 
and generalized trust was increased by only 0.011. The results suggest that in rural 
China, villages' basic attributes like population size, territory, local economy, geographic 
location, and heterogeneity did not influence the relationship between particularized trust 
and generalized trust. This kind of relationship seems to be prevalent across different 
localities in rural China. 
Combining these results with our earlier finding about the impact of 
sociodemographic factors on the relationship between the two types of trust, we can 
conclude that the weak yet positive relationship between particularized trust and 
generalized trust seems to be universal across both social domains and geographic space. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have attempted to answer three questions of considerable 
importance: Are particularized trust and generalized trust intertwined in the minds of 
ordinary Chinese rural residents, or do they differentiate between these types of social 
trust? If there is connection, does Chinese rural residents' trust in their fellow residents 
hinder or foster their trust in strangers? Moreover, does the relationship between the two 
types of trust vary across different social categories or localities? The answers to these 
questions are not only important to our understanding of social trust in rural China, but 
also to our efforts to shed light on the unresolved debates pertaining to the relationship 
between particularized trust and generalized trust. 
Specifically, I have empirically examined those disparate arguments using data 
from the 2005 rural China survey. The findings that emerge from bivariate analyses 
indicate that there is a weak yet positive correlation between our Chinese rural 
respondents' trust in fellow villagers and their trust in strangers. Moreover, this kind of 
weak yet positive relationship is prevalent across both major sociodemographic divides 
(i.e., sex, age, marital status, education, and income) and villages with various 
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sociogeographic profile (i.e., population, territory, income per capita, village-owned 
enterprise, surname fragmentation, distance from nearest fair and the seat of township 
government). 
One implication that we can draw from these finding is that Chinese villagers' 
intense trust in their fellow villagers is not a hindrance to the development of their trust in 
general strangers. On the contrary, the ordinary Chinese rural residents' trust in 
surrounding people might help cultivate and build their positive expectations about 
strangers, although this process is likely to be weak and slow. More importantly, these 
findings appear to be in direct contradiction to the conventional view among China 
scholars that the Chinese villagers' bonding and parochial trust constrain their trust in 
general others.4 In fact, the particularized trust in rural China is not as parochial as they 
have suggested. 
As for the implication for comparative studies of social trust, the findings suggest 
that the relationship between particularized trust and generalized trust is far more 
complicated than that of a simple picture of "bad" trust and "good" trust. As Eric 
Uslaner has noted, "[o]ur views of generalized trust and particularized trust are highly 
stylized. The former is universally good, the latter unconditionally bad. But this view 
may be too simplistic."41 Nonetheless, the findings in this chapter are only based on one 
country. Further studies are required to conclusively reveal the relationship between 
particularized trust and generalized trust. 
40
 Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for 
Chinese Studies, 1988); Idem, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989); Richard H. Solomon, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese 
Political Culture (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971). 
41
 Uslaner, "Democracy and Social Capital," 128. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SOURCES OF PARTICULARIZED TRUST AND GENERALIZED TRUST: 
A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS 
The analysis in the previous chapters has described the distributions of and the 
interaction between particularized trust and generalized trust. The findings indicate that 
our respondents in rural China seem to conceptualize the two dimensions of social trust 
differently, which implies that the formation of each dimension may be shaped by 
different combinations of socioeconomic and sociopolitical factors. As a consequence, it 
is imperative to investigate the ways in which different factors influence the people learn 
to trust people whom they know personally (i.e., particularized trust) and strangers (i.e., 
generalized trust). To address this crucial question, in this chapter I will examine various 
socioeconomic and sociopolitical factors, at both the individual level and the village level, 
that are expected to influence the two types of social trust. Through examination of these 
determinants, I will address the following questions of great importance: Who is more 
likely to trust in contemporary China? More specifically, what sorts of people choose to 
trust or not to do so, and in what kinds of villages they are more likely to develop trust in 
surrounding people and strangers? 
Previous empirical studies on the origins of social trust have exclusively focused 
on either the aggregate level or the individual level. While researches ground in 
aggregated data, as warned by Mitchell Seligson, may easily become preys to the 
"ecological fallacies,"1 analyses at individuals tend to exclude many important contextual 
1
 Specifically, ecological fallacies, as Seligson summarized, refer to the error "of incorrectly imputing to 
the higher order unit the aggregation of values of individuals," which are more likely to occur in cross-
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factors out of consideration.2 Recognizing the limitations associated with both the 
aggregate and the individualistic approach, I conduct a multilevel analysis of 
particularized trust and generalized trust by incorporating five categories of sociopolitical 
factors at both the individual and the aggregate (i.e., village) levels into analysis. 
Specifically, I examine three categories of socioeconomic and sociopolitical factors at the 
individual level—sociodemographic attributes, subjective orientations, and informal 
social interactions, and two categories at the village level—sociogeographic attributes 
and community heterogeneity. 
As discussed in Chapter I, both theoretical and empirical findings from earlier 
studies suggests that all these five categories of determinants may robustly shape 
individuals' trust in each other. In this chapter, I will first theoretically explore why we 
need a multilevel analysis, and subsequently I will present empirical evidence illustrating 
why a multilevel approach is superior to the traditional multivariate regression analyses. 
Establishing a multilevel framework, I will discuss theoretical propositions of the 
relationship between variables in each of the five categories on the one hand, and 
particularized trust and generalized trust on the other. In addition, such relationships will 
be examined against the data collected from the rural China. Finally, I will conclude this 
chapter with a discussion on implications from our empirical findings for both China 
studies and comparative studies of social trust in general. 
national studies. See, Mitchell A. Seligson, "The Renaissance of Political Culture or the Renaissance of the 
Ecological Fallacy?," Comparative Politics 34, no. 3 (2002), 273, 276-8. 
2
 For example, see Glenn Firebaugh, "A Rule for Inferring Individual-Level Relationships from Aggregate 
Data," American Sociological Review 43, no. 4 (1978); Marco R. Steenbergen and Bradford S. Jones, 
"Modeling Multilevel Data Structures," American Journal of Political Science 46, no. 1 (2002); Nathaniel 
Beck, "Multilevel Analyses of Comparative Data: A Comment," Political Analysis 13, no. 4 (2005); 
Pamela M. Paxton, "Association Memberships and Generalized Trust: A Multilevel Model across 31 
Countries," Social Forces 86, no. 1 (2007). 
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WHY WE NEED A MULTILEVEL APPROACH? 
Theory building in political science is increasingly characterized by incorporating 
explanatory variables at different levels. As noted by Marco Steenbergen and Bradford 
Jones, more and more theories "hinge on the presumption that 'something' observed at 
one level is related to 'something' observed at another level." Concerning the studies of 
the origins of social trust, this trend is particularly evident, for at least two reasons. First, 
as discussed in Chapter I, social trust is inherently a meso or "multilevel concept," and, 
therefore, it is shaped by variables at both the individual and the aggregate level 
simultaneously. Second, the increasing availability of multilevel data provides scholars 
with more opportunities for theory testing and development. Therefore it is theoretically 
desirable and empirically practical to conduct multilevel analyses of the origins of social 
trust. In the following parts of this section, I will find illustrate these two points 
respectively. 
A. Social Trust and Multilevel Analysis: From A Theoretical Perspective 
Social trust, as discussed in Chapter I, is a key concept in both micro and macro 
theories. Consequently, students of social trust can largely be divided on the basis of the 
ways in which they locate their levels of analysis. Specifically, there are two broad 
schools of thoughts.5 The first school, focusing on micro mechanisms, theorizes social 
3
 Steenbergen and Jone, 218. 
4
 See, Margaret Levi and Laura Stoker, "Political Trust and Trustworthiness," Annual Review of Political 
Science 3, no. (2000). For further dicussion on concepts across different level, see, for example, M. 
Stephen Weatherford, "Measuring Political Legitimacy," The American Political Science Review 86, no. 1 
(1992). 
5
 Jan Delhey and Kenneth Newton, "Who Trusts? The Origins of Social Trust in Seven Societies," 
European Societies 5, no. 2 (2003); Marc Hooghe, "Social Capital and Diversity: Generalized Trust, Social 
Cohesion and Regimes of Diversity," Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science 
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trust as a property of individuals, and therefore it is argued that social trust is more 
associated with individual traits like personalities or such sociodemographic features like 
age, gender, education, economic status, and class. The second school, on the other 
hand, perceives social trust is a property possessed by collectives. Accordingly, social 
trust is more correlated with certain contextual and aggregate factors, such as community 
heterogeneity, income inequality, and presence of trust networks. 
This divide with regard to the levels of analysis profoundly influences how 
empirical studies are conducted, and is conspicuously reflected in the different ways in 
which social trust is operationalized by political scientists. John Brehm and Wendy Rahn, 
for instance, argue that social trust reflects a person's psychological involvement and 
commitment in each other, and therefore has its basis at individual levels.8 
Correspondingly, they test the origins and consequences of social trust against data 
collected at the individual level. By contrast, Ronald Inglehart suggests that social trust 
"is a relatively enduring characteristic of given societies: it reflects the entire historical 
heritage of a given people, including economic, political, religious, and other factors" 
politique 40, no. 3 (2007); Marc Hooghe et al., "Ethnic Diversity and Generalized Trust in Europe: A 
Cross-National Multilevel Study," Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 2 (2009) 
6
 Treating social trust as an individual property in more popular in economics, sociology, and psychology. 
For example, see John Brehm and Wendy Rahn, "Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and 
Consequences of Social Capital," American Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3 (1997); Tarja Nieminen 
et al., "Measurement and Socio-Demographic Variation of Social Capital in a Large Population-Based 
Survey," Social Indicators Research 85, no. (2008). 
7
 For example, see Gema M. Garcia Albacete, "The Saliency of Political Cleavages and the 'Dark Sides' of 
Social Capital: Evidence from Spain," American Behavioral Scientist 53, no. 5 (2010); Marc Hooghe and 
Dietlind Stolle, eds., Generating Social Capital: Civil Society and Institutions in Comparative Perspective 
(New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Natalia Letki and Geoffrey Evans, "Endogenizing Social 
Trust: Democratization in East-Central Europe," British Journal of Political Science 35, no. 3 (2005); Bo 
Rothstein and Eric M. Uslaner, "All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust," World Politics 58, no. 
1 (2005); Jan W. van Deth, "Participation in Voluntary Associations: Dark Shades in a Sunny World?," 
American Behavioral Scientist 53, no. 5 (2010) 
8
 Brehm and Rahn, "Individual-Level Evidence," 1001. 
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(emphasis added). Guided by this collective view of social trust, Inglehart and his 
colleagues aggregate data obtained from individual questionnaires into units of countries, 
and examine the relationship between social trust, economic development, and 
democracy at the societal level. 
Given this divide, a natural question is: how can we situate our analysis at 
seemingly incompatible analytical levels? To put it differently, how can we overcome 
the micro-macro divide in the studies of the origins of social trust? As suggested in 
Chapter I, I argue that factors at both the individual and the aggregate level can strongly 
affect the formation of social trust. It is both imperative and promising to incorporate 
theories at these two different levels. The two levels of analyses, and theories subscribed 
under them, are not mutually exclusive or irreconcilable. On the contrary, these theories 
can complement each other by highlighting different causal mechanisms. A research 
agenda encompassing different levels of analysis, therefore, can significantly advance our 
understanding of the origins of social trust. The validity and necessity of such a cross-
level research approach is best articulated by Jan Delhey and Kenneth Newton as follows: 
In the first place, some of them are concerned with different types and levels of 
explanation. ... In the second place, while different theories may contribute to 
explaining the origins of social trust, either separately or in combination, they 
may also have different effects in different circumstances. And in the third place, 
both the theories and their indicators overlap to some extent.' 
Given the theoretical advantages associated with this cross-level approach, how 
can we realize it in empirical research? In this study, I employ a multilevel model to test 
the independent effects of a variety of individual characteristics and village attributes on 
the formation of social trust. 
9
 Ronald Inglehart, "Trust, Welling-Being and Democracy," in Democracy and Trust, ed. Mark E. 
Warren(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 88. 
10
 Delhey and Newton, "Who Trusts?," 100-1. 
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The multilevel model or hierarchical model, as noted by Nathaniel Beck, is 
"obviously a good thing, for both methodology and comparative politics," since it 
provides a reliable tool for political scientists to assess the micro and the macro variables 
simultaneously. While traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) and related single-
equation techniques are built upon the assumption that the all the independent variables 
are at the same analytical level, multilevel analyses allow scholars to "tie together micro 
and macro variables" of theoretical interests. Specifically, the multilevel analysis, as a 
variant of random coefficient model, assumes observations of micro level is nested within 
the macro-level units (in this study, the village). Therefore, multilevel analysis is "less 
likely to suffer from model misspecification than when compared to models comprised of 
1 ^ 
a single level," and accordingly is more appropriate when the causal mechanisms of 
interest encompass different analytical levels. 
Given its apparent theoretical and methodological advantages, or in the words of 
Steenbergen and Jones, "substantive and statistical strengths,"14 the multilevel analysis 
has been increasingly applied in the studies of the origins of social trust, and has been 
proved to be reliable for overcoming micro-macro dualism. For instance, recognizing 
11








 For multilevel studies of social trust, see, for example, Edward Fieldhouse and David Cutts, "Does 
Diversity Damage Social Capital? A Comparative Study of Neighbourhood Diversity and Social Capital in 
the Us and Britain," Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 43, no. 
02 (2010); Christopher J. Anderson and Aida Paskeviciute, "How Ethnic and Linguistic Heterogeneity 
Influence the Prospects for Civil Society: A Comparative Study of Citizenship Behavior," The Journal of 
Politics 68, no. 4 (2006); Francisco Herreros and Henar Criado, "The State and the Development of Social 
Trust," International Political Science Review 29, no. 1 (2008); Markus Freitag and Marc BuDhlmann, 
"Crafting Trust: The Role of Political Institutions in a Comparative Perspective," Comparative Political 
Studies 42, no. 12 (2009); Marc Hooghe et al., "Ethnic Diversity and Generalized Trust in Europe."; 
Amaney Jamal and Irfan Nooruddin, "The Democratic Utility of Trust: A Cross-National Analysis," The 
Journal of Politics 72, no. 1 (2010); Natalia Letki, "Socialization for Participation? Trust, Membership, and 
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the dangers embedded in the single-level analysis, Putnam, in one of his recent articles, 
employs a multilevel model to explore the impacts of ethnic diversity at the aggregate 
level on people's trust at individual level. Specifically, his finds that the results emerged 
from the multilevel analysis are significantly different from, and more reliable than that 
generated by single-level regression models.16 Similarly, Paxton uses multilevel models 
to test the relationship between connected and isolated associational activities at the 
country level and social trust expressed by individual respondents. After examining the 
empirical results, she concludes that a multilevel approach tends to be more appropriate 
in exploring the origins of social trust. 
In sum, regarding the sources of social trust, both theoretical and methodological 
considerations favor a multilevel approach. However, it is still too early to conclude that 
the multilevel level analysis is appropriate for the studies focusing on a single country. 
Grounded in the assumption that socioeconomic and sociopolitical conditions vary 
dramatically across countries, virtually all the multilevel studies of social trust hitherto 
have treated country as the aggregate unit. For a study focusing on one country— 
China—we have to answer a series of questions before we can conduct a multilevel 
analysis: Do socioeconomic and sociopolitical conditions vary dramatically across 
different localities and regions in China? Do these different conditions actually affect 
Chinese rural residents' trust in their fellow villagers and strangers? If so, to what extent 
the variation of social trust can be explained by the attributes of such regional units like 
the village in China? In the following section, combining both interpretive findings and 
Democratization in East-Central Europe," Political Research Quarterly 57, no. 4 (2004); Pamela M. 
Paxton, "Association Memberships and Generalized Trust." 
16
 Robert D. Putnam, "£ Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century," 
Scandinavian Political Studies 30, no. 2 (2007). 
17
 Pamela M. Paxton, "Association Memberships and Generalized Trust." 
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empirical evidence, I will demonstrate: (1) the necessity of a multilevel analysis in the 
Chinese settings, (2) why village is an ideal unit, and (3) to what extent village attributes 
can help us to explain the variations of social trust at individual level. 
B. Social Trust and Multilevel Model: From An Empirical Perspective 
Ever since Edward Banfield's 1958, social trust has been found varying within a 
nation. In his canonical work Making Democracy Work, Putnam reiterates the regional 
differences pertaining to social trust, by dividing Italy into the North and South on the 
basis of their different cultural heritages and paths of political developments.l He 
further concludes that it is these regional differences that fundamentally shape the volume 
and distribution of social trust in Italy. Although Putnam's division of north-south Italy 
is criticized for being too arbitrary and neglecting more subtle and nuanced regional 
differences, few would deny the importance of regional difference in affecting the levels 
of social trust.20 
Similarly, in China studies, scholars have frequently emphasized the effects of the 
regional differences (e.g., south vs. north, and coast vs. inland) on sociopolitical 
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development in the country. Owing to the limitations of available data and analytical 
tools, however, no systematic studies at nationals level has been conducted to explore to 
Edward C. Banfield, Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Riverside, NJ: Free Press, [1958] 1976). 
19
 Putnam, Making Democracy Work. 
20
 For example, while accepting the importance of regional differences in shaping social trust, Sidney 
Tarrow ascribes such differences to political institutions, rather than the cultural and historical factors 
proposed by Putnam. See, Sidney Tarrow, "Making Social Science Work across Space and Time: A 
Critical Reflection on Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work," The American Political Science Review 
90, no. 2(1996). 
21
 For discussion on regional difference in China, see, for example, C.W. Kenneth Keng, "China's 
Unbalanced Economic Growth," Journal of Contemporary China 15, no. 46 (2006); Qingshan Tan, 
"Growth Disparity in China: Provincial Causes," Journal of Contemporary China 11, no. 33 (2002); Yehua 
Dennis Wei, "Multiscale and Multimechanisms of Regional Inequality in China: Implications for Regional 
Policy," Journal of Contemporary China 11, no. 30 (2002); Yanrui Wu, "Understanding Growth in China's 
Regional Economies," Journal of Contemporary China 14, no. 42 (2005). 
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what extent the regional differences can affect the formation of social trust. In other 
words, we still have no concrete knowledge about to what extent the variation of social 
trust can be explained by the attributes of subnational units in China. 
Taking advantages of the 2005 nation-wide China survey and new statistical 
methods, I am able to quantitatively demonstrate how differences of such aggregate units 
as the village can affect the levels of social trust. As many researchers find out, an 
intuitive way to examine the potential impacts of aggregate units is to contrast the 
observed aggregate means (i.e., means by village in this dissertation) with group means 
that are the results of randomly assigning individuals to simulated groups. 22 If actual 
group means and the simulated group means are identical, there is no evidence of group 
effects. However, if a number of groups have higher than expected means, and a number 
have lower than expected means, it suggests that attributes of aggregate units strongly 
affect the distribution of the measured variable. 
To detect the magnitude of aggregate-level factors, I contrast the village-means of 
both generalized trust and particularized with simulated village means. The results are 
presented in Figure 1 (the top for particularized trust and the bottom for generalized trust). 
In the figure, the bar charts represent each village's average particularized (and 
generalized) trust sorted from highest to lowest, and the line solid represent a random 
distribution where 401 pseudo villages (with exact size characteristics of the actual 
villages) were created 100 times and the sorted values were averaged across 1000 
22
 Paul D. Bliese, "Group Size, ICC Values, and Group-Level Correlations: A Simulation," Organizational 
Research Methods 1, no. 4 (1998); Idem, "Within-Group Agreement, Non-Independence, and Reliability: 
Implications for Data Aggregation and Analysis.," in Multilevel Theory, Research, and Methods in 
Organizations: Foundations, Extensions, and New Directions, ed. Katherine J. Klein and Steve W. J. 
Kozlowski(San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 2000); Joop J. Hox, Multilevel Analysis: Techniques and 
Applications, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010). 
iterations. The dotted lines represent the upper and lower 90% confidence interval 
estimates. In other words, the line represents the expected distribution if there were no 
village-level properties associated with the data. The graphs, however, apparently 
suggest village level properties were associated with both particularized trust and 





Figure 1. Contrast between Actual and Simulated Village Means of Particularized Trust 
and Generalized Trust 
Source: The 2005 China General Social Survey. 
Note: N. of villages = 401. 
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Furthermore, the importance of village-level properties in explaining the 
variations of particularized trust and generalized trust can be confirmed by two multilevel 
reliability measures, ICC (1) and ICC (2).23 Specifically, the ICC (1) gauges to what 
extent the variance in variables at the individual level (level-1) can be explained by 
properties of villages (level-2); the ICC (2) indicates to what extent the village unit can 
be reliably differentiated in terms of the variables at the individual level, in our case, 
particularized trust and generalized trust. 
The results of the ICC (1) and ICC (2) are reported in Table 12. The overall 
results reassure our observation of the substantial impacts of village properties on 
particularized trust and generalized trust. First, the ICC (1) value of particularized trust 
is .2349, which suggests that almost one quarter of variance in particularized trust 
possessed by individuals can be explained by village identities. Similarly, for generalized 
trust the ICC (1) score is .3061, indicating village properties can explain almost one third 
of variance in individual generalized trust. Second, the ICC (2) value of particularized 
trust and generalized trust is .9293 and .8192, which means that villages can be reliably 
differentiated in terms of both particularized trust and generalized trust. Together, these 
findings suggest that the village attributes strongly and substantially shape the volume of 
both particularized trust and generalized trust. Therefore, it is not only appropriate but 
also imperative to incorporate key variables at village level into our analysis. 
23
 In multilevel analysis, intraclass correlation (ICC) is the proportion of total variance that is between 
groups. In a two-level model, the ICC is found by dividing the variance at the aggregate level (in this 
dissertation level-2) by the sum of the variances at the individual level (in level-1) and the aggregate level. 
In other words, as Equation (1) explains, lCC(p) for a two-level model is the proportion of group level 
variance from the total variance, where o~l0 represents the level-2 variance and o];0 represents the level-1 
variance: 
For more details on ICC, see Katherine and Kozlowski, Multilevel Theory, Research, and Methods; Hox, 
Multilevel Analysis. 
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Table 12. The Multilevel Reliability Test by Particularized Trust and Generalized Trust 
T , Particularized Trust Generalized Trust Index 
ICC(l) 
ICC (2) 
N. of Respondents 
N. of Villages 
Source: The 2005 China General Social Survey. 







In this section, we review the debate about the levels of analysis in the study of 
origins of social trust, and illustrate the necessity of adopting a multilevel approach. 
Drawing on data collected from 2005,1 further demonstrate that besides variables at 
individual level, attributes of village in China also play a pivotal role in shaping both 
types of social trust. In the following section, I will describe the relationship between 
major explanatory variables at both individual and village level on one hand, and the two 
types of social trust on the other hand, and test their the relationship against the data 
collected in rural China. 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
A quick survey of the literature reveals that current individual-level theories of 
social trust are strongly shaped by socio-psychological school of thought in the United 
States in the 1950s and 1960s.24 In general, this school emphasizes the role of individual 
psychology in political analysis, arguing that personal traits, life experience and 
socialization process can play a decisive role in forming one's attitudes like trust. For 
Delhey and Newton, "Who Trusts?" 
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instance, Lucian Pye, one of the pioneers of this approach, argues that "how to go from 
our rich knowledge of individual psychology to the analysis of collective behavior, 
ranging from that of groups to whole nations" is the key to our understanding of various 
political phenomena. Following this vein of thinking, most micro theories of social 
trust tend to agree that: 
[Social trust] is learned in early childhood, and tends to persist in later life, 
changing only slowly as a result of experience thereafter ... [Social trust] is part 
of a broader syndrome of personality characteristics that includes optimism, a 
belief in co-operation, and confidence that that individual can resolve their 
differences and live a satisfactory social life together. 
As discussed in Chapter, I include three categories of determinants at individual 
level that are expected to be strongly associated with formation of social trust: 1) socio-
demographic factors like gender, age, education, and etc.; 2) subjective orientations like 
life satisfaction, perception of equality, and norms of civility; and 3) intensity of informal 
social interactions. 
A. Sociodemographic Factors and Their Impacts 
The current literature on the sources of social trust has suggested that many 
sociodemographic factors at individual levels can profoundly affect the development of 
social trust. Paxton, for instance, argues that: "In the absence of specific information 
about the trustee, individual characteristics of the trustor become more important in the 
Lucian W. Pye, "The Elusive Concept of Culture and the Vivid Reality of Personality," Political 
Psychology 18, no. 2 (1997), 241. 
26
 Delhey and Newton, "Who Trusts?," 94. Similarly, Pye also argues that: "Viewed from the perspective 
of the individual, trust emanates from two sources. The first relates to the basic personality of the 
individual that is established during infancy and early childhood. ... The second source of trust comes at a 
later phase of socialization when children learn to distinguish between friends and enemies." See, Lucian 
W. Pye, "Civility, Social Capital, and Civil Society: Three Powerful Concepts for Explaining Asia," 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History 29, no. 4 (1999), 770. 
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assessment of the trustworthiness of generalized others." In this dissertation, I focus on 
age, sex, education, marital status, economic status, and the membership of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). These attributes, as discussed in Chapter I, are expected to be 
9S 
strongly correlated with both particularized trust and generalized trust. Capturing key 
aspects of socialization, such sociodemographic factors as age, gender, and education 
tend to have a strong and long-lasting impact on people's predisposition of trusting 
others. 
In earlier empirical studies of social trust in democratic, transitional, and non-
Chinese settings, there is a widespread consensus that such sociodemographic factors as 
age, gender, and education can influence individuals' social trust, measured by the "most-
people" question. Particularly, in exploring the declining social trust and social capital in 
the United States, Putnam has found out it is the key demographic changes that 
9Q • 
contributes to the erosion of social trust. Tarja Nieminen and his colleagues also report 
that the levels of social trust vary significantly across different sociodemographic 
categories like gender, age, and income. In general, these empirical findings have 
strongly support a general hypotheses that that people's trust in each other are affected by 
Paxton, "Association Memberships and Generalized Trust," 49. For similar emphasis on 
sociodemographic factors in trust formation, see, for example, Markus Freitag, "Social Capital in 
(Dis)Similar Democracies: The Development of Generalized Trust in Japan and Switzerland," Comparative 
Political Studies 36, no. 8 (2003), 946; Gerry Veenstra, "Explicating Social Capital: Trust and 
Participation in the Civil Space," The Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie 27, 
no. 4 (2002); Christian Bjornskov, "Determinants of Generalized Trust: A Cross-Country Comparison," 
Public Choice 130, no. 1 (2007). 
28
 For impacts of sociodemographic factors on both types of social trust, see, for example, Maria L. Chavez, 
Brian Wampler, and Ross E. Burkhart, "Left Out: Trust and Social Capital among Migrant Seasonal 
Farmworkers," Social Science Quarterly 87, no. 5 (2006), 1021. . 
29
 Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," Journal of Democracy 6, no. 
1 (1995); Idem, "Tuning in, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America," PS: 
Political Science and Politics 28, no. 4 (1995); Idem, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of 
American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000). 
30
 Nieminen, et al., "Measurement and Socio-Demographic Variation." 
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various process of socialization processes, which are attributable to key 
sociodemographic factors. 
Drawing upon these prior studies, it is plausible to assume that major 
sociodemographic attributes may exert strong impacts on particularized trust and 
generalized trust respectively. Thus, I expect that our respondents with different 
sociodemographic characteristics vary in their particularized trust and generalized trust. 
In this section, I will explore the relationship between each of the sociodemographic 
variables and particularized trust and generalized trust. 
Age Students of social trust have frequently emphasized the generational cohort 
effects on a person's inclination of trust. As Putnam points out, people of different 
generations have been socialized under dramatically different sociopolitical 
environments, and consequently a clear cohort pattern of social trust can be observed. 
In particular, he finds precisely such a pattern in the United States, and he ascribes this 
pattern to the contrast between a "long civic generation" born between 1910 and 1940 
and a less civic generation born after 1940. Putnam's finding that the generational 
change in trust are further confirmed by many following empirical studies. Concerning 
studies at individual level, Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara find a positive effect of 
age structure in the United States. More importantly, the impacts of age on formation 
of social seem to prevail across national borders. After in examining social trust in the 
United Kingdom, Peter Hall have found that "overall levels of social trust [in Britain] 
31
 Putnam, "Bowling Alone."; Idem, "Tuning in.". 
32
 For example, Veenstra, "Explicating Social Capital."; Eric M. Uslaner, "Social Capital, Television, and 
the 'Mean World': Trust, Optimism, and Civic Participation," Political Psychology 19, no. 3 (1998). 
33
 Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara, "Who Trusts Others?," Journal of Public Economics 85, no. 2 
(2002). 
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declined between 1959 when 56 per cent of respondents said they generally trust others 
and 1990 when only 44 per cent said they do. There is almost certainly a general period 
effect here of some magnitude."34 
The relationship between generation change and the propensity of trusting has 
been confirmed by the evidence emerged from some earlier surveys in China. Based on 
data collected from a six-city sample survey in 1999, Wenfang Tang finds that there is an 
apparent cohort effect in China, and the correlation is largely positive.35 Specifically, 
Tang divides the respondents into five age groups: the pre-socialist generation, the 
socialist generation, the Cultural Revolution generation, the post-Cultural Revolution 
generation, and the reform generation. The two Cultural Revolution generations, owing 
to their traumatic experiences obtained from the totalitarian political campaigns, were the 
least trusting compared to other respondents. 
The theory and empirical findings from earlier studies in Chinese and non-
Chinese settings simply suggest that the older a person, the more likely she or he is to 
trust other people. In this study, then, I expect our respondents' age to be positively 
associated with their levels of particularized trust and generalized trust. In other words, 
while older respondents are more likely to be trusting, younger ones are more likely to 
distrust other people. To explore this expectation, I compare the distribution of the two 
types of trusts among six age groups. The results of the comparison are presented in 
Table 13. 
34
 Peter A. Hall, "Social Capital in Britain," British Journal of Political Science 29, no. 3 (1999), 431-2. 
35
 Wenfang Tang, Public Opinion and Political Change in China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2005), 108-10. 
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Table 13. Particularized Trust and Generalized Trust by Age, 2005 
Age 
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 65-over 































































Source: The 2005 China General Social Survey. 
Note: The original particularized trust and generalized trust indexes are trichotomized into high, 
medium, and low levels. 
*"p< 0.001, "p< 0.0 \,*p< 0.05. 
As Table 13 indicates, generally, respondents' ages were positively associated 
with both particularized trust and generalized trust in our survey. Specifically, while 40 
percent of people at 65 or older demonstrated high level of particularized trust, only 25 
percent of people at age of 18 to 25 registered the same level. With respect to 
generalized trust, while 29 percent of people at 65 or older demonstrated high level of 
particularized trust, only 25 percent of people at age of 18 to 25 registered the same level. 
In addition, between these two age groups, the levels of particularized trust and 
generalized trust grew consistently with increasing age. Together, these results support 
109 
our expectation about the effect of aging on social trust: Age is positively associated 
with the level of both particularized trust and generalized trust in China. 
Sex Some earlier studies have found that women and men are different with 
regard to their inclination of trusting. As Vivien Lowndes argues, with respect to social 
trust, "gender differences are clearly important (across and within other social 
categories)." But there is no consensus among students as to how gender actually 
affects the levels of social trust. 
In general, there are at least two competing arguments about the effects of gender 
on the formation of social trust. One suggests that, compared to men, women are less 
likely to trust other people, either strangers or people in neighborhood. A major reason 
frequently cited is women's isolation from various sociopolitical interactions. Across 
various societies, women are traditionally holding the responsibility for caring and 
T O 
domestic work. As a consequence, women largely cannot invest as much time as men 
TQ 
in various social activities and political participation. As suggested by Alesina and La 
Ferrara, "[wjomen participate less in social activities because of a time constraint." 
With limited range of social activity, it is hard for women to develop social trust 
equivalent to that of men. 
36
 Vivien Lowndes, "Women and Social Capital: A Comment on Hall's 'Social Capital in Britain,'" British 
Journal of Political Science 30, no. 3 (2000), 536. 
37
 See, for example, Nieminen et al., "Measurement and Socio-Demographic Variation"; Luke Keele, 
"Macro Measures and Mechanics of Social Capital," Political Analysis 13, no. 2 (2005). 
38
 Lowndes, "Women and Social Capital." 
39
 For a general discussion on the gender inequality in available time outside domestic affairs see, Nancy 
Burns, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba, "The Public Consequences of Private Inequality: 
Family Life and Citizen Participation," The American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 (1997). In China, 
the gender inequality in political participation is particularly acute. See, for example, M. Kent Jennings, 
"Gender and Political Participation in the Chinese Countryside," The Journal of Politics 60, no. 4 (1998). 
40
 Alesina and La Ferrara, "Who Trusts Others?," 218. 
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Moreover, some empirical studies have also warranted support to this theoretical 
proposition. Hall, for instance, compares data drawn from three sample surveys conduct 
in Britain from 1959 to 1999, and finds that women were not only less active in various 
formal or informal civic participations, but also demonstrated lower levels of social trust 
consistently. In the United States, similar relationship between gender and social trust 
has been found. Alesina and La Ferrara, using data collected from 1974-94 General 
Social Survey (GSS), find that women in the United States are significantly less trusting 
i 42 
than men. 
The other argument contends that women are no less, if not more, trusting than 
men. Specifically, Lowndes argues that "there are important differences in the types of 
activity undertaken by women and men," and current survey studies often overlook the 
informal social activities in which women are more active.43 As a matter of fact, taking 
these "informal sociability" into account, Lowndes finds that women are socially active 
and accordingly more trusting than men.44 Similarly, in addressing the creation of social 
capital, in which social trust is an essential component, Putnam also suggests that women 
are more likely to be trusting due to their informal sociability: "Most of our mothers 
were house-wives, and most of them invested heavily in social capital formation—a 
jargony way of referring to untold, unpaid hours in church suppers, PTA meetings, 
neighborhood coffee klatches, and visits to friends and relatives."45 
In sum, the two competing arguments leave us with two contradictory hypotheses. 
While one expects women are less trusting, the other suggests the opposite. To examine 
41
 Hall, "Social Capital in Britain." 
42
 Alesina and La Ferrara, "Who Trusts Others?," 217-9. 
43
 Lowndes, "Women and Social Capital," 534. 
44
 Ibid, 535. 
45
 Putnam, "Tuning In," 670; Idem, Bowling Alone. 
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these two hypotheses, I conducted cross-tabulations between respondents' gender and 
registered levels of particularized trust and generalized trust. The results are 
demonstrated in the table. 










































Source: The 2005 China General Social Survey. 
Note: The original particularized trust and generalized trust indexes are trichotomized into high, 
medium, and low levels. 
'"p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, > < 0.05. 
As Table 14 reveals, women seemed to be less willing to place trust in 
surrounding people and complete strangers, albeit the impacts were quite weak. 
Specifically, our female respondents registered more in "low" and less in "high" than 
male respondents for both types of social trust. These results, thus, lend support to one of 
the two above-mentioned hypotheses that women in China are less trusting than men. 
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Marital Status Some students of social trust have also noted that individuals' 
marital status could affect their trust levels.4 Specifically, they cite two mechanisms 
linking marriage and social trust: (1) building family per se as a process of trust 
creation; (2) the negative impacts of marriage on people's available time and energy. 
Yet, these two mechanisms lead to contradictory conclusion on the relationship between 
marriage and social trust. 
The first argument suggests that married couples are more trusting because 
marriage life per se is a trust creation process. For instance, Michael Welch and his 
colleagues find that "[i]n dyadic relationships ... the more an individual trusts his or her 
significant other, the more likely that a long-term commitment will be made with that 
person."49 Similarly Putnam argues that "[s]ince the family itself is, by some accounts, a 
key form of social capital [in which trust is a principal component], perhaps its eclipse is 
part of the explanation for the reduction in joining and trusting in the wider community." 
He further supports his argument by presenting empirical results emerged from the US 
GSS. Specifically, Putnam finds that "controlling for education, age, race, and so on, 
single people—both men and women, divorced, separated, and never-married—are 
significantly less trusting and less engaged civically than married people. Roughly 
speaking, married men and women are about a third more trusting and belong to about 
15-25% more groups than comparable single men and women. ... In short, successful 
46
 See, for example, John F. Helliwell and Robert D. Putnam, "The Social Context of Well-Being," 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B 359, no. 1449 (2004); Scott D. McClurg, 
"Social Networks and Political Participation: The Role of Social Interaction in Explaining Political 
Participation," Political Research Quarterly 56, no. 4 (2003); Laura Stoker and M. Kent Jennings, "Life-
Cycle Transitions and Political Participation: The Case of Marriage," The American Political Science 
Review %9, no. 2(1995). 
47
 Putnam, "Tuning In," 671; Idem, Bowling Alone. 
48
 Stoker and Jennings, "Life-Cycle Transitions and Political Participation." 
49
 Michael R. Welch et al., "Determinants and Consequences of Social Trust," Sociological Inquiry 75, no. 
4 (2005). 
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marriage (especially if the family unit includes children) is statistically associated with 
greater social trust and civic engagement." 
The other argument, on the contrary, contends that married people tend to be less 
trusting in others, since they could not spend as much time as unmarried individuals in 
various social activities. Specifically, they argue that married couples are often caught by 
various domestic issues. As a consequence, they either do not have time, or just are 
unwilling to participate in various social interactions.51 Therefore, marriage tends to be a 
constraint for people to develop and sustain their trust relationships. Moreover, some 
empirical evidences have also been found to support this argument. 
In sum, two competing propositions can be found with respect to the role of 
marriage in shaping one's social trust. While one proposition suggests marriage is 
positively correlated with interpersonal trust, the other implies the opposite. To examine 
these two competing propositions, I ran cross-tabulation between respondents' marital 
status and particularized trust and generalized trust. The results are presented in Table 
15. As indicated in the table, our married respondents' were generally lower in both 
particularized trust and generalized trust; unmarried individuals tended to be more 
trusting. Such results confirm the second argument about marriage and social trust: 
marriage is negatively associated with social trust. 
50
 Putnam, "Tuning In," 671. 
51
 Stoker and Jennings, "Life-Cycle Transitions and Political Participation." 
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Source: The 2005 China General Social Survey. 
Note: The original particularized trust and generalized trust indexes are trichotomized into high, 
medium, and low levels. 
'"p < 0.001, "p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. 
Education Ever since Almond and Verba's seminal work The Civic Culture, 
education has been widely perceived to be robustly associated with social trust.5 
Consequently, education as a predictor of social trust has appeared in virtually all 
empirical studies pertaining to the origins of social trust. In general, students of social 
trust believe that people's level of educational attainment is positively related to the 
levels of generalized trust, and negatively to those of particularized trust.54 In other 
words, the higher a person's level education, the more likely she or he is willing to trust 
strangers and place less trust in people she or he knows personally. As Stephen Knack 
and Philip Keefer suggest, educational system can make individuals better informed and 
more cooperative, reduce uncertainty about the behaviors of strangers, and therefore 
53
 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations (Newbury Part: Sage Publications, 1963). 
54
 For example, see, Putnam, "Tuning In," 667-8; Idem, Bowling Alone; Delhey and "Who Trusts?"; 
Alesina and La Ferrara, "Who Trusts Others?"; Marcus Alexander, "Determinants of Social Capital: New 
Evidence on Religion, Diversity and Structural Change," British Journal of Political Science 37, no. 2 
(2007); Bjornskov, "Determinants of Generalized Trust." 
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alleviate the distrust resulted from ignorance. In other words, schooling, as an 
important socialization process, may give people more positive attitudes towards 
strangers. Furthermore, people with longer years of education are commonly high in 
social mobility, and therefore are less confined to closed and parochial trust relations.5 
Accordingly, individuals with higher educational achievement are less likely to develop 
strong sense of particularized trust. 
Evidences from earlier survey studies in non-Chinese settings have also 
confirmed the relationship between education and social trust.57 For example, based on 
General Social Survey conducted from 1974 to 1994 in the United State, Putnam 
concludes that "[e]ducation is by far the strongest correlate that I have discovered of... 
CO 
social trust," even controlling for income, life satisfaction, and social status. Similarly, 
Delhey and Newton, after situating the relationship between social trust and education in 
seven different societies, find that individuals with higher levels of education are more 
trusting.59 Even more relevant to our study of social trust in China, using data from 
Eurobarometer survey encompassing post-Soviet Central and East European countries, 
Jan Fidrmuc and Klarita Gerxhani have also found a potent and positive connection 
between social trust and education, which further implies that the impacts of education on 
social trust prevails across various sociopolitical settings. 
55
 Knack and Keefer conclude that: "In short, highly educated people are much more likely to be joiners 
and trusters, partly because they are better off economically, but mostly because of the skills, resources, 
and inclinations that were imparted to them at home and in school." See, Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, 
"Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation," Quarterly Journal of 
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Table 16. Particularized Trust and Generalized Trust by Education, 2005 
Education 
Elementary or Middle School Undergraduate 













































Source: The 2005 China General Social Survey. 
Note: The original particularized trust and generalized trust indexes are trichotomized into high, 
medium, and low levels. 
**> < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. 
Does the above-mentioned proposition about social trust and education hold in 
China? The results from a cross-tabulation test imply a positive answer to this question. 
Specifically, as presented in Table 16, with improving level of educational attainment, 
from "elementary or lower," "middle school," "high school," to "undergraduate or 
higher," the percentage of respondents registered in high particularized trust dropped 
accordingly. With respect to generalized trust, the increment in educational attainments 
is accompanied by increasing trust in strangers, albeit the trend was quite weak. 
Therefore, the results for our data support the propositions developed in earlier studies 
about the impacts of education on social trust. 
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Economic Status Few students would deny the critical importance of economic 
wellbeing in shaping individuals' trust in others. In general, drawing on both 
modernization theory and personal resource theory, they postulate that individuals with 
more economic resources are more likely to trust other people. There are at least three 
frequently referred reasons. In the first place, richer people generally have more 
opportunities to participate in various social activities and civic organization. Given the 
extensive interactions, they are more likely to develop trust in others.63 Second, as 
discussed in Chapter I, trust reflects individuals' willingness to risk their interests. Given 
more economic freedom, the costs of being trusting seem to be smaller to wealthy people 
than the less affluent. As Christian BJ0rnskov suggests, "rich people are more willing to 
take a chance in trusting strangers, hence capturing a difference of relative risk aversion 
that would tend to decrease as incomes increase."1 Thirdly, compared to people less 
affluent, economically successful individuals tend to more optimistic about the world, 
and therefore are more likely to develop benign views about others. As a result, wealthy 
people tend to be more trusting.65 Collectively, all these three reason lead us to the 
conclusion that income level is positively associated with social trust. 
For arguments drawn from modernization theory, see, for example, Delhey and Newton, "Predicting 
Cross-National Levels of Social Trust"; Idem, "Who Trusts?"; Freitag, "Social Capital in (Dis)Similar 
Democracies." For arguments rested on personal resources, see, for example, Henry E. Brady, Sidney 
Verba, and Kay Lehman Schlozman, "Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation," The 
American Political Science Review 89, no. 2 (1995) 
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Along the consensus on the role of income, the empirical studies under various 
settings have also warranted credentials to the claim at both national level and individual 
level. At national level, for instance, Inglehart and his colleagues have found that 
economic development is a strong predictor of social trust.66 Similar association has been 
identified at individual level in Delhey and Newton's cross-national comparisons and 
Alesina and La Ferrara's study in the United States.67 
To examine whether such a postposition hold in China, I conducted a bivariate 
test of income and social trust. Specifically, based on respondents' gross personal 
income in 2004,1 divide them into three income groups. The results of the bivariate 
analysis are presented in Table 17. 



















































Source: The 2005 China General Social Survey. 
Note: The original particularized trust and generalized trust indexes are trichotomized into high, 
medium, and low levels. 
*"p< 0.001, *>< 0.01, > < 0.05. 
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The results from Table 4.6 indicate that personal wealth may have mixed impacts 
on the two types of social trust. While wealthier people are less likely to trust their 
fellow villagers, they invest more trust in strangers. One possible explanation is that in 
China to be rich one has to search economic opportunities outside the villages, and hence 
one would have more socioeconomic changes with strangers. 
Party Membership In China and other countries with the Communist legacies, 
one of most controversial sociodemographic categories pertaining to the creation of 
social trust is the membership of Communist party. There is no consensus on the impact 
of party membership yet. On one hand, according to social capital theory, participations 
in various associations may facilitate the formation of social trust. Specifically, party 
members, exposed to various and intensive sociopolitical activities, should have a higher 
/TO 
level of social trust. Tang, for instance, argues that the Communist party may well 
functions "as a formal association promotes interpersonal trust, just as social capital 
theory would predict. ... The modernization of the party organization therefore makes 
its members function similar to members in any modern association." On the other 
hand, as discussed in Chapter II, communist control over the society is characterized by 
atomization of individual citizens.70 The party-state, carrying out various political 
campaigns, deliberately eradicates any trust groups that might potentially challenge its 
68
 For a general discussion on the role of formal association, see Putnam, Making Democracy Work. For 
arguments on the impacts of party membership on various civic participation, see, for example, Letki, 
"Socialization for Participation?" 
69
 Tang, Public Opinion and Political Change, 110. For discussion on the modernization of CCP, see, for 
example, Yanjie Bian, Xiaoling Shu, and John R. Logan, "Communist Party Membership and Regime 
Dynamics in China," Social Forces 79, no. 3 (2001). 
70
 For example, see, Hannah Arendt, The Origin of Totalitarianism (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1973); Berman, "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic," World Politics 49, 
no. 3(1997). 
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control.71 As a consequence, party members should consistently demonstrate long levels 
of social trust. 
Up until now, there are few systematic empirical studies have been conducted to 
explore the correlation between party membership and the levels of social trust. To 
preliminarily investigate this question, I ran cross-tabulation tests of party membership 
between particularized trust and generalized trust. The results are present in Table 4.6. 
Table 18. Particularized Trust and Generalized Trust by CCP Membership, 2005 
Non-CCP 
CCP 






































Source: The 2005 China General Social Survey. 
Note: The original particularized trust and generalized trust indexes are trichotomized into high, 
medium, and low levels. 
**> < 0.001, "p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. 
71
 Concerning the Communist party's political campaigns in destroying social trust, Bahry and Silver have 
suggested that totalitarian regimes, like the ones under Stalin and Mao, "atomize society so that people 
become isolated and mistrustful of one another and hence unable to concert their efforts in organized 
political activity." See, Donna Bahry and Brian D. Silver, "Intimidation and the Symbolic Uses of Terror 
in the USSR," The American Political Science Review 81, no. 4 (1987), 1065. 
72
 It should be noted that Tang has carried out a study on the relationship between party membership and 
social trust in China. However, his study, based on data collected in six major cities, is highly skewed to 
sociopolitical situations in larger urban areas, and therefore, provides us with few insights about the 
relationship in the rest of China. See, Tang, Public Opinion and Political Change. 
121 
From Table 18, we can draw at least two important findings. First, in rural China, 
party membership is significantly and negatively correlated with particularized trust. 
This indicates that being a party member means being less trusting in fellow villagers. 
This finding is consistent with our prior discussion about the impacts of communist rule. 
Specifically, party-state's penetration will reduce the level of social trust circulated 
within a village, and socialization within party system will create personal detachment 
from local and personal trust relations. 
Second, party membership is positively, albeit not significantly, associated with 
generalized trust. In other words, party members are less suspicious about the complete 
strangers, and more willing to place trust in them. Such a finding seems to confirm the 
social capital thesis that interaction creates social trust. Specifically, "skills and civic 
resources learned under a non-democratic political system can well be used in a 
democracy. Party membership is a type of conventional activism that socializes citizens 
to be interested and participate in politics." 
B. Attitudinal Factors and Their Impacts 
Our discussion thus far has helped us identify who is most likely to trust in the 
Chinese context. However, it is still unclear why people in China choose to or not to 
trust. Particularly we are not equipped with knowledge about the psychological paths 
leading people to trust. To explore these unspecified psychological mechanisms, I will 
examine the effects major attitudinal factors in this section. Specifically, I include three 
important attitudes—subjective well-being, perception of equality, and norms of civility, 
73
 Letki, "Socialization for Participation," 667; Also see, Tang, Public Opinion and Political Change; 
Bian et al., "Communist Party Membership." 
which reflects one's basic views on personal life, the society, and morality. As 
discussion in Chapter I, I expect that all these three attitudes robustly affect one's 
predisposition of trusting. Briefly, this is because these attitudes are a set of normative 
and subjective values and beliefs related closely to the one's assessment of the outside 
world and others in general, and therefore fundamentally shape her or his willingness to 
take the risk of trust, or using Bernard Barber's words, to believe in "the persistence and 
fulfillment the natural and moral orders."74 
Subjective Well-being It has been argued that people's subjective evaluation of 
their overall well-being is potently associated with social trust. Specifically, some 
scholars argue the personal experiences strongly shape one's inclination of trusting; how 
well things are going with one affect her or his view about others.76 As Freitag 
comments, people's life experiences "influence the extent of one's life satisfaction ... 
individuals who are more happy and satisfied with their lives are more likely to trust 
other people than are individuals who are unhappy or dissatisfied. Life satisfaction 
reflects whether one has a generally positive or negative bearing toward the environment 
or the world in which one lives." While positive evaluation of one's own life leads to 
higher social trust, "anxiety and insecurity," as noted by Patterson, "are clearly the most 
powerful forces driving distrust." 
Bernard Barber, The Logic and Limits of Trust (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983), 9. 
75
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Earlier empirical studies at both societal and individual level have also confirmed 
such a strong relation between life satisfaction and social trust. For instance, drawing on 
data collected from various waves of WVS, Inglehart and his colleagues have found that 
"life satisfaction, happiness, interpersonal trust ... all tend to go together in a cultural 
7Q 
cluster." At individual level, Freitag, after comparing Japan and Switzerland, reports 
that life satisfaction seems to yield positive impacts on social trust in both societies. 
Furthermore, similar results have been found by Delhey and Newton with references to a 
more comprehensive comparison across seven countries.81 
Is the above-mentioned proposition about social trust and subjective well-being 
supported by the data in our survey? To answer this question, I conducted a bivariate 
analysis of life satisfaction and social trust. As confirmed and regularly used by various 
representative surveys, "satisfaction with one's life as a whole is one of the best available 
indicator of subjective well-being."82 Specifically, in this study, respondents were asked 
to evaluate their satisfaction with their life on the basis of a ten-point scale. 
The results of this bivariate analysis in presented in Figure 4.2. Deviated from 
observations obtained in non-Chinese settings, life satisfaction seems not to have a linear 
and positive effect on particularized trust or generalized trust. Our respondents registered 
higher level of life satisfaction did not express more particularized trust and generalized 
trust. Surprisingly, regarding generalized trust people who trusted most were those least 
satisfied with their own lives. With respect to particularized trust, its relationship with 
life satisfaction appears to be a concave curve: life satisfaction increases the likelihood 
79
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80
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 Inglehart, "Trust, Welling-Being and Democracy," 105; Also see, Helliwell and Robert D. Putnam, 
"The Social Context of Weil-Being," 1435-6. 
that a person will place moderate trust in people she or he knows personally, but its 
impacts diminishes as life satisfaction further increases 
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Figure 2 Particularized Trust and Generalized Trust by Life Satisfaction 
Source The 2005 China General Social Survey 
One possible explanation to the findings emerged from our survey is that life 
satisfaction, as an assessment ones' own well-being, is only weakly associated with 
individuals' willingness to take the risk of trusting. After all, social trust is "inherently a 
matter of the beliefs that one agents has about the behavior of another," and, therefore 
are mainly influenced by the confidence that other people "will manifest sensible and, 
when, needed, reciprocally beneficial behavior in their interactions."84 
Perception of Equality Increasingly students of social trust emphasize the effects 
of equality on the formation of social trust. In general, they have argued the inequality in 
income and opportunity is detrimental to the development of social trust. As Uslaner and 
Brown suggest, there are at least two mechanisms linking income inequality and distrust 
in a given society: 
[T]rust in others rests on a foundation of economic equality. When resources are 
distributed inequitably, people at the top and the bottom will not see each other as 
facing a shared fate. Therefore, they will have less reason to trust people of 
different backgrounds. Also, trust rests on a psychological foundation of 
optimism and control over one's environment. Where inequality is high, people 
will be less likely to believe that the future looks bright, and they will have even 
or 
fewer reasons to believe that they are the masters of their own fate. 
Following the same vein, some studies further suggest equality in opportunity 
could also lead to creation of social trust in a society. Specifically, reflecting upon 
socioeconomic and sociopolitical progresses in the future, people with strong sense of 
equality in opportunity may still develop strong social trust even when the society is 
highly stratified now.86 Jointly these earlier studies simply suggest that equality in both 
forms is positively and significantly associated with social trust circulated in a society. 
Empirical studies conducted in non-Chinese settings have also confirmed such a 
strong association between equality and social trust. Uslaner and Brown, using a variety 
James C. Cox, "How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior 46, no. 2 
(2004), 263. 
84
 Welch et al., "Determinants and Consequences of Social Trust," 457. 
85
 Uslaner and Brown, "Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement," 869. 
86
 Rothstein and Uslaner, "All for All." 
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of data sources collected in the United State, have found that economic inequality could 
exert "a dampening effect" on the development of social trust.87 In another cross-national 
study, Rothstein and Uslaner have concluded that the effects of equality in income and 
opportunity trump national borders, and social trust is universally generated by the two 
types of equality. In a word, the more a society is characterized by income and 
opportunity equality, the more likely citizens are going to trust each others. Yet does this 
proposition hold in the Chinese context? 
Before moving to examine the relationship between equality and social trust in 
China, it is imperative for us to specify the measurement of equality in this dissertation. 
When students of social trust assess equality, they usually rely on objective measures like 
QQ 
the Gini score. Theoretically, discrepancies can exist between a society's objective 
reality and people's perceptions of such reality. Although certainly valuable, objective 
evaluations do not tell us how people within China perceive equality in their daily life. 
Since only when individuals perceive the society to be plagued by inequality in income 
and opportunity, do they feel less optimistic and place less trust in others. Subjective 
evaluations therefore are more pertinent to social trust. Given this, in this dissertation I 
have chosen to use subjective indicators—the respondents' subjective evaluation of 
economic equality and opportunity equality—to gauge equality. 
Specifically, in order to measure our respondents' belief in equality, I asked them 
to assess following three statements: 
1. Currently some people earn a lot of money, while others only a little. This is 
fair. 
87
 Uslaner and Brown, "Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement," 889. 
88
 Rothstein and Uslaner, "All for All," 70-1. 
89
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2. If my children work hard and smart enough, they have an equal chance to 
receive higher education. 
3. In our society, children of workers and peasants have an equal chance to 
become people of great wealth and social status. 
Given our prior discussion that both income equality and opportunity equality is of 
critical importance in the development of social trust, question 1 is tapped to measure 
income equality, and question 2 and 3 is designed for opportunity equality. For all the 
three items, the respondents were asked to assess the corresponding behaviors on a five-
point scale. Specifically, "strongly agree" is coded 5, and "Strongly disagree" is coded 1. 
The three items were further combined to form an additive index, and reliability test for 
the index indicated that the standardized Cronbach's alpha is 0.758. To examine the 
relationship between norms of civility and particularize trust and generalized trust, I 
conducted bivariate correlation test. The results are presented in Table 19. 
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Table 19. Correlation between Perception of Equality and Particularized Trust and 
Generalized Trust, 2005 
















































Source: The 2005 China General Social Survey. 
Note: The original perception of equality, particularized trust and generalized trust indexes are 
trichotomized into high, medium, and low levels. 
"*p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, p < 0.05. 
From Table 19, at least two important findings stand out. First, there is a fairly 
strong relationship between one's perception of equality and particularized trust. 
Specifically, while only 25 percent of those who have reported low equality highly 
trusted people they personally know, 35 percent of those who have express high equality 
registered the same level of particularized trust. This result means that the more one 
believes in income and opportunity equality, the more likely she or he is going to trust 
surrounding people. 
Second, contrary to the strong association between perception of equality and 
particularized trust, there is only a weak relationship between generalized trust and 
equality—the gamma coefficient is as low as .02. This finding appears to be significantly 
deviating from the results emerged from empirical studies in non-Chinese settings, where 
generalized trust and perception of equality comes hand-in-hand. A possible 
explanation to this is that most of our rural respondents form their views about equality 
by observing people around them. Therefore, their perception of equality is more related 
to particularized trust than trust in strangers. 
Norms of Civility Norms of civility has long been perceived to be strongly 
associated with social trust.91 In recent decades, such a proposition has revived under 
social capital theories, in which social trust is a product of strong moral norms. 2 More 
provocatively, some scholars have further claimed that trust per se is a moral norm.93 In 
general, students have argued that norms of civility facilitate the formation of trust in 
strangers and constrain the overdevelopment of particularized trust. This line of 
arguments is well articulated in Uslaner's writings: 
Generalized trust encompasses the belief that people who are different from us 
nevertheless are part of our 'moral communities..' We have a responsibility for 
taking care of the less fortunate (emphasis added).94 
Trust in people we know, which I call 'strategic trust,' helps us decide which 
stockbroker we use or which electrician we hire. ... We usually don't know all 
potential bowling league members, but we do rely upon friends of friends, which 
also depends upon knowledge and experience, even if not so directly (emphasis 
added).95 
For example, see, Uslaner and Brown, "Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement."; Rothstein and 
Uslaner, "All for All." 
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Therefore, earlier studies tend to suggest that generalized trust is more correlated with 
norms of civility than particularized trust: while generalized trust is largely driven by 
individuals' morality, particularized trust is based direct or indirect personal knowledge 
and experience. 
However, such a proposition is largely formulated in the Western context, 
shedding little light on how distinct cultures like Confucianism may alter the relationship 
between norms of civility and social trust. As Lucian Pye points out, the relationships 
between norms of civility and generalized trust and particularized trust are not 
universal.96 Instead, the relationship is highly context-based, varying dramatically across 
different cultures. 
With regard to the relationship between norms of civility and social trust in China, 
most China specialists point out that although traditional Confucianism leads to strong 
norms of civility, such norms in China encourage distrust in strangers and extensive trust 
in surrounding people. Richard Solomon, for instance, argue that in China"[f]rom the 
time children begin to have contact with nonfamily peers, they are led to acquire a 
distrust of other people's motives ... The legacy of these early life images of social 
Q7 
relations beyond the family is a limited sense of interpersonal trust." 
While confirmed by many following interpretative studies and field observations, 
such a proposition is not tested by any survey-based empirical studies. To fill this gap, I 
try to test the relationship between the norms of civility. In order to measure our 
96
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Heberer, and Gunter Schubter(Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 2007). 
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respondents' belief in basic norms of civility, I asked them to assess following three types 
of behaviors: 
1. Not caring for the elderly, the sick, the disabled, the pregnant and children. 
2. Not being punctual. 
3. Not being credible 
For all the three items, the respondents were asked to assess the corresponding behaviors 
on a five-point scale. Specifically, "strongly dislike" is coded 5, and "highly acceptable" 
is coded 1. The three items were further combined to form an additive index, and 
reliability test for the index indicated that the standardized Cronbach's alpha is 0.758. To 
examine the relationship between norms of civility and particularize trust and generalized 
trust, I conducted bivariate correlation test. The results are presented in Table 20. 






















































Source: The 2005 China General Social Survey. 
Note: The original norms of civility, particularized trust and generalized trust indexes are 
trichotomized into high, medium, and low levels. 
**V< 0.001, "p< 0.01, p< 0.05. 
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From the results of Table 20, we can draw at least two important conclusions 
about the relationships between norms of civility and social trust. First, our findings 
confirm that social trust, either particularized or generalized trust, is strongly affected by 
norms of civility. The scores of gamma coeffiecents—.09 for particularized trust and -
.13 for generalized trust—are not only substantial but also statistically significant. 
Although the directions of impacts are different, it is evident that norms of civility 
robustly shape social trust. 
Second, the results demonstrated in Table 4.8 lend a strong support to the 
argument put forward by China specialists—that is, the traditional and prevailing norms 
of civility in China, while emphasizing intimate trust, discourage the development trust in 
strangers. Specifically, those who demonstrated strong preferences of norms of civility 
were more likely to trust people they personally know; yet, the same norm-oriented group 
of people appeared to be more suspicious of the strangers. Such a finding confirms our 
general proposition in Chapter I: social trust is strongly correlated with cultural norms. 
C. Social Interactions and Their Impacts 
As discussed in Chapter I, individuals are deeply embedded in various social 
networks and interactions. Correspondingly, individuals' trust in each other is also 
shaped by their experiences in various social interactions. As articulated by Alesina and 
La Ferrara: 
[PJeople may trust more others with whom they have had a longer interaction. 
Also, trust may be increased by an expectation of repeated interaction in the 
future. The possibility of retaliation is a basic requirement for cooperative 
equilibria, so sporadic interactions should be less conducive to 'trust' in the sense 
of expecting cooperative behavior. If this is the case, people who have lived 
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longer in a community may be more likely to trust. In the aggregate, the more 
go 
stable and less 'transient' a community is, the higher should be trust. 
Across various disciplines, students of social trust have all listed social interactions as the 
most important determinant of social trust. Specifically, political scientists like Putnam 
and Fukuyama have constantly emphasized the role of various social interactions in 
fostering social trust.99 Similarly, Luhmann, Giddens, and many other sociologists also 
argue that without familiarity resulted from extensive social interaction, social trust is 
unlikely to emerge.100 With regards to the field of economics, it is well accepted that 
trust between different participants can be only created through repetitive interactions. 
All in all, social trust is a product of social interactions. 
Both survey-based empirical studies and experimental studies have warranted 
strong support to this proposition. Brehm and Rahn, for instance, using data collected 
from 1972-94 GSS in the United States, demonstrate that at individual level, social trust 
is strongly determined by the intensity of social interactions; the more an individual 
communal activities, the more likely she or he trust others. In addition, many studies 
based cross-national surveys also confirm this finding. Paxton tests the relationship 
between social interactions, measured in associational membership on one hand, and on 
the other hand, social trust. Her research demonstrates that association membership not 
98
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only strong affects one's inclination of trust others, but such impacts prevail across all the 
31 societies included in the study. 
Paralleled to survey-based studies, numerous experimental studies also confirm 
the causal relationship running from repetitive social interactions to social trust. For 
example, in a classic experiment that is well cited by economists, Beck, Dickhaut, and 
McCabe find conclusive evidence that participants' knowledge about prior social 
interactions can strongly influence their future trusting behaviors. Similarly, in another 
research combining both sample survey and experiments, Glaeser and his colleague find 
that individuals' trusting behaviors can be best explained by their past experience of 
social exchanges, which leads them to conclude: "When individuals are closer socially, 
both trust and trustworthiness rise."105 
Furthermore, some earlier studies have also explored the relationship between 
specific types of social interactions on one hand, and on the other hand, particularized 
trust and generalized trust. Generally, they agree that the open and civic social 
interactions leads to creation of generalized trust, while closed and parochial ones leads 
to formation of particularized trust.106 As summarized by Sullivan and Transue, "when 
people are loosely bound to an association, their trust for their fellow members 
generalizes, but when they are tightly bound, they are more likely to trust only their 
fellow members."107 
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Based on the earlier theoretical, empirical, and experimental studies, in this 
dissertation I expect that respondents' reported intensity of social interaction to be 
positively associated with their trust in fellow villagers (i.e. particularized trust), but 
negatively with trust in strangers (i.e. generalized trust). 
Specifically, I used the following three subjective measurements to gauge 
respondents' involvement in social interactions: 
1. How could you describe the intimacy level between you and your 
relatives/friends? 
2. How could you describe the familiarity level between you and your 
neighbors? 
3. How could you describe the intensity of cooperative activities between you 
and your neighbors? 
For all the three items, the respondents were asked to assess the corresponding behaviors 
on a five-point scale. Specifically, "strongly dislike" is coded 5, and "highly acceptable" 
is coded 1. It should be noted that although many students of social trust reply on 
objective measurement like membership to gauge the intensity of social interaction, I 
believe subjective measurement is more appropriate in the Chinese setting. 
First, such objective measures as associational membership is widely criticized 
for their inability to reflect actual intensity and type of social interactions. As many 
scholars state, the simply index of membership, also known as Putnam's index, cannot 
reflect to the respondents' actual participation in the associations.10 Worse more, 
Bob Edwards and Michael W. Foley, "Civil Society and Social Capital Beyond Putnam," American 
Behavioral Scientist 42, no. 1 (1998). 
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associations per se are notoriously for categorization.109 For the majority of associations 
it is hard tell whether or not they are closed. 
Second, formal membership excludes a lot of informal social activities which 
tends to more prevalent in China. For most non-western countries, due to various 
reasons, formal associations remain largely underdevelopment. Therefore, informal 
social activities serve as the main vehicle of trust creation. As Gibson observes, in 
Russia, it is the informal social interactions like "kitchen circles"—"groups of friends 
who met in the kitchens of their apartments and led endless conversations about the 
meaning of creation, art, and politic"—that have playing a pivotal role in shaping 
interpersonal trust.110 Given this, it is reasonable to assume that people in China, sharing 
the same communist heritage like Russian, are more frequently participating in informal 
social exchanges. 
Third, for purpose of this research, subject assessment of involvement in social 
interaction is more relevant to the formation of social trust. As Tang once points out, "it 
seems intuitively that one's closeness to family members, neighbors, friends, co-workers, 
schoolmates, and so on should also build interpersonal trust."111 
To test our expectation on the relationship between intensity of social interaction 
and the two types of trust, I examined their bivariate correlations as presented in Figure 3. 
10
 For example, see, Sjoerd Beugelsdijk and Ton van Schaik, "Social Capital and Growth in European 
Regions: An Empirical Test," European Journal of Political Economy 21, no. 2 (2005); Michele P. 
Claibourn and Paul S. Martin, "The Third Face of Social Capital: How Membership in Voluntary 
Associations Improves Policy Accountability," Political Research Quarterly 60, no. 2 (2007). 
110
 James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's 
Democratic Transition," American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 1 (2001), 54. 
1
' ' Tang, Public Opinion and Political Change in China, 107 
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Figure 3. Particularized Trust and Generalized Trust by Intensity of Social Interaction 
Source: The 2005 China General Social Survey. 
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The results of Figure 4.4 largely confirm our expectation about the relationship 
between pariticularized trust and generalized trust and intensity of social interactions. 
Specifically, two important findings stand out. First, as revealed in (a), (c), and (e), 
respondents' particularized trust rose with all three indicators of social interactions. This 
means that the more an individual is involved in social exchanges, the more likely she or 
he develops sense of trust in others. This finding is consistent with our aforementioned 
argument that trust is a product of social interactions. 
Second, generalized trust in not positively correlated with localized social 
interactions. Throughout (b), (d), and (f), there is no sign that generalized trust will rise 
with increased intensity of social interaction. On the contrary, as indicated in (b), 
generalized trust declines with increased familiarity reported by respondents. Jointly, 
these results suggest that such informal social interactions will not lead to the creation of 
generalized trust. In other words, an individual who is active in village affairs is less 
likely to develop trust in strangers. 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL 
To this point, I have addressed individual-level influences on the two types of 
social trust. Besides the determinants at the individual level, many studies of social trust 
have already pointed out that aggregate features at national level could profoundly shape 
1 1 9 
individuals' inclination of trusting. In this dissertation, as demonstrated in the previous 
discussion, I argue that contextual influence can also be found at village level. Certain 
112
 For example, Paxton, "Association Memberships and Generalized Trust"; Jamal and Nooruddin, "The 
Democratic Utility of Trust." 
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contextual features of a village can strongly encourage or discourage trusting behaviors 
of individuals. 
Although students of social trust have increasing recognized the importance of the 
contextual factors in shaping social trust, few survey-based studies, particularly sample 
surveys other than WVS and GSS, have been devoted to explore the contextual origins of 
social trust.113 To fill this gap, I will examine the effects of features of villages in this 
section. Specifically, I expect two categories of village features—sociogeographic 
features and community heterogeneity—to have strong impacts on the formation of social 
trust. However, since trust possessed by individuals and village features are at different 
levels, no bivariate analyses are conducted in this section. 
A. Sociogeographic features 
As discussed above, villages in China differentiate from each other dramatically 
in terms of basic sociogeographic situations. Similar to the category of socioeconomic 
factors discussed above, I expect villages with different sociogeographic features provide 
different conditions for the development of social trust. Specifically, in this dissertation, 
I focus on population size, the number of natural villages, territory size, income per 
capita, distance from the nearest fair and Zhen/Xiang government. Capturing key aspects 
of sociogeographic conditions of villages, these variables may tells us under what sort of 
situations people are more likely to trust others. In the following part of this section, I 
will briefly examine their relationship with the development of social trust. 
113
 A quick literature review will show that most multilevel studies of social trust are using the WVS 
dataset. See for example, Paxton, "Association Memberships and Generalized Trust 
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Table 21. Descriptives of Ex 
Items 
Population size 
N. of natural villages 
Territory size (Km2) 
Income per capita (xlO-3) 
Distance from the nearest 
fair (Km) 
Distance from Zhen/Xiang 
government (Km) 
Largest surname group (%) 
Second largest surname 
group (%) 
Third largest surname group 
(%) 
Existence of informal 
lineage group (0-1) 















Source: The 2005 China General Social 















































Population Size Some earlier studies have emphasized that the population size of 
a community can strongly shape people's trust. Based on network analysis, they have 
concluded the social trust is most likely to evolve in smaller networks.114 In addition, 
compared to small communities, larger communities tend to be more diverse, and 
therefore are inhospitable for the creation of various social trusts.115 Some empirical 
studies also incorporate population size at national level in cross-national comparison. 
In this study, I expect population size is negatively related to the levels of social trust. As 
indicated in Table 4.9, there are significant variations associated with the size of 
114
 Bjornskov, "Determinants of Generalized Trust," 7. 
115
 For instance, see, Elinor Ostrom, "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective 
Action," The American Political Science Review 92, no. 1 (1998), 2. 
116
 Freitag and BuDhlmann, "Crafting Trust." 
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population, ranging from small villages with less than two hundred people to town-like 
villages with about 17 thousand villagers. 
Natural Village A complication pertaining to the exploration of villages in China 
is that an administrative village is often composed of several geographically dispersed 
natural villages. As revealed in Table 4.9, nation-widely speaking, one administrative 
village in China normally encompasses about five natural villages. In some extreme 
examples, an administrative village could include as many as 70 villages. 
What are the implications of dispersed natural villages for the development of 
social trust? Apparently with increased number of natural villages, the transaction cost of 
social interaction will be exponentially increased. This means, more natural village in an 
administrative village includes, the less frequently villagers of different natural village 
engage in interactions, and accordingly social trust is less likely to be developed. Thus, 
in this dissertation I expect that the number of natural village is negatively associated 
with social trust. 
Territory Size Compared to population size and number of natural village, the 
relationship between territory size and social trust seems to be less certain. On one hand, 
territory size appears to be negatively linked to social trust since people residing within a 
small village are more likely to know each other and accordingly trust each other. On the 
other hand, social trust can be positively correlated with social trust because smaller 
territory means smaller resource pool and more chances of conflicts. Therefore, 
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concerning the relationship between territory sized and social trust, our expectation, like 
Gibson, Duch and Tedin, is "ambiguous, if not contradictory."117 
Economic Development Many students of social trust have found that at the 
global level, a nation's economic development level (often operationalized as GDP per 
* • 118 
capita) is significantly correlated with social trust. Specifically, Inglehart, using data 
collected from 61 countries from 1990 to 1997, finds that "[t]he people of rich societies 
show higher levels of interpersonal trust than the publics of poorer ones."119 As argued 
by BJ0rnskov, this may reflect a scale-up effect of personal income at individual level, 
that is, within a country when more people are relatively economically secure, they are 
more likely to take the risks of trust, which will according lead to higher level of social 
trust. The same logic can also be applied to village level. Hence, in this dissertation, I 
expect that the economic development level of a village, measured in village GDP per 
capita, is positively correlated with social trust. In other words, the wealthier a village is, 
the more likely the villagers develop social trust. 
Geographic Isolation As discussed in Chapter I, the interaction and direct 
experiences with members of other social groups play a pivotal role in shaping the 
formation of social trust. In particular, the positive experience with dissimilar people 
may lead to higher level of generalized trust, while intensive intra-group activities could 
117
 James L. Gibson, Raymond M. Duch, and Kent L. Tedin, "Democratic Values and the Transformation 
of the Soviet Union," The Journal of Politics 54, no. 2 (1992), 357. 
118
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contribute little to the development of generalized trust. As Melissa J. Marschall and 
Dietlind Stolle suggest, "social interactions among heterogeneous groups and individuals 
and positive cooperative experiences are more conducive to the development of trust that 
includes members of the former out-group."122 In light of this, a geographically isolated 
village will turn out to be inhospitable to the formation of social trust, since the villagers 
have few chances in engaging in interaction or cooperation with strangers. On the other 
hands, a village enjoying transporting advantages is more likely to develop generalized 
trust. Therefore, I expect the geographic isolation is positively associated with 
particularized trust, but negatively generalized social trust. Specifically, in this 
dissertation, I use to measures to gauge villages' geographic isolation: distance from the 
nearest fair and distance from Zhen/Xiang government. 
B. Heterogeneity 
Besides the basic sociogeographic features addressed above, heterogeneity of a 
community frequently appears in the literature, and is ascribed by most students as a key 
determinant of social trust.123 In this study, I include in the category of community 
heterogeneity two items—surname fragmentation and solidary groups. As discussed in 
Chapter I and revealed in Chapter II, I expect there may be association between 
heterogeneity and social trust, but such associations should be weak. In this section, I 
will explore their associations. 
121
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Types of Lineage Groups China scholars have long emphasized lineage identities 
helping rural Chinese to distinguish from each other is the lineage.1 Villagers 
belonging to the same lineage groups are not only bonded by the same identity, but more 
* 19S 
likely to be intensively engaged in collective activities like lineage gatherings. 
Accordingly, the presence of strong lineage groups is commonly perceived as a 
convenient of indicator of high social trust. Therefore, earlier studies in general suggest 
that with the presence of lineage group, villagers are more likely to develop strong sense 
of particularized trust. 
However, as revealed in Chapter II, there is no statistically significant difference 
between villagers' trust in kinsmen and non-kinsmen. The finding implies that the role of 
lineage groups in shaping social trust is limited. To certain extent, this can be explained 
by political campaigns of the communist party to destroy traditional social groups. 
Therefore, in this dissertation, I expected that the presence of lineage groups is weakly 
associated with particularized trust. Specifically, this variable encompasses three—the 
existence of lineage groups with ancestral halls, existence of lineage groups without 
ancestral halls, and non-existence of lineage groups. 
For studies on lineage identities in China, see, for example, Susanne BrandtstaUdter, "Taking Elias to 
China (and Leaving Weber at Home): Post-Maoist Transformations and Neo-Traditional Revivals," 
Sociologus 50, no. 2 (2000); Myron L. Cohen, "Lineage Organization in North China," The Journal of 
Asian Studies 49, no. 3 (1990); Lily L. Tsai, Accountability without Democracy: Solidary Groups and 
Public Goods Provision in Rural China (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
It should be noted that in rural China several expressions are interchangeably used to describe 
lineage group, such as daxing, zongzu, jiazu, or zong. In this survey, the term of "daxing" is used, since it 
commonly refers to the dominant or major lineage group in a village. For more detailed discussion, see, for 
example, Chenggui Li, "Dangdai Zhongguo Nongcun Zongzu Wenti Yanjiu [Lineage Group Study in 
Contemporary Rural China]," Guanli Shijie [Management World] 5, no. (1994); Rui Wen and Guohe Jiang, 
"20 Shiji 90 Niandai Yilai Dangdai Zhongguo Nongcun Zongzu Wenti Yanjiu Guankui [Lineage Group 
Study in Contemporary Rural China since 1990s]," Fujian Shifan Daxue Xuebao [Journal of Fujian 
Normal University] 4, no. (2004). 
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Lineage Fragmentation Besides the presence of the lineage groups, some other 
scholar have further pointed out that their relationship may strongly affect the formation 
of social trust. Specifically, as a basal identity, surname identify can serve as a source of 
conflicts As Kennedy once observed, "the greater the number of relevant lineage 
organizations within the village, the greater the conflict over village resources, adding 
that village elections have exacerbated this conflict."1 Therefore, earlier studies suggest 
that lineage fragmentation is negatively associated with the formation of generalized 
social trust. However, as discussed the above, the role of lineage groups tend to be over-
emphasized by prior studies. The results in this dissertation suggest no significant of 
lineage group. Based on this, I expect that fragmentation is also weakly associated with 
the formation of social trust. Specifically, we create a weighted score of the number of 
lineage groups for each sampled village, applying the standard formula for effective 
1 97 
number of parities (ENP). The larger the value of this measure, the more lineage 
groups exist in a village, and hence the more fragmented the village is. 
126
 John James Kennedy, "The Face of'Grassroots Democracy' in Rural China: Real Versus Cosmetic 
Elections," Asian Survey 42, no. 3 (2002), 470. Also see, for example, Melanie Manion, "Democracy, 
Community, Trust: The Impact of Elections in Rural China," Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 3 
(2006). 
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 This measure was also used in a study of elections in rural China by Manion. Specifically, in this 
dissertation, the following formula has been used, 
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Frag. Index = =3 j (1) 
where, p, stands for the percentage of fth largest surname group in a given village. See, Manion, 
"Democracy, Community, Trust," 306-7. 
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 For example, if there are two lineage groups in a village and they are exactly the same size, the value of 
the measure is 2. If, however, one lineage group consists of 80% of the villagers in a village and the other 
20%, the value of the measure is just below 1.5. 
A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS 
Up to this point, I have addressed the relationship between various sociopolitical 
factors on one hand, and the two types of social trust on the other hand. In order to 
determine the independent effects of these explanatory variables at both individual level 
and village level, and the relative weights of these effects on social trust, we need to 
employ a multilevel analysis that incorporates all above-specified, explanatory variables 
at two different levels. Specifically, I will first briefly specify the model, and then 
discuss the results emerged from the analysis. 
A. Multilevel Model 
Given aforementioned five categories of determinants, in this chapter I use 
multilevel models to test them against the data drawn from 2005 China General Social 
Survey. As described in Chapter I, unlike most representative surveys conducted in 
China,129 this 2005 China survey has used two sets of questionnaires at both individual 
and village levels. Such a data structure allows us to simultaneously test the independent 
effects of our key explanatory variables at different levels. 
While a comprehensive discussion of multilevel model is beyond the purpose and 
1 ^0 
scope of this dissertation, I will provide a short overview. The key to understanding 
multilevel model is to analyze how variances are introduced by contextual variables at 
the macro level. In other words, multilevel model is a method to model variance at 
macro level. One major variance term that distinguishes a multilevel model from a 
129
 Melanie Manion, "Survey Research in the Study of Contemporary China: Learning from Local 
Samples," The China Quarterly 139, no. Sep. (1994). 
130
 For more detailed discussion of multilevel model, see, for example, Hox, Multilevel Analysis. 
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regression model is a term that allows aggregate units to differ in their mean values. For 
instance, a simple two-stage multilevel model can be stated as: 
Vu = Po, + PiXuj + el} (3) 
Poj = 0oo + "0 , (4) 
In combined form, the model is: 
Vij = /?oo + PiXuj + uo} + £ij ( 5 ) 
This model states that the dependent variable, yy, at micro level is a function of a 
common intercept, B00 , and two error terms: the error term at macro level, UQ}, and the 
error term at micro level ey. Essentially, the model suggests that any value of the 
dependent variable can be described in terms of an overall mean plus error associated 
with macro and micro error. In this dissertation, a multilevel model of social trust means 
that we do not assume that the two types of social trust, the intercept of Boo, and the 
influence of the micro-level independent variables R\ are the same in all villages. Instead, 
we are dealing with variables that can vary according to context. Furthermore, multilevel 
model allows us to model of specific contextual factors, such as the size of village, 
heterogeneity, geographic isolation, and etc., that explain variation on the macro level 
(e.g., from village to village). Schematically, such a two-level model takes the following 
form: 
Vij = 00, + PlXli, + - + PnXmj + £ij (6) 
Poj = 0oo + YiWu + - + ynWnj + u0j (7) 
In combined form, the model is: 
7i} = 000 + PlXuj + ••• + PnXmj + YlWu + - + YnWnj + £ij + "o7 (8) 
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This model indicates that a specific type of social trust (y) of an individual (i) in a 
village (J) is explained by the national average (fioo), individual-level characteristics (X, or 
the coefficient 0), and properties of the various countries (W, or the coefficient y). In this 
manner, both individual differences (eyy) and context-dependent differences in the 
underlying level of trust (uoj) are all covered in the model. Using the hierarchical model 
we estimate whether and to what extent the variance in individual generalized trust can be 
explained by differences between individuals, differences between countries, and 
differences in the effects of the independent variables. 
B. Findings and Discussions 
In this section we subject our theory-derived relationships to empirical tests, 
exploring how factors at both individual and village level affect the formation of 
particularized trust and generalized trust. Specifically, for both generalized trust and 
particularized trust, I present a progression of models, beginning by estimating a baseline 
model with basic sociodemographic of individuals and sociogeographic of villages. I 
precede my analysis by adding other categories of independent variables into the model. 
Finally, a full model encompassing all categories of independent variables will be 
presented. 
Table 22. Multilevel Model of Particularized Trust among Rural Resident in China 
Intercept 
Individual-Level Factors 





CCP membership (0-1) 
Life satisfaction 
Norms of civility 
Perception of equality 
Familiarity with fellow 
villagers 
Cooperative activities 




















































































































Table 22. Continued 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Village population (log) 
Number of natural 
villages 
Village territory 
Income per capita (x 10"3) 
Distance from the nearest 
fair 
Distance from the site of 
Zhen/Xiang government 
Surname fragmentation 
Informal lineage networks 
(0-1) 





























































Number of Observations 
Number of Villages 
Pseudo-R Square 1 .15 
3504 
370 
.16 .12 .12 .1! 
Note: Entries are maximum likelihood coefficients estimated using the packages of multilevel and nlme in R. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. "*p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
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Sources of Particularized Trust Table 4.10 presents results of multilevel analysis 
of the impacts of variables on the formation of social trust. First conclusion we can draw 
from these results is that a multilevel analysis is appropriate for study of origins of social 
trust. It is clear the variation of particularized trust can be explained by variables at both 
individual level and village level. Such findings confirm our theorization that both 
individual and contextual factors are involved in the creation of social trust. Without 
taking explanatory variables at both levels into consideration, our answers to the origins 
of social tend to be incomplete, if not highly biased. 
Second, just as we expected, particularized trust is a function of such socio-
demographic factors at individual level as age and marital status. Specifically, the results 
indicate that those who were older and unmarried tend to place more trust in fellow 
villagers. Other social categories like gender, economic status, education, and party 
membership, albeit the correct signs, fail to exert significant impacts on particularized 
trust. 
Third, the results in Table 4.10 demonstrate that even controlling for all the other 
factors, subjective orientations like life satisfaction, perception of equality, and norms of 
civility are significantly correlated with particularized trust. Such findings indicate that 
in rural China individuals who are highly satisfied with their live, believe in equality of 
income and opportunity, and adhere to norms of civility are more likely in place their 
trust in relative, neighbors, and other fellow villagers. 
Forth, with regard to informal social interaction, the empirical evidence in Table 
4.10 indicates that social interaction plays a deterministic role in the development of 
particularized trust. Specifically, both the two subjective and one objective measures of 
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social interaction are positively and significantly correlated with particularized trust, even 
controlling for other variables. In other words, people who were more intimate with 
relatives, more familiar with neighbors, and active in informal cooperation were more 
easily to trust people they know. 
Finally, in examining explanatory variable at village level, only the territory size 
and number of natural villages yield strong impacts on particularized trust. Specifically, 
controlling for all other variables, both the territory size and number of natural villages 
are significantly and negatively associated with particularized trust. Such findings 
demonstrate that in an administrative village encompassing large territory and multiple 
natural villages, villagers are less likely to develop their trust in their follow villagers. 
This evidence, along with the results associated with social interaction mentioned above, 
support one of the most important general hypotheses specified in Chapter I, that is, since 
people gain the knowledge and information of other people in the process of social 
interactions, the patterns and intensity can fundamentally shape the formation of 
particularized trust. 
The final interesting finding standing out from Table 4.10 is that heterogeneity 
associated with lineage identifies fails to exert any substantial impact on the development 
of particularized trust. Specifically, neither lineage fragmentation index nor types of 
lineage groups are significantly correlated with the levels of particularized trust. Such 
findings confirm our earlier discussion on the distribution of social trust in China, that is, 
despite anecdotal cases of lineage-dominant villages, nation-widely speaking, the role of 
lineage groups is limited. In other words, with respect to the basic trust relation in China, 
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there is no significant different between villages with lineage networks and villages 
without. 
Sources of Generalized Trust Table 4.11 presents results of multilevel analysis of 
the impacts of variables on the formation of generalized trust (i.e., villagers' trust in 
strangers). Overall the results from the multilevel analysis confirm most of the results 
from the bivariate analyses above. 
Table 23. Multilevel Model of Generalized Trust among Rural Resident in China 
Intercept 
Individual-Level Factors 




Income (xlO" ) 
CCP membership (0-1) 
Life satisfaction 
Norms of civility 
Perception of equality 
Familiarity with fellow 
villagers 
Cooperative activities 





















































































































Table 23. Continued 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Village population (log) 





Distance from the nearest 
fair 


































































Number of Observations 
Number of Villages 
Pseudo-R Square .09 .11 .11 
3463 
370 
.12 .10 .10 .12 
Note: Entries are maximum likelihood coefficients estimated using the packages of multilevel and nlme in R. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. "*p < 0.01, "p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
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First of all, among various sociodemographic factors, only age and party 
membership can strong influence one's trust in strangers. Specifically, across the five 
models, both age and party membership is positively and significantly correlated with 
generalized trust. In other words, older CCP members are more likely to place trust in 
strangers. However, other sociodemographic factors like sex, marital status, education, 
and personal income, could not independently influence generalized trust, albeit their 
correct signs. 
Second, with respect to subjective orientations, only norms of civility had 
independent impacts on generalized trust. Specifically, the level of norms of civility is 
negatively and significantly associated with generalized trust. This means that those who 
expressed stronger moral obligations are less likely to trust strangers. Such a finding is 
consistent with our earlier discussion on why Chinese traditional culture discourage trust 
in strangers albeit its emphasis on the norms of civility. Meanwhile, it should be noted 
that the other two widely-accepted important predictor of generalized trust—life 
satisfaction and perception of equality—could not independently affect our respondents' 
trust in strangers. 
Third, there is no strong relationship between intra-village interactions and 
generalized trust. Specifically none of three measures of intra-village interaction could 
independently exert strong impact on generalized trust. Such a finding implies that 
intensive intra-village interactions are far from being an obstacle to the development of 
generalized trust. Individuals who were locked in close-knit networks are not less likely 
to development generalized trust in others. Therefore, this is no necessary negative 
relationship between trust in strangers and intensive in-group activities. 
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Finally, at village level, only the number of natural village is significantly and 
negatively related to generalized trust, while all the other variables like economic 
development, geographic isolation, or heterogeneity had little independent and direct 
impact on generalized trust. Specifically, the number of natural village is negatively and 
significantly associated with generalized trust. This means that individuals who resided 
in an administrative village with multiple natural villages are less likely to develop trust 
in strangers. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Who is more likely to trust other in rural China? What are the most important 
psychological and sociopolitical factors prompting people to trust? In what kinds of 
villages people are more likely to develop trust in each other? In this chapter, I have 
addressed these three questions of critical importance by examining the impacts of five 
categories of explanatory variables—sociodemographic attributes, subjective orientations, 
and social interactions, at individual level, and sociogeographic attributes and community 
heterogeneity at village level—on the formation of particularized trust and generalized 
trust. The major findings and implications are reiterated as follows. 
In the first place, who is more or less likely to trust surrounding people and 
strangers in rural China? From the 2005 nation-wide survey, I have found that (1) older 
people were more trusting with regard to their fellow villagers and general others; and (2) 
married people were generally invest less trust in their surrounding people. Besides these 
two, other sociodemographic factors failed to independently affect the development of 
particularized trust and generalized trust. 
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Second, why do the ordinary Chinese rural residents' choose to or not to trust 
others? Based on the findings from this survey, we may conclude that in rural China 
some villagers are more likely to trust their fellow villagers because they are more 
satisfied with their lives, believe in income and opportunity equality, demonstrate 
stronger norms of civility, or interact with their family, friends, and neighbors more 
frequently. Additionally, we could conclude that the ordinary Chinese rural residents are 
less likely to trust strangers when they attach great values to norms of civility like helping 
the weak, and being punctual and credible. 
Third, in what kinds of villages people are more likely to develop trust in each 
other? The empirical evidence emerged from our analysis suggests that the Chinese 
villagers who live in administrative villages with multiple natural villages are less likely 
to trust either their fellow villagers or strangers. Also, one can conclude that villages 
with larger population are less likely to foster trust among the residents. 
From these findings, one can easily find that the formation of particularized trust 
and generalized trust appear to follow different psychological paths. While particularized 
trust is strongly shaped by a various factors ranging from personal traits to intra-village, 
only a limited number of factors can independently affect generalized trust. This finding 
further confirms the necessity and validity to distinguish between particularized trust and 
generalized trust. 
A second implication we can draw from above-mentioned findings is that both 
cultural arguments and rational arguments can help us to unveil the formation of social 
trust. Specifically, the Chinese villagers' trust level is not only influenced by their 
subjective orientation, but also shaped their personal experience gained in informal social 
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interactions. Therefore, it would be misleading to conceptualized social trust solely as 
cultural or rational phenomenon. 
The empirical findings also imply that besides factors at individual levels, the 
attributes of community can robustly affect people's propensity to trust. However, my 
findings suggest that the presence of such solidary groups as lineages does not have a 
substantial impact on ordinary villagers' trust in each other. Therefore, it seems that role 
of solidary groups in rural China is not as influential as many scholars postulated, at least 
with regard to the trust relations among the ordinary Chinese rural residents. 
Finally, our exploration of the determinants of social trust in rural China indicates 
that strong norms of civility are not always positively associated with people's trust in 
strangers. The relationship between civic norms and social trust is far from being 
universal. In the case of China, civic norms like help the weak, punctuality, and 
credibility prompts villagers to trust their surrounding people, and discourage people to 
engage in trust relations with stranger. Yet, if in China the prevalent social norms 
discourage people to trust strangers, does this imply that like southern Italy, the 
particularized-trust-abundant rural China will be unable to achieve good local governance? 
In the following chapter, I will visit this question by examining the impacts of 
particularized trust and generalized trust on rural public goods provision in China. 
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CHAPTER V 
SOCIAL TRUST AND PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION IN RURAL CHINA 
As illuminated in previous chapters, social trust is a multi-dimensional concept, 
encompassing two important sub-dimensions—particularized trust and generalized trust. 
Moreover, the discussion in Chapter IV demonstrates that Chinese rural residents develop 
these two types of trust through different psychological paths. Although increasing 
number of scholars have recognized the distinction between particularized trust and 
generalized trust, there is no consensus on what kinds of roles the two types of trusts play 
in shaping such desirable sociopolitical outcomes as public goods provision. Specifically, 
does a village's repertoire of particularized trust (i.e. trust in people we personally know) 
and generalized trust (i.e. trust in strangers) robustly affect its level of public goods 
provision? If so, how? The answers to these questions not only are of critical importance 
in advancing our understandings of social trust, but also have direct implications for how 
to improve the quality of rural governance. To fill this gap, in this chapter I will address 
these questions by examining the impacts of the two types of social trust on public goods 
provision in rural China. 
PREVIOUS SCHOLARSHIP AND THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
Ever since the late 1960s, political scientists have already noticed the pivotal role 
played by social trust in shaping public goods provision at the local level.1 Particularly 
1
 Edward C. Banfield, Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Riverside, NJ: Free Press, [1958] 1976); Also 
see, for example, Celso Furtado, Development and Underdevelopment (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1964); Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1965). 
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after Putnam's path-breaking work, Making Democracy Work, there is a body of rapidly 
growing literature on the relationship between social trust and pubic goods provisions. 
However, scholars are still exploring and debating on how exactly social trust affects the 
level public goods provision. Generally, there are two general schools of thoughts, 
which I term as Social Capital Thesis and Solidary Group Thesis respectively. 
Social capital thesis, derived from the Tocquevillian tradition, emphasizes the 
importance of generalized trust in facilitating civic cooperation and participation, arguing 
that while generalized trust is positively associated with public goods provisions, a large 
repertoire of particularized trust is detrimental to local public goods provisions by 
hindering cooperation across various social divides such as class and ethnicity. Solidary 
group thesis makes an important revision to social capital thesis by suggesting that under 
certain sociopolitical environments, particularized trust could still contribute to public 
goods provision at local level.5 Specifically, solidary group thesis argue that only when 
there is one single solidary group in a village (viz., the boundary of the solidary group 
2
 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1993). 
3
 See two good reviews on the debates of the impacts of social trust, Peter Nannestad, "What Have We 
Learned About Generalized Trust, If Anything?," Annual Review of Political Science 11, no. (2008); 
Michael Woolcock, "The Rise and Routinization of Social Capital, 1988-2008," Annual Review of Political 
Science 13, no. (2010). 
4
 Gema M. Garcia Albacete, "The Saliency of Political Cleavages and the 'Dark Sides' of Social Capital: 
Evidence from Spain," American Behavioral Scientist 53, no. 5 (2010); Jie Chen, Narisong Huhe, and 
Chunlong Lu, "Generalized vs. Particularized Social Capital: Social Trust and Grassroots Governance in 
Urban China," in Toward Better Governance in China: An Unconventional Pathway of Political Reform, 
ed. Baogang Guo and Dennis Hickey(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009). 
5
 Alejandro Portes, "Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology," Annual Review of 
Sociology 24, no. (1998); Alejandro Portes and Patricia Landolt, "Social Capital: Promise and Pitfalls of Its 
Role in Development," Journal of Latin American Studies 32, no. 02 (2000); Alejandro Portes and Julia 
Sensenbrenner, "Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action," 
The American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 6 (1993); Rebecca L. Sandefur and Edward O. Laumann, "A 
Paradigm for Social Capital," Rationality and Society 10, no. 4 (1998); Lily L. Tsai, Accountability without 
Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007); Idem, "Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods 
Provision in Rural China," American Political Science Review 101, no. 2 (2007); Anirudh Krishna, Active 
Social Capital: Tracing the Roots of Development and Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2002). 
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coincides with the administrative boundary of the village), could particularized trust lead 
to sufficient public goods provision. 
However, in this dissertation, I find both theses are flawed. As discussed in 
Chapter I, I argue that as far as local public goods provision is concerned, particularized 
trust is actually positively correlated with public goods provision, while generalized trust 
is only weakly associated with the provision of public goods. In the following parts of 
this section, I will first review the major arguments of the two theses. Subsequently, I 
explain why both social capital thesis and solidary group thesis are flawed. Finally, the 
testable hypotheses concerning the relationship between social trust and public goods 
provision will be addressed. 
A. Social Capital Thesis 
Social capital thesis, popularized by Bourdieu, Coleman, and Putnam, suggests 
that besides formal institutions, certain features of social organizations such as trust could 
significantly improve the overall efficiency of a society. Having recognized 
shortcomings of the early conceptualization of social capital,7 more and more scholars 
6
 Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," in Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of 
Education, ed. John G Richardson (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986); James S. Coleman, "Social 
Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," in Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective, ed. Partha 
Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000); Robert D. Putnam, Making 
Democracy Work. 
7
 The concept of social capital is notoriously difficult to accurately define and reliably measure. Drawing 
on intellectual roots in economics, sociology, and political science, the concept of social capital is endowed 
by different authors with various but distinct properties. As much empirical research reveals, the various 
dimensions of social capital do not function as a monolithic whole, see, for example, Christian Bjornskov, 
"The Multiple Facets of Social Capital," European Journal of Political Economy 22, no. 1 (2006). 
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have agreed that social trust is the most important component of social capital, and 
accordingly steered their attention to studies of the impacts of social trust. 
Concerning the relationship between social trust and public goods provision, most 
scholars of social capital thesis agree upon the difference between particularized trust and 
generalized trust, and suggest that these two types of trusts have dramatically opposite 
impacts on various sociopolitical outcomes. In general, they postulate that only 
generalized trust is playing a positive role in the provision of public goods and services. 
In the first place, social capital thesis postulates that generalized trust contributes 
to local public goods provision by facilitating social cooperation. As well established by 
political scientists and economists, public goods provisions at local level often involve in 
a collective action problem,11 where every rational actors has a strong motivation to free 
ride on the contribution made by everyone else. Such a problem seems to be particularly 
acute among strangers. According to social capital thesis, such a problem could be easily 
solved when people possess strong generalized trust. When one trusts in strangers, she 
or he is more likely to take the risk to cooperate. However, they argue that strong norms 
Uslaner, "Democracy and Social Capital " 
9
 See, for example, Patrick Francois and Jan Zabojmk, Trust, Social Capital and Economic Development 
(2005), Paul J Zak and Stephen Knack, "Trust and Growth," The Economic Journal 111, no 470 (2001) 
10
 Fukuyama, Trust The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York, NY Penguim Books, 
1995), Putnam, Bowling Alone, William A. Callahan, "Social Capital and Corruption Vote Buying and the 
Politics of Reform in Thailand," Perspectives on Politics 3, no 3 (2005), Sonja Zmerli, "Applying the 
Concepts of Bonding and Bridging Social Capital to Empirical Research," European Political Science 2(3), 
(2003), 68-75 
11
 Mancur Olson, Logic of Collective Action Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1971), Lars Udehn, "Twenty-Five Years with the Logic of Collective Action," 
Acta Sociologica 36, no 3 (1993) 
12
 Fukuyama, Trust, Putnam, Making Democracy Work, Bo Rothstein, "Trust, Social Dilemmas and 
Collective Memories," Journal of Theoretical Politics 12, no 4 (2000), 477 
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of particularized trust hinder social cooperation, since particularized trusters are less 
likely to extent their trust to strangers. 
Secondly, social capital thesis further suggests that generalized trust helps to hold 
public officials accountable, while particularized trust can only encourage corruption and 
parochial interests. Carles Boix and Daniel Posner, for instance, argue the generalized 
trust has important consequences for the extent to which public officials are accountable 
to ordinary citizens. Specifically, they note that generalized trust can significantly 
expand the "opportunities for citizens to discuss civic affairs, increase their awareness of 
political issues and argue about whether or not the government is doing everything that it 
should to improve their welfare. Knowing that their constituents are monitoring and 
discussing their behaviour, elected political elites will work harder to govern effectively, 
lest they be removed from office at election-time."15 Similarly, Margit Tavits argues that 
when masses and bureaucrats share generalized trust, the later are more likely to 
internalize the interests of masses, and therefore are more self-motivated to behavior in 
responsive manners. 
With regard to the relationship between particularized trust and governmental 
accountability, most students of social capital speculate a negative relationship. 
Specifically, in encouraging closed and strong ties among acquaintances, particularized 
trust tends to foster patronage and corruption in government. Rather than representing 
the broad masses, public officials in communities with abundant particularized trust are 
13
 Fukuyama, "Social Capital and Development"; Zmerli, "Applying the Concepts of Bonding and 
Bridging Social Capital." 
14
 Carles Boix and Daniel N. Posner, "Social Capital: Explaining Its Origins and Effects on Government 
Performance," British Journal of Political Science 28, no. 4 (1998). 
15
 Ibid, 690. 
16
 Margit Tavits, "Making Democracy Work More? Exploring the Linkage between Social Capital and 
Government Performance," Political Research Quarterly 59, no. 2 (2006). 
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more likely to speak for her or his own parochial groups.17 As a result, communities with 
abundant particularized trust are usually plagued by irresponsible public officials and 
intergroup conflicts. After exploring trust relations in Thai local election, William 
Callahan finds that particularized trust, as the "complementary opposite" of generalized 
trust, is closely associated political corruption, vote buying in particular. 
To take a stock of above, social capital thesis postulates that only generalized trust 
is conducive to the provision of public goods, and particularized trust appears to be toxic 
to rural governance. 
B. Solidary Group Thesis 
With the development of studies on social trust, increasing numbers of students 
have recognized that social capital thesis appears to be too "neat" to fit the complex 
nexus between social trust and public goods provision in the real world. Departed from 
social capital thesis, many of them argue that particularized trust, under certain 
sociopolitical conditions, could still contribute to local governance. For example, Lily 
L. Tsai, based on a representative survey conducted in China, finds particularized trust 
could lead to sufficient public goods provision only when the following two conditions 
are simultaneously met: 1) there is only one solidary group in the community (i.e., 
encompassment), and 2) public officials must be members of such solidary groups (i.e., 
embeddedness).19 Specifically, with presence of both conditions, not only are there 
homogenous public interests shared by all the villagers, but also public officials are 
motivated by "informal accountability" to provide more public goods. Therefore, 
17
 Callahan, "Social Capital and Corruption," 495. 
18
 For example, see Portes, "Social Capital." 
Tsai, Accountability without Democracy: Idem, "Solidary Groups." 
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villages of encompassment and embeddedness are more likely to have better public goods 
provisions. On the other hand, if a village is occupied by multiple solidary groups, strong 
particularized trust, as suggested by Tsai, can only lead to inter-group conflicts, which 
will inevitably obstructs adequate provision of public goods. 
Alejandro Portes and his colleagues also find strong particularized trust is 
contingently associated with better public goods provision. Specifically, Portes suggest 
that groups with abundant particularized trust, especially in the form of bounded solidary, 
could prompt members of a group to contribute to public goods within the group 
boundary. However, such "altruistic dispositions," as emphasized by Portes, "are not 
universal but are bounded by the limits of their community."20 Moreover, Mark 
Granovetter finds such a closed-trust-relation arrangement is pervasive among oversee 
Chinese to solve public goods provision problem.21 All in all, solidary group thesis 
makes a significant revision to social capital thesis by adding the particularized trust may 
be contingently conducive to the public goods provision. 
C. An Alternative View 
Both social capital thesis and solidary group thesis has provided us with valuable 
insights on the relationship between social trust and public goods provision. However, as 
discussed in Chapter I, both thesis are flawed: while social capital thesis tends to 
overstate the importance of generalized trust, the role of particularized trust is 
underestimated by solidary group thesis. In this dissertation, I argue that particularized 
trust is more relevant to communal cooperation and governmental accountability than 
20
 Portes, "Social Capital," 8. Also see, Portes and Sensenbrenner, "Embeddedness and Immigration." 
21
 Mark S. Granovetter, "Economic Institutions as Social Constructions: A Framework for Analysis," Acta 
Sociologica 35, no. 1 (1992), 7-8. 
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generalized trust, and the presence of a single solidary group is not a necessary condition 
for particularized trust to work. 
Trust and Communal Cooperation Although all scholars agree that communal 
cooperation is of momentous importance in provision of public goods, few have explored 
how exactly social trust functions at different stages of communal cooperation. A closer 
look at cooperation reveals that there are at least two important stages of communal 
cooperation—initiation and continuation of cooperation.22 For public goods to be 
adequately provided in a community, cooperation should not only be initiated, but must 
be sustained in the long term. Moreover, many experimental studies on cooperation have 
already revealed that many people choose to quit cooperation game if there is an exit 
option, which indicates that continuation of cooperation is even harder to be achieved 
than initiation. 
A fundamental problem associated with social capital thesis, therefore, is that it 
solely focuses on how trust in strangers helps to initiate cooperation, but overlooks how 
cooperative relations are maintained in the long run. Specifically, as Boix and Posner 
once noted, social capital thesis is quite comfortable with a vague game theory 
Avner Greif, "Political Organizations, Social Structure, and Institutional Success: Reflection from 
Genoa and Venice During the Commercial Revolution," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics 151, no. 4 (1995). 
23
 Abigail Barr, "Trust and Expected Trustworthiness: Experimental Evidence from Zimbabwean 
Villages," The Economic Journal 113, no. 489 (2003); Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe, 
"Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior 10, no. 1 (1995); Toshio 
Yamagishi, "Seriousness of Social Dilemmas and the Provision of a Sanctioning System," Social 
Psychology Quarterly 51, no. 1 (1988); Toshio Yamagishi, Karen S. Cook, and Motoki Watabe, 
"Uncertainty, Trust, and Commitment Formation in the United States and Japan," The American Journal of 
Sociology 104, no. 1 (1998); Toshio Yamagishi and Toko Kiyonari, "The Group as the Container of 
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(1994). 
168 
explanation on generalized trusters are more likely to initiate cooperation, but leaves us 
"without an explicit articulation of the mechanism." 
Yet how can trust help to sustain cooperative relations in the long run? Or put it 
differently, what kind of social trust is more closely related to continuation of cooperative 
activities? In this dissertation, I argue that particularized trust is the key in sustaining 
long-term cooperative activities. Specifically, particularized trust helps to sustain 
cooperation by enabling self-monitoring and self-enforcement, which fundamentally 
reduces the transaction cost. By contrast, generalized trust, in reducing the opportunity 
cost, has little to do with the continuation of communal cooperation. 
Different from formal institutional arrangements, communal cooperation in public 
goods provision lacks the third-party monitoring and punishment. Therefore, how to 
monitor and punish the free-riders is a key problem faced by the participants of 
communal cooperation. Particularized trust, characterized as close-knit ties and intensive 
interpersonal interactions, then provides a solution to this monitoring problem. 
Specifically, when individuals trust each other, less resource will be spent on monitoring 
free-riders. In addition, with a large repertoire of particularized trust, the risk of detection 
and punishment is significant higher than the benefits of free-riding. Free-riders within 
close-knit groups are not only more easily to be identified, but also facing severe social 
i c 
sanctions ranging from neighborhood boycott to ostracism. 
24
 Boix and Posner, "Social Capital," 689. 
25
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Toshio Yamagishi and his associates' works have robustly confirmed the critical 
role of particularized trust in maintain cooperation. After comparing trusting behaviors 
of Americans and Japanese, Yamagishi proposes an "institutional view" of Japanese 
culture. Specifically, Yamagishi et al. argues that Japanese often "prefer" to cultivate 
particularized trust. In dealing with free-riding, abundant particularized trust in Japanese 
society help to develop "systems of mutual monitoring and sanctioning to curtail free 
riding, and these solutions work for the group insofar as such a 'collective' solution to the 
free rider problem is in place." Moreover, in addressing why generalized trust is only 
weakly associate with communal cooperation, Yamagishi et al. find that "in groups 
artificially created in the laboratory without opportunities for face-to-face interactions 
such collective solutions as informal mutual monitoring and sanctioning do not exist." 
Similarly, Elinor Ostrom's studies on common pool resource problem also reveal 
that it is particularized trust that plays a decisive role in solving various social dilemmas. 
Specifically, she argues that particularized trust, emerged from "repeated, face-to-face" 
interactions, is robustly and positively related to norms of reciprocity and individual 
reputation, which in turn greatly increases the potential cost of free-riding.29 Therefore, 
in communities of abundant particularized trust, common pool resources problems are 
more likely to be solved. 
More importantly, this kind of relationship between particularized trust and 
communal cooperation has also been confirmed by some earlier anecdotal studies 
26
 Yamagishi, "Seriousness of Social Dilemmas"; Yamagishi et al., "Uncertainty, Trust, and Commitment 
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conducted in China. Jae Ho Chung, Hongyi Lai, and Ming Xia, for instance, find that 
when there is a large repertoire of particularized trust in forms of religious groups or 
kinship organizations, villagers in rural China more likely to cooperate with each other to 
provide basic public goods. In some localities, such communal arrangement in public 
goods provision has been replacing the village governments. Specifically, as Chung et al. 
note, such self-organized trust groups are "competing with and in few areas even 
gradually replacing township and village governments as an institution with legitimacy, 
T 1 
popular support, and the reputation of helping those in need." 
All in all, particularized trust appears to be more important than generalized trust 
in maintain communal cooperation. Since public goods provisions reply more on 
persistent communal cooperation, it is reasonable to assume that particularized trust has a 
robust and positively impact, while generalized trust only has a marginal role in affecting 
communal cooperation in providing public goods. 
Trust and Governmental Accountability Does particularized trust reduce 
governmental accountability? Specifically, does particularized trust, as suggested by 
social capital thesis, undermine accountability of public officials by fostering parochial 
interests? As far as public goods provision is concerned, the answer is probably negative. 
Unlikely private goods, public goods are neither excludable nor rival. Individuals 
and groups have no conflicting interesting in enjoying such public goods as better schools, 
bridges, roads, and clinics. Therefore, with regard to public goods provision, it is 
reasonable to assume homogeneous interests. 
j0
 Jae Ho Chung, Hongyi Lai, and Ming Xia, "Mounting Challenges to Governance in China: Surveying 
Collective Protestors, Religious Sects and Criminal Organizations," The China Journal 56, no. Jul. (2006). 
31
 Ibid, 27. 
171 
If particularized trust is not necessarily associated with representation of parochial 
interests, how does particularized trust help to install government accountability? There 
are at least two mechanisms. First of all, when local officials are embedded in strong 
trust ties, they are more likely to develop shared identities and norms with ordinary 
villagers. If pubic goods are to be provided effectively, local officials must first believe 
that they are part of the collectivity and that their contribution will be morally rewarded. 
As local officials develop bonding trust relations with villagers, they are more likely to 
identify themselves as members of the group and commit to shared norms, and thus have 
stronger moral incentives to contribute to the good of the groups. 
Second, in villages where particularized trust is abundant, the costs for patrons to 
monitor and punish local officials' compliance with and deviations from the public 
interest are relatively low. Specifically, the intensive trust relations within communities 
provide ordinary group members with easier access to information concerning local 
officials' contribution or malfeasance. Moreover, when connected by strong bonding ties, 
ordinary group members will also have more opportunities to render their approval or 
disapproval, ranging from praise/shame to grant/denial, of officials' performance with 
regard to public goods provision. Aware of these social monitoring and punishment, 
local officials, motivated by either moral or instrumental rewards, are less likely to 
deviate from informal accountability. 
While particularized trust tends to be robustly and positively related to public 
goods provision, the function of generalized trust is quite limited, particularly in 
developing countries where formal institutions are commonly weak and less accountable. 
Specifically, unlike countries with effective democratic institutions, the public in China 
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and many other developing countries have to rely more on personal connections (i.e. 
particularized trust relations) to exert influence on public officials. Compared to 
particularized trust, generalized trust, therefore, only has a remote impact on 
governmental accountability. 
Moreover, earlier documentary and survey studies in China have also confirmed 
that interpersonal trust relations are closely related to accountability of public officials at 
local level. For instance, M. Kent Jennings compares how cadres at different levels and 
villagers view their local problem based a representative survey conducted in Ahhui, 
Hebei, Hunan, and Tianjin. Specifically, Jennings finds that public officials at higher 
levels (i.e., township and county) held markedly different views on local views from 
ordinary villagers. However, villager agendas were faithfully reflected in the village 
cadres, who enjoy "physical proximity" to ordinary villagers. Jointly these findings 
suggest that the more public officials are embedded local trust relations, the more policy 
congruence could be observed between public officials and villagers. 
In short, both theoretical inquires and empirical evidences indicate that 
particularized trust plays a critical role in fostering accountability of public officials at 
local level, while generalized trust is only remotely and weakly associated with 
governmental accountability. 
Trust and Solidary Groups Is the functioning of social trust, as argued by 
solidary group thesis, contingent on the different types of solidary groups? After 
32
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examining the inter-group relations in the context of public goods provision, I find that 
the most probable answer is negative. Specifically, as discussed earlier, an important 
characteristic of public goods (as opposed to "private" goods) is its inclusiveness. The 
existence of multiple trust groups does not necessarily invoke intra-village tensions. 
There should be little conflict across different social groups over receiving such public 
goods as public order, schools, roads, and clinics. 
In a carefully designed research on interethnic cooperation, James Habyarimana 
and his colleagues find that such identities as ethnics do not necessarily obstruct 
intergroup cooperation in public goods provision at local level.34 Sepecifically, with a 
combination fo experimental studies and statistsical analysis Habyarimana et al. have 
convincingly demonstrated that members of different ethnic groups do not care about 
whether the beneficiaries of public goods are all from the same group. Instead, what 
concerns them most is how effective the public goods can be provided and whether their 
wellbeing can be improved. Consequently, as long as public goods are adequately 
provided, the identities of social groups are far from being source of intra-community 
conflicts, or an obstruction of inter-group cooperation. 
Moreover, recent field studies in China also indicate inter-group cooperation far 
more common than scholars expected before. Mei's study of Wang Village in Henan 
province reveals that although there are six major lineage groups within a village, public 
goods such as social order, aid to the needy, and irrigation system are adequately 
34
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maintained and provided. Not only is a harmonious relationship maintained among 
ordinary villagers, within village government a power-sharing mechanism is also formed 
to achieve better village governance. Seven positions of the village government are 
shared by all the major lineage groups, and the major decisions are made based on 
consensus. 
Therefore, in the context of public goods provision, it is reasonable to assume that 
the functioning of social trust is not contingent to solidary groups. Even in village with 
multiple solidary groups, all the residents share the same interests in adequate provision 
of public goods. 
D. Testable Hypotheses 
Drawing on previous discussion on the relationship between social trust and 
public goods provision, I formulate my main hypothesis as follows, 
Particularized trust is significantly and positively correlated with quality of rural 
governance, while generalized trust has little or no effect on rural public goods provision. 
PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION IN RURAL CHINA AND ITS MEASUREMENT 
In order to better understand the impacts of the two types of social trust (i.e., 
generalized trust and particularized trust) on the public goods provision in rural China, in 
the section I will present an overview of the development of how public goods are 
provided at village level in contemporary China. Then I will explain how public goods 
provisions are measured in this dissertation. 
36
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A. Evolution Public Goods Provisions in Rural China 
In China, rural public goods provisions have undergone substantially changes 
from Mao's era to post-Mao era. During the Mao's era, most functions of public goods 
provisions were carried out by village party branches. Specifically, a village in China is 
the lowest level within the government hierarchy. In each village, there was a 
communist party branch and an administrative office, which was led by the party 
secretary and the villager head respectively. Yet, the secretary of party branch, although 
in theory only responsible for party affair, often took the leading role in allocating 
resources and providing basic public goods. The roles of the administrative office and 
the village heads were largely marginalized throughout Mao's era.38 
Until the late 1970s, both village party secretaries and village heads were 
appointed by upper levels of governments (i.e. people's commune and township 
government). Besides providing basic public goods and services, the major 
responsibilities of village party secretaries and village heads are to enforce state policies: 
(1) collecting taxes and fees, (2) fulfilling family planning, and (3) implementing grain 
procurement.39 Since their political promotions depend on upper-level governments' 
evaluation on how well state policies were implemented, appointed party secretaries and 
village heads were less interested in providing basic public goods and services, but more 
It should be noted that technically, villages are an officially recognized level of government. 
38
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concerned with how to carry out the above-mentioned three unpopular state policies. 
Given this, it is not surprising that public goods were generally underprovided in Mao's 
With the death of Mao and the downfall of the Gang of Four in 1976, rural China 
started to witness rapid and radical changes. Specifically, the decollectivization of 
agricultural production and abolishment of commune system fundamentally changed how 
public goods and services are provided in China. In the first place, the programs of 
public goods investment are largely "self financed" in rural areas since the onset of post-
Mao reform. In order to reduce financial burdens, the central government restructured 
public goods and services system, having those previously state-run services either 
marketized or decentralized in 1980s.42 In rural China, the village turns out to be the 
major investor of public goods programs after the central government's withdrawal. 
Second, the post-Mao reform in rural China has significantly empowered ordinary 
rural residents, fueling communal cooperation on public goods provision. By the 1980s, 
virtually all communes had been disbanded. Correspondingly, village leaders had lost 
direct control over collective properties (most importantly, land), and ordinary rural 
resident had gain more autonomy in various socioeconomic activities. The de facto 
retreat of state on village level and empowerment of ordinary villagers had opened new 
Bevin J. O'Brien and Liangjiang Li, "Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China," Comparative 
Politics 31, no. 2 (1999); Jude Howell, "Prospects for Village Self-Governance in China," Journal of 
Peasant Studies 25, no. 3 (1998). 
41
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Contemporary China 7, no. 19 (1998); Renfu Luo, Linxiu Zhang, Jikun Huang, and Scott Rozelle, 
"Elections, Fiscal Reform and Public Goods Provision in Rural China," Journal of Comparative Economics 
35, no. 3 (2007). 
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spaces for various social groups to organize socioeconomic life, assert their interests, 
and influence political outcomes.47 With regard to public goods provision, villagers have 
become more active in organizing informal cooperation in maintaining and providing 
such public goods as bridges, schools, and irrigation systems.48 
Third, the reform, particularly the introduction of village committee (VC) election, 
has made village leaders more concerned about public goods provision but not the 
unpopular state policies. Aware of authority break-down in rural areas, the Party adopted 
a decentralized approach to rural governance, leading to institutionalization of elected 
village committees.49 Specifically, villagers' committees (VCs) elected by ordinary 
villagers—according to the Organic Law of Village Committees50—are supposed to be in 
charge of public goods provision at village level, pooling resources from villagers and 
administering public goods and services, such as village-own and -run primary schools, 
roads, and sanitation and irrigation systems.5 
After the final promulgation of the Organic Law of Village Committees in 1998, 
villagers, at least in theory, could nominate candidates and have a choice among multiple 
candidates for seats of village committees (VCs). The results, as many students of China 
have pointed out, are that elected village leaders more likely to behave in villagers' 
interests, initiating programs benefiting villagers and counterfeiting unpopular state 
Yusheng Peng, "Kinship Networks and Entrepreneurs in China's Transitional Economy," The American 
Journal of Sociology 109, no. 5 (2004); Martin King Whyte, "The Social Roots of China's Economic 
Development," The China Quarterly 144 (1995). 
46
 For example, Lianjiang Li and Kevin J. O'Brien, "Protest Leadership in Rural China," The China 
Quarterly 193, no. Mar. (2008). 
47
 Ben Hillman, "The Rise of the Community in Rural China: Village Politics, Cultural Identity and 
Religious Revival in a Hui Hamlet," The China Journal 51, no. Jan. (2004). 
48
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Review 90, no. 4(1996). 
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policies like one-child policy and compulsory grain procurement. In pursuing local 
interest, village leaders often allied with their fellow villagers against upper-level 
governments. In some extreme cases, as Ignatisu Wibowo observes: "[Rjural cadres 
[even] prefer to go to jail along with their fellow villagers. For them, obeying their 
superior is one thing and defending their fellow villagers is another." 
In sum, the post-Mao reform has introduced significant changes to pubic goods 
provision in rural China, transforming it from state-funded and -directed system to self-
financed and -governed. In this process, not only did ordinary villagers become more 
active, but village leaders turned to be more village-oriented. 
B. Measuring Public Goods Provision in Rural China 
To measure public goods provision at local level, we focus on five categories of 
rural public goods: irrigation, transportation, education, health care, and electrification. 
While the five categories do not exhaust all aspects of public goods provision, they 
together capture major concerns of rural residents across various regions in rural China. 
The relevance and importance of the five categories to rural residents' lives have been 
confirmed by many studies of rural governance in rural China. Thus, we believe that 
the five categories can serve as a good test of public goods provision in rural China. In 
addition, it should be noted that focusing solely on a single indicator may lead us to 
highly biased conclusions about public goods provision. As revealed in many earlier 
52
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studies, localities differ dramatically with regard to their sociogeographic and 
socioeconomic conditions. 5 Therefore, different villages often have different demands 
and formulate different policies. For instance, a village with abundant water resources 
tends to spend less in irrigation system comparing to a village plagued by droughts. If 
simply relying on the measure of expenditure in irrigation system, we might easily make 
wrong inferences about the public goods provision in the village. In this respect, the 
multiple measures used in this dissertation can give us a more accurate picture about the 
public goods provision in rural China. 
Table 24. Descriptives of Dependent Variables 
Item N Mean Std. 
Investment in irrigation and agriculture per capita by __, „ ,<. . .._ 
thousand yuan 
Village government expenditure on roads/bridges by __, . . ,
 1 cn 
_., ? 376 1.16 1.59 
thousand yuan 
Number of schools per thousand population 
Number of hospitals per thousand population 










Sourc : The 2005 China General Social Survey. 
In terms of the specific measure for each of the five categories of public goods 
provision, we use per capita village expenditure for irrigation and roads in 2004, while 
we employ the number of school per thousand residents for education, number of clinics 
55
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and hospitals per thousand residents for medical care, and percentage of households with 
electricity for electrification. The descriptives of these measures are reported in Table 24. 
MEASURING OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
In this chapter, to test the plausibility of our hypothesis about the relationship 
between the two types of trust and rural pubic goods provision at village level, I measure 
social trust as an attribute of village and use village as the basic unit. Such an approach 
has been widely used in studies on the relationship between social trust and aggregate 
sociopolitical outcomes. Specifically, in order to have a collective profile of each type of 
social trust in each surveyed village, I computed the community-average score for 
particularized trust and generalized trust along the with distinction we established in 
Chapter II. The descriptives of particularized trust and generalized trust by village is 
reported in Table 25. 



















Source: The 2005 China General Social Survey. 
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CONTROL VARIABLES 
To determine the independent effect of the particularized trust and generalized 
trust as the determinants public goods provision, I control for six sets of factors that may 
also have an impact on village public goods provision: village committee elections, 
villagers' political interest, solidary groups, economic development, 
geographic/demographic traits and regions. 
A. Village Committee Election 
The introduction of VC elections during post-Mao reform is widely perceived to 
be positively correlated with public goods provision in rural China.56 Although these 
elections have by no means been fully competitive and democratic,57 they appear to 
induce local officials to provide public goods by increasing the preference congruence 
between public officials and villagers.58 Specifically, while local party branches and 
township leaders may decide who is nominated or appears on the final ballots,59 the 
candidates still have to gain a majority of votes in the final ballot. Given the pressures of 
winning popular votes, local officials tend to be more responsive to needs and demands 
of villagers, and hence are more likely to invest in education, medical services and the 
likes. As a result, the implementation of VC elections may contribute to village public 
Bjorn Alpermann, "Village Governance and Prospects for Democracy in China," Journal of 
Contemporary China 13, no. 38 (2004. 
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goods provision by introducing formal incentives. In this reassessment, we include a 
dummy variable for whether the VC elections are conducted in each surveyed village. 
B. Villagers' Political Interests 
I expect that public goods provision by village governments are influenced by the 
political interests of rural residents. More specifically, I hypothesize that villagers' 
attentiveness to major local issues and politics is positively correlated with public goods 
provision. As revealed by previous findings from rural China,60 villagers who are 
interested in local issues tend to be more active in rural affairs, and more inclined to use 
various channels to voice their demands and exert influences on village affairs. At the 
village level, the more villagers are interested in local politics, the more pressures are 
imposed on local officials to provide public goods. To measure villagers' interests in 
village affairs, we asked our respondents one question: "Are you concerned with daily 
operations and decisions of Village Committee?" The individual villagers were asked to 
assess their levels of interest on a five-point scale, where 1 stands for no interest ("do not 
care") and 5 refers to intense interest ("very concerned"). We then use the mean of 
villager's interest score within each village as the indicator of villagers' interest at village 
level. 
C. Solidary Groups 
Solidary group thesis postulates that the existence of certain solidary groups is the 
prerequisite for adequate public goods provision at local level. However, as discussed 
earlier, I propose that with respect to pubic goods provision, multiple solidary groups 
60
 Zhong and Chen, "To Vote or Not to Vote." 
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within a village will not necessarily lead to inter-group conflicts. There should be little 
difference between villages with different profiles of solidary groups. In light of this, we 
expect that the simple presence of solidary groups is not significantly correlated with 
public goods provision. Specifically, I examine the impacts of solidary groups by 
looking at lineage groups. As many earlier studies reveal, in contemporary China, 
lineage groups have become the most potent and prevalent solidary group in rural areas. 
To gauge the presence of lineage groups, I employ a survey item of existence of 
lineage groups with ancestral halls. In addition, although ancestral halls are important in 
lineages' ritual activities, not all lineage groups were able to build up their own ancestral 
halls due to various reasons. Due to historical factors, such as wars and migrations, many 
lineage groups were unable to build ancestral halls for the practice of ancestral cults and 
worship. Instead, lineage ritual activities are held in lineage graveyards or other 
corporate estates. Furthermore, in those localities with lineage halls, the buildings are 
open only for very limited events. For instance, Myron Cohen observes that in northern 
China many ancestral halls are open only for the celebration of the Chinese New Year. 
In the rest of the year, lineage activities, such as the distribution of corporate and family 
property, are more frequently held at the homes of lineage leaders or other corporate 
estates. Given this, I incorporate another survey item, existence of lineage groups 
without ancestral halls to detect the impacts of solidary groups on rural public goods 
provision. 
61
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D. Economic Development 
The level of economic development is widely perceived as one of determinants of 
public goods provisions. As the level of economic development rises, a village could 
have more resources available for improvement of public goods and services. Thus 
wealthy villages are more likely to have adequate public goods and services. To gauge 
economic development level, we employ village income per capita. In addition, to 
capture the level of industrialization of each village, which is related to the level of 
economic development, we also incorporate a dummy variable for the existence of 
village enterprises. 
E. Geographic and Demographic Traits 
The geographic and demographic variables in this study include village 
population, the number of natural villages under one VC, village terrain, arable land per 
capita, education level, and distance from the county site. All of these variables may 
have some implications for public goods provision. For example, larger population 
always increases demands of public goods provision. The number of natural village 
might be positively correlated with the costs of maintaining roads and bridges. Similarly 
The costs of constructing and maintaining roads and bridges are also positively related to 
the territory sizes of villages. The arable land per capita is also positively correlated with 
village investment in agriculture; the more arable land, the more investments are needed. 
In addition, demand for public goods provision should be higher in village where the 
average education level is high, since well-educated individuals tend to have higher 
expectations on the quality of life. Proximity to county site might be negatively 
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correlated with demands of better education and medical services, since individuals could 
easily travel to county sites for such services. 
F. Regions 
Regions might also play a role in shaping public goods provision, since, for 
example, the resources and demands for public goods and services might vary with 
regions due to their different economic, social and cultural conditions. This reassessment, 
therefore, we use regions to address the variations stemmed from regional differences. 
Drawing on the report by a national government agency, Development Research Center 
(DRC) of China, I divided the country into eight major regions (see Figure 1): 
Northeastern, North-coastal, Yellow-River, Northwestern, East-coastal, Yangzi-River, 
South-coastal and Southwestern China. This geographic classification, we believe, can 
well capture China's regional differences in terms of natural endowment, population 
density, infrastructure, industry profiles, sub-cultural proximity, socioeconomic 
challenges, and so on. For instance, the three provinces in Northeastern China, Liaoning, 
Jilin, and Heilongjiang, share the similar climate and natural endowments. The industries 
in the three provinces are all characterized as heavy industries. In addition, the three 
provinces also face similar problems like depletion of natural resources, and unbalanced 
industrial structures. 
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"igure 4. Geographic Distribution of Surveyed Villages and Eight Regions of China 
Note: The figure is created by the author on the basis of data collected from the 2005 China 
General Social Survey. The numbers on the map indicate how many villages are surveyed in 
each of the sampled provinces. 
The different socioeconomic and socio-cultural characteristics of each region may 
have an impact on resources available and people's expectation for public goods 
provision. For instance, rural residents in mountainous Southwestern China are more 
concerned with investment in transportations; peasants in Yangzi-River China are less 
worried about water resources due to their proximity to Yangzi River; and villagers in 
well-developed East-coastal and South-coastal China need far more electric power to 
boost their local economies. In other words, without considering the regional differences, 
we cannot accurately assess the public goods provisions in rural China. 
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MODEL ANALYSIS 
In this section, I subject our theory-derived relationships between social trust and 
public goods provision to empirical tests. I will first specify the seemingly unrelated 
regression model I employed, and explain the advantages associated with this model. 
Subsequently, discussion on empirical findings will be delivered. 
A. Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model 
In order to explore the effects of embeddedness and encompassment on village 
public goods provision, we employ the following seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
model: 
y,k = flik + j32k(P.Trust)lk + p3k(G.Trust)lk +fi4k(Control)lk + elk (1) 
In this model, the dependent variable v&ylk, the public goods provision, where k 
indexes its five different categories: public irrigation, road and bridge, education, health 
service, and electrification, and / indexes different villages. (Embed)lk represents the 
measure of embeddedness of local officials, while (Encomp)lk denotes the measure of 
encompassment. (Control)lk is a vector of the six sets of controls. In this model, we also 
employ a joint test for all categories of public goods provision. Specifically, the first 
joint null hypothesis is fck = 0 for all £ categories of public goods provision, while the 
second is f)3k = 0 for all k categories of public goods provision. Rejection of the first 
hypothesis implies that embeddedness of local officials is significantly correlated with 
public goods provision, and rejection of the second hypothesis indicates that 
encompassment exerts significant influences on public goods provision. 
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One of the advantages of the SUR model is its superior capability to estimate 
multiple multivariate regression models simultaneously. 4 Such a capability is essential 
to an analysis of the multiple dimensions of public goods provision in rural China, 
because villages with different needs and limited resources usually have differing 
priorities with respect to public goods provision. For instance, villages with abundant 
water resources but roads in poor condition might first choose to invest in transportation 
before making any investments in an irrigation system. As Tsai suggests, "using SUR to 
look simultaneously at multiple measures of village governmental public goods provision 
allows for the possibility that different places prioritize different goods." 5 
In this model, we employ the technique of multiple imputations to treat missing 
data, in order to achieve more accurate estimates and preserve more information. 
Specifically, for each missing data point five values are imputed using MCMC (Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo) method and five complete datasets are created. The SUR analyses 
of these five datasets generate five different sets of point and variance estimates for each 
parameter. Finally, a combined estimate for each parameter is made, on the basis of the 
five sets of results from the imputed datasets. Such combined inferences usually 
generated more conservative and reliable estimates for parameters of interests. Table 1 
reports the combined results of the SUR estimates generated from the imputed datasets. 
William H. Greene, Econometric Analysis, 5th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002). 
Tsai, "Solidary Groups," 363. 
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B. Empirical Findings and Discussion 
Table 1 reports the results of the SUR estimates of the model specified above. 
Overall, the results confirm our expectations explained earlier and contradict or differ 
from those suggested by social capital theses and solidary group theses. 
First, the particularized trust is independently, significantly, and positively 
correlated with village pubic goods provision. Even when we control for generalized 
trust, VC elections, villagers' political interest, solidary groups, economic development, 
and other demographic and geographic factors, the estimated effect of particularized is 
still positive for four out of five categories of public goods provision (i.e., irrigation and 
agriculture, schools, clinics and hospitals, and electricity coverage) and statistically 
significant for irrigation and agriculture, clinics and hospitals, and electricity coverage. 
In addition, the estimated effect of particularized trust on roads and schools, though 
negatively signed, has a very high level of uncertainty. The null joint hypothesis that the 
coefficient of particularized across the five categories of public goods provision is equal 
to zero can also be rejected at a 95 percent confidence level, given its p-value equals to 
0.0354. Based on these results, a one can say that ceteris paribus villages with high level 
of particularized trust are more likely to have effective public goods provision. 
Table 26. Particularized Trust, Generalized Trust and Public Goods Provision in Rural China 
Particularized Trust 
Generalized Trust 
Vi ase Committee e ection (0-1 1 
Interests in VC election 
Village-owned enterprises 






Loose lineage networks (0-1) 
Formal lineage networks 
Village Population (log) 
Number of natural village 
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Village terrain (xlO ) 
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Note: N= 408. Figures in cells are seemingly unrelated regression coefficients. In parentheses are standard errors. p = 0.\0, p = 0.05, p 
0.01. The hypothesis that the coefficient estimates on each term is equal to zero across the seven in the table is tested using SUR in the final 
column. McElroy R-square = .21. 7 
a
 Villages without any lineage networks is used as the control group. 
* "Northwestern China" is used as the control group. 
Marjorie B. McElroy, "Goodness of Fit for Seemingly Unrelated Regressions: Glahn's Ryx2 and Hooper's R2," Journal of Econometrics 6, no. 3 (1977). 
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Second, the results from our SUR analysis show that generalized trust is not 
significantly associated with village public goods provision. Across five categories of 
public goods provision, the measure of generalized trust yields no substantial impact and 
has mixed signs. In addition, the uncertainty levels of estimated effects of generalized 
trust are considerably high. Finally, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient of generalized trust is equal to zero jointly across the five categories of public 
goods provision, since the p-value is as high as 0.37. These results suggest that the level 
of generalized trust in a village does not influence quality of pubic goods provision. 
In sum, these two major findings presented above directly contradict social capital 
thesis that only generalized trust is the necessary condition for better public goods 
provision. Our findings suggest that while particularized trust significantly, positively 
influences public goods provision, generalized trust does not. 
Furthermore, as a control variable, the presence of lineage groups, with or without 
ancestral halls, has no substantial impact on village public goods provision. Not only the 
signs of estimated effects of the two kinds of lineage groups are mixed, but the estimated 
effects of two types of lineage groups are not statistically significant (with only one 
exception of lineages without ancestral halls on electricity coverage). Moreover, null 
joint hypotheses that the coefficients of the two kinds of lineage groups across five 
categories of public goods are zero cannot be rejected given their remarkable large p-
values: 0.637 for lineages with ancestral halls and 0.332 for lineages without. These 
findings call into questions solidary group thesis that "the right kind of social groups" is 
the key determinant of public goods provision.68 Instead, these findings reconfirm our 
Tsai, "Solidary Group," 370; Idem, Accountability with Democracy. 
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theoretical positions that rather than solidary group, it is the levels of particularized trust 
significantly correlated with public goods provision. 
Third, the results from this SUR analysis show that the per capita income still has 
a significant, positive impact on public goods provision. The estimated effects of 
villagers' income and village-owned enterprises are positive in three categories of public 
goods provisions (i.e., irrigation, transportation, and electricity coverage for villagers' 
income, and irrigation, clinics and hospitals, and electricity coverage for village-owned 
enterprises), and statistically significant for investment in irrigation. For villagers, as 
North noted, economic development will inevitably increase their demands for better 
public goods provisions. For the VC, economic growth also means more resources 
available.69 
Forth, contrary to many earlier studies, the results from this SUR analysis do not 
support that VC election can significantly improve public goods provision at local level. 
Not only the signs of estimated effects of VC election are largely negative, but most of 
the estimated effects of VC election are not statistically significant (with one exception of 
clinics and hospitals, but the sign is also negative). These findings suggest that in terms 
of public goods provision there is no significant differences between villages with or 
without VC election. Yet how can we explain the discrepancy between earlier studies on 
VC elections and the results in this study? I do not have a full answer to this question 
due the lack of empirical data our survey. Nonetheless, I believe there are at least two 
factors that have contributed to this discrepancy. In the first place, most of earlier studies 
are not based on nation-wide survey data. Our sample, on the other hand, is designed to 
69
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Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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be representative of all mainland China. As a consequence, our sample consists of more 
local variations of both independent variables and dependent variables. The differences 
between our findings and earlier studies could be derived partially from the underlying 
socioeconomic and socio-demographic differences between different samples. 
Last but not least, the results in Table 3 confirm our expectation about the sheer 
regional differences in public goods provision. Specifically, east-coastal, south-coastal, 
and Yangzi-river China significantly outperformed the other regions, particularly with 
respect to the investment in roads and bridges. On the other hand, north-eastern, Yellow-
river, and southern-western China invested considerably less in rural public goods, 
especially in the domain of irrigation and agriculture. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Do particularized trust and generalized trust affect public goods provision in rural 
China? If so, how? These are the two critical questions I have intended to answer in this 
chapter. So as to answer these questions, I have first examined two popular theses on the 
relationship between social trust and public goods provision at local level. After 
specifying their relative weaknesses, I have introduced a third approach to analyzing the 
relationship, and empirically examined it against the 2005 rural China survey. In this 
final section, I will revisit the major findings and explore their implications. 
With respect to our first question of whether social trust affects rural public goods 
provision in China, the empirical findings presented in this chapter clearly demonstrate 
that the level of social trust in a villager does affect its provision of public goods and 
services. Moving to the second question, the analysis also pointed out that particularized 
195 
trust and generalized trust is variably associated with rural public goods provision in 
China. That is, villages with higher level particularized trust were more likely to have 
adequate public goods provisions, whereas villages' generalized trust could not exert 
substantial influence on the quality of public goods provision. 
These findings have two important, general implications for the sociopolitical 
outcomes associated with social trust. First, in non-democratic settings, since ordinary 
people cannot rely on formal institutions to achieve better governance, dense trust 
relations seem to be the option they have. In other words, the role of social trust is of 
even great importance in non-democracies for well-being of ordinary people. 
Second, the empirical findings also suggest that the roles of different types of 
social trust in local governance are far more complicated than we early thought. 
Specifically, strong in-group trust is not necessarily associated with hatreds or conflicts. 
With common interests at stake, particularized trust might be conducive to local 
governance by establishing effective informal monitoring and enforcement. By contrast, 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Social trust is of the utmost importance to virtually all aspects of society, ranging 
from economic development to political governance. Unfortunately, in contemporary 
political science, the studies of social trust are skewed towards the relationship between 
democracy and social trust. As a consequence, our knowledge of social trust in non-
democracies is regrettably underdeveloped and simplistic. 
By introducing a flexible relational conceptualization of social trust, I attempt to 
systematically and empirically explore the magnitude, the origins, and the impacts of 
social trust in non-democratic settings, using the data from the nation-wide 2005 China 
General Social Survey. Specifically, I try to answer the following four critical questions: 
(1) Whom do ordinary Chinese rural residents trust, and to what extent? (2) What is the 
relationship between the different forms of trust? (3) Who is most likely to trust their 
fellow villagers and strangers in contemporary rural China, and what are village contexts 
that correlate these two types of trust? (4) What are the impacts of the different types of 
social trust on rural public goods provision? Since the results presented in this 
dissertation are drawn from a representative national sample, it is reasonable to assume 
that these findings can be generalized to the entire Chinese rural population. Furthermore, 
these findings can also offer us a needed baseline against which findings from future 
studies in urban China or the other parts of the world can be compared. 
In this concluding chapter, I will first summarize the empirical findings discussed 
in the previous chapters. Subsequently, key political and theoretical implications of the 
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findings will be addressed. Finally, I will briefly discuss the limitation of this study and 
possible directions for future studies. 
SUMMARY OF MAJOR EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
My exploration of social trust in rural China starts with the measurement issues. 
Owing to its inherent vagueness, the current "canonical question" of trust—i.e., "most 
people can be trusted"—appears to be problematic as a means of measuring one's trust in 
different groups of people. In order to accurately gauge the stocks of social trust in 
contemporary rural China, I introduce a new set of trust measurements based on the 
relational categories of the trustees. By specifying such relational categories as relatives, 
neighbors/non-neighbors, and villagers with same surname/with different surnames, we 
can reliably determine whom ordinary Chinese rural residents generally trust and the 
extent of these different types of trust. On the basis of this set of measurements, I reach 
two important findings. 
First, although earlier interpretative works have suggested six possible relational 
categories—i.e., relatives, neighbors, no-neighbors, villagers of the same surname, 
villagers of different surnames, and strangers-of social trust in rural China, the analysis 
has revealed that the only and most important qualitative difference was the one between 
particularized trust and generalized trust. Specifically, there was no substantial 
difference in the levels of trust with respect to the various members of the village 
community. However, there is clear line between people's trust in strangers and other 
types of social trust. These findings confirm our expectation in Chapter I that 
particularized trust and generalized trust are the two most important components of social 
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trust. Moreover, it indicates that particularized trust in rural China is not as 
"particularistic" as many have proposed. In fact, particularized trust in rural China 
extends well beyond relatives or members of lineages, encompassing all the fellow 
villagers. 
Second, as regards the stocks of the two types of social trust, the scores of 
particularized trust and generalized trust indexes suggest that our respondents in rural 
China tend to place great trust in people they personally know (well above the midpoint 
of the scale measuring), whereas their trust in strangers was very low. This finding can 
help us to disentangle the contradiction between China specialists and general 
comparativists on the magnitudes of social trust in China. One plausible explanation is 
that whereas Chinese specialists are talking about generalized trust, the general 
comparativists, using the problematic "most-people" question, are actually measuring 
particularized trust. 
After examining the magnitudes of social trust, I explore, in Chapter III, the 
relationship between particularized trust and generalized trust. The results of bivariate 
analyses demonstrate that there is only moderate correlation between the two types of 
trust. In other words, in the minds of ordinary Chinese rural residents, trust in 
surrounding people and trust in strangers are not closely intertwined. In addition, the 
findings also indicate that in rural China intensive particularized trust is not a hindrance 
to the development of generalized trust. On the contrary, it seems that particularized trust 
might foster the creation of generalized trust, although this positive interconnection is not 
robust. Furthermore, this kind of weak but positive relationship between particularized 
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trust and generalized trust is prevalent across various socioeconomic categories and 
localities with different sociogeographic profiles. 
To answer the question of who is most likely to trust, and what are the village 
contexts that correlate to the two types of trust, I have examined the roles of five 
categories of factors at both the individual level and the village level—sociodemographic 
attributes, subjective orientations, informal social interactions, sociogeographic attributes, 
and village heterogeneity— with respect to their effect on particularized trust and 
generalized trust. First, as for the impacts of these five categories of factors on 
particularized trust, the empirical findings suggest that, with the exception of village 
heterogeneity, all the categories robustly affect the extent of particularized trust. 
Specifically, in terms of the effects of sociodemographic attributes, I find that those who 
are older and unmarried are more likely to trust surrounding people. As for the impacts 
of subjective orientations, the findings suggest that those who are more satisfied with 
their lives, report a strong sense of income and opportunity equality, and express robust 
norms of civility had stronger bonds of particularized trust. With regard to the effects of 
informal social interaction, the data reveal that those who are more intimate with relatives, 
familiar with neighbors, and more active in informal cooperation are more likely to trust 
their fellow villagers. As for determinants at the village level, I have found that those 
who live in administrative villages with fewer natural villages were more likely to 
develop strong particularized trust. 
Second, as for the effects of these five categories of factors on the extent of 
villagers' trust in strangers, the results suggest that individual subjective orientations and 
the village's sociogeographic attributes appeared to be important in predicting the 
Chinese rural residents' levels of generalized trust. Specifically, the empirical evidence 
from this nation-wide survey shows that those who report strong norms of civility are less 
likely to trust strangers. As for the impacts of village contexts, I find that villagers who 
live in administrative villages with more natural villages are less likely to develop 
generalized trust. Overall, these findings suggest that generalized trust is more norms-
driven; intensive informal social exchange among acquaintances might not necessarily 
hinder the development of generalized trust. 
In order to explore the effects of social trust upon pubic goods provision in rural 
China, I have investigated the differing impacts of particularized trust and generalized 
trust on five kinds of the most common and important public goods: (1) irrigation, (2) 
roads and bridge, (3) schools, (4) clinics and hospitals, and (5) electricity coverage. The 
empirical findings suggest that villages with higher levels of average particularized trust 
are more likely to have higher levels of expense on irrigation systems, more clinics and 
hospitals, and higher rates of electricity coverage; the average level of generalized trust 
was not significantly correlated with any of the above-mentioned five public goods. In 
other words, in villages where residents trust each other more, there is a higher level of 
public goods provision, whereas villager's trust in strangers does not affect to the extent 
of the public goods provision. 
In summary, the empirical findings from this dissertation have presented us a 
multifaceted image of social trust in contemporary rural China. What does this 
multifaceted picture imply for rural governance in China as well as for China's state-
society relationship in general? Moreover, what do the findings in this dissertation imply 
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for comparative studies of social trust? In the following part of this chapter, I will 
address these two important questions. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RURAL GOVERNANCE AND STATE-SOCIETY 
RELATIONSHIP FN CHINA 
The empirical findings presented in this dissertation have important implications 
with respect to the achievement of better local governance in China. Although most 
scholars have postulated that it is hard for communities to maintain good governance 
without a large reservoir of generalized trust, the results from this dissertation suggest 
that it is strong particularized trust among villagers that leads to better public goods 
provision in contemporary rural China. This provides us with a mixed picture of the 
state-society relationship in China, as well as CCP's rule in the long run. On the one 
hand, the current Party-state can draw substantial legitimacy from good rural governance 
supported by strong norms of particularized trust. On the other hand, intense 
particularized trust among villagers may also undermine the Party-state's capabilities 
regarding the extraction of resources and the implementation of unpopular public policies 
in rural China. 
A. Particularized Trust Rural Governance 
This study suggests the prevalent concepts of the "good" generalized trust and 
"bad" particularized trust tend to be stylized and simplistic. The analysis shows that the 
relationship between particularized trust and rural governance is very complex, and that it 
cannot be qualified with a simple term, such as "negative." Specifically, the empirical 
findings in this research imply that particularized trust can also bring about such desirable 
sociopolitical outcomes as better local governance. First, it is evident that the strong 
norms of particularized trust can effectively cultivate solidarity not only among ordinary 
rural residents, but also between villagers and local public officials. Intense 
particularized trust, in general, appears to be accompanied by effective peer monitoring 
and informal sanctions or punishment. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that 
particularized trust is more effective in structuring individuals' behaviors than 
generalized trust. When motivated by common interests like public goods provision, 
people of strong particularized trust are more likely to engage in long-term informal 
cooperation. 
Second, the data from this nation-wide survey reveal that particularized trust 
appears to be even more important than formal institutions as a determinant of public 
goods provision in contemporary rural China. As documented in Chapter V, 
particularized trust is strongly and positively correlated with rural public goods provision, 
whereas the introduction of village committee (VC) elections had virtually no impact. 
These findings imply that in countries like China, where formal democratic institutions 
are ineffective or simply nonexistent, particularized trust, by enabling informal 
monitoring and sanctions, tends to be the only available option for ordinary citizens to 
achieve such desirable sociopolitical outcomes as public goods provision. 
Third, our finding on the positive relationship between particularized trust and 
public goods provision also implies that the popular perception that particularized trust 
breeds inter-group hostility and conflict is overstated. Specifically, there is no simple 
linear positive correlation between the two. On the contrary strong norms of 
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particularized trust may help to effectively reduce inter-group conflicts. As James Fearon 
and David Laitin point out, owing to the costs of conflicts and the benefits of cooperation, 
"decentralized, nonstate institutional mechanisms [backed by strong particularized trust] 
may often arise to mitigate problems of opportunism in interactions between individuals 
from different ethnic groups." 
B. Particularized Trust and State-Society Relationship in China 
The predominant role played by particularized trust in public goods provision as 
well as in the structuring of ordinary rural residents' behaviors implies a changed state-
society relationship in China, which in turn has important implications with respect to the 
strength and weakness of CCP rule. 
Our findings on the critical role of particularized trust in public goods provision 
implies that in contemporary China ordinary villagers rely not on the state, but on their 
fellow villagers to achieve certain desirable sociopolitical outcomes. In other words, with 
considerable room to undertake their own initiatives, ordinary Chinese villagers are more 
autonomous in taking various socioeconomic actions and organizing socially as they see 
fit. Taking one step further, it is reasonable to infer that given their strong bonds of 
1
 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," The American Political 
Science Review 90, no. 4 (1996), 715; Robert H. Bates, "Capital, Kinship, and Conflict: The Structuring 
Influence of Capital in Kinship Societies," Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne des 
Etudes Africaines 24, no. 2 (1990). In addition, Anver Greif also finds that in medieval Italy, clan groups 
based strong partiuclarized trust could engage in intensive cooperation with each other, which in turn led to 
the very institutioanl success in cities like Genoa, see Avner Greif, "Political Organizations, Social 
Structure, and Institutional Success: Reflection from Genoa and Venice During the Commercial 
Revolution," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 151, no. 4 (1995); Idem, Institutions and 
the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade (New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
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particularized trust, and of course trust-based networks,2 ordinary Chinese villagers have 
become more empowered and autonomous, particularly compared to the period of Mao's 
rule, when the ordinary Chinese rural residents were atomized. 
Indeed, the abolishment of the commune system and the introduction of the 
household responsibility system in the era of post-Mao reform significantly reduced the 
state's direct control over individuals' lives, especially with regard to the rural residents. 
The rural family began to reassert itself as the fundamental unit of economic production. 
Economically empowered rural residents also tried to rebuild trust networks such as 
kinship groups and religious sects in order to safeguard their economic gains against such 
predatory practices of the state as excessive taxes and fees. Although there are no 
baseline statistics from late 1970s to testify the rapid growth of trust networks, anecdotal 
research does confirm such a trend. For instance, Vivien Shue observed only sporadic 
trust-based informal groups were created "to fill the need for new forms of local 
protection [against the state]" in the 1980s,5 whereas two decades later a variety of trust-
based networks routinely interfere with the operation of local government.6 Therefore, 
2
 Concerning trust networks, I prefer the definition offered by Charles Tilly: "Trust networks, to put it 
more formally, contain ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within which 
people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, 
or failure of others." See, Charles Tilly, Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 81; 
Idem, Trust and Rule (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
J
 See, for example, Vivien Shue, Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politics (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1988); Idem, "State Power and Social Organization in China," in State Power 
and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World, ed. Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, and 
Vivien Shue (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Thomas B. Gold, "The Resurgence of 
Civil Society in China," Journal of Democracy 1, no. 1 (1990). 
4
 For example, see Shue, Reach of the State. 
5
 Ibid, 121. 
6
 See, for example, Ben Hillman, "The Rise of the Community in Rural China: Village Politics, Cultural 
Identity and Religious Revival in a Hui Hamlet," The China Journal 51, no. Jan. (2004); Isabelle Thireau 
and Linsha Hua, "Power Beyond Instituted Power: Forms of Mediated Spaces in the Chinese Countryside," 
in Politics in China: Moving Frontiers, ed. Francoise Mengin and Jean-Louis Rocca (New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Lily L. Tsai, Accountability without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public 
Goods Provision in Rural China (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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we can construct a somewhat speculative picture of the state-society relationship in rural 
China: The balance between the two has been increasingly tilted toward the society. 
This changed state-society relationship in rural China represents a mixed message 
with respect to CCP rule in the long run. One the one hand, the party-state may still 
enjoy the political legitimacy derived from improved rural governance at least in the 
short run. As discussed in Chapter V, strong norms of particularized trust can improve 
the overall performance of rural governance. As long as basic public goods and services 
are properly provided, Chinese residents will not be strongly motivated to challenge the 
authorities, and will therefore acquiesce to Party rule. 
On the other hand, with increased local autonomy buttressed by high levels of 
particularized trust circulating among villagers and local officials, the CCP's control and 
penetration of rural China will be significantly undermined, making implementation of 
unpopular state policies like the one-child policy increasingly difficult. Local officials, 
embedded in close-knit trust networks, may not act in accordance with party decrees but 
in accordance with the local interests. As Thomas Gold once observed, "[The CCP] 
actually comprises people from a wide variety of backgrounds. ... Most of them, 
moreover, do not work in party organizations, but in social units. In some cases their 
views may reflect the interests of their social unit, and they may resist policies that seem 
7
 For a general discussion on mass support under one-party, see Beatriz Magaloni and Ruth Kricheli, 
"Political Order and One-Party Rule," Annual Review of Political Science 13, no. (2010), 128-30. For mass 
support in China, see, for example, Jie Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004); Idem, "Popular Support for Village Self-Government in China: Intensity and 
Sources," Asian Survey 45, no. 6 (2005); Jie Chen and others, "Assessing Political Support in China: 
Citizens' Evaluations of Governmental Effectiveness and Legitimacy," Journal of Contemporary China 6, 
no. 16 (1997); Jie Chen, Yang Zhong, and Jan William Hillard, "The Level and Sources of Popular 
Support for China's Current Political Regime," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 30, no. 1 (1997). 
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to threaten it." Furthermore, recent studies reveal that trust-based networks serve as an 
important vehicle for the mobilization of villagers to challenge the unpopular policies of 
the upper-level governments.9 As noted by Carsten Vala and Kevin O'Brien, in 
contemporary rural China, social bonds and feelings of trust "are a crucial 'pull factor' 
that connect recruits with a chance to participate [in public protests]."10 
As demonstrated above, an examination of social trust in rural China leaves us the 
realization that the relationship between social trust and rural governance is far more 
complex than political scientists had postulated, and this examination has led us to reflect 
more deeply on the changing state-society relationship in rural China. This examination 
also returns us to a reconsideration of the contemporary studies of social trust. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF SOCIAL TRUST 
Besides examining our empirical concerns about social trust in rural China, this 
dissertation sheds light on an important goal: the improved understanding of social trust 
in non-democracies. In this final section, I will discuss this dissertation's implications for 
comparative studies of social trust, particularly as found in non-democracies. 
See, Gold, "The Resurgence of Civil Society in China," 20. For more discussions on the rise of localism 
in China, see, for example, Ignatius Wibowo, "Rural Party Rectification in China in the 1990s: 
Rectification or Reification?," Journal of Contemporary China 1, no. 19 (1998); David Zweig, Freeing 
China's Farmers: Rural Restructuring in the Reform Era (Artnonk N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997). 
9
 See, for example, Kevin J. O'Brien, "Rightful Resistance," World Politics 49, no. 1 (1996); Kevin J. 
O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006); Sidney Tarrow, "Prologue: The New Contentious Politics in China: Poor and Blank or Rich and 
Complex?," ed. Kevin J. O'Brien (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
10
 See, Carsten T. Vala and Kevin J. O'Brien, "Recruitment to Protestant House Churches," in Popular 
Protest in China, ed. Kevin J. O'Brien (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 108. 
A. A More Flexible Approach 
As discussed at the very beginning of this dissertation, the democratic theory of 
social trust, with its focus on civic participation and association, consensual politics, and 
political trust, is quite helpful in explaining the roles of social trust in democratic settings. 
However, when we turn to non-democracies, this democratic theory appears to be 
stylized and simplistic. Indeed, in non-democratic settings, the role of social trust and its 
relationship to various socioeconomic and sociopolitical outcomes are far more dynamic 
and complex than democratic theory has suggested, which forces us to find a new 
framework for our investigations. 
In this dissertation, I have proposed a more flexible relational framework, 
allowing us to incorporate insights from middle-range theories and other disciplines. By 
emphasizing the relational nature of social trust, I have been able to bridge the divide 
between culture-driven trust and rationality-driven trust, as well as the one between 
individual trust and collective trust. Moreover, guided by this framework, I have been 
able to incorporate and empirically test various middle-range theories about the 
relationship between different types of trust, the sources of social trust, and the 
consequences of social trust. 
Although far from being highly integrative, the relational approach proposed in 
this dissertation provides a useful framework for the empirical and systematic 
examination of various aspects of social trust. Like many other concepts in political 
science, social trust is an "essentially contested concept," "whose utility to social 
science," as noted by Michael Woolcock, "rests less on its capacity to forge an inherently 
1
' See, G. W. B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56, no. 
(1955). 
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elusive scholarly or policy consensus on complex issues than its capacity to facilitate 
constructive dialogue about agreements and disagreements between groups who would 
otherwise rarely (if ever) interact."12 
B. Social Trust: Conceptualization and Measurement 
Although the recent surge of inquiry into social trust has generated many 
theoretical, empirical, and experimental findings, social trust remains as one of the most 
controversial and confused concept in political science and social science at large. 
Scholars of social trust still cannot agree upon either what the term "social trust" 
designates, or the proper categorization of different types of social trust. This chaotic 
conceptualization and categorization of social trust severely thwarts the development of 
studies in social trust. After reviewing empirical and experimental studies in social trust, 
Russell Hardin concludes that, 
there is relatively little to learn about trust from these two massive research 
programs. Without retuning their protocols to address standard conceptions of 
trust, they cannot contribute much to understanding trust as we generally know it, 
and they cannot play a very constructive role in explaining social behavior, 
institutions, or social and political change.13 
Indeed, without a stable definition of social trust and a shared understanding of categories, 
empirical and experimental studies can only lead to inconsistent and even contradictory 
findings. 
This study, by proposing a relational understanding of social trust, presents a 
possible solution. This relational approach argues that trust is deeply embedded in 
ongoing social relations, and that we can define and distinguish different types of social 
12
 Michael Woolcock, "The Rise and Routinization of Social Capital, 1988-2008," Annual Review of 
Political Science 13, no. (2010), 470. 
13
 See, Russell Hardin, Trust (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2006), 74. 
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trust by specifying the relational categories of the trustees. As demonstrated in Chapter II, 
this relational approach is theoretically attractive, and it can also help us to increase the 
validity of the measurements of social trust. 
Moreover, the relation-based measurements of social trust adopted in this study 
have important implications for cross-national empirical studies of social trust. Most of 
this kind of studies nowadays rely on a simple and vague trust measurement—i.e., "Do 
you think most people can be trusted." Owing to the inherent vagueness of this 
measurement, people of different cultural backgrounds may interpret this in extremely 
different ways, and hence their answers are hardly comparable. It seems to be extremely 
hard, if not impossible, to accurately estimate the magnitude, the origins, and the 
consequences of social trust using data collected on the basis of this question. Given this, 
it is not surprising that many empirical findings based on this question are inconsistent 
and even contradictory.14 The relation-based measurements proposed herein can easily 
avoid this problem, and therefore should be the preferred choice in the future empirical 
studies, particularly cross-national studies, of social trust. 
FUTURE STUDIES 
Before concluding this study, I would like to briefly discuss topics concerning 
social trust in non-democratic countries that future researchers might explore. 
First, future studies might be devoted to the ways in which trust networks might 
affect various socioeconomic and sociopolitical outcomes. As established in this 
dissertation, trust is relational concept, deeply embedded in various trust networks. 
14
 Peter Nannestad, "What Have We Learned About Generalized Trust, If Anything?," Annual Review of 
Political Science 11, no. (2008), 431. 
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Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the way in which people are connected (i.e., 
trust networks) can, along with people's subjective trust, strongly influence individuals' 
economic and political behaviors.15 However, empirical studies on of trust networks are 
scarce. Admittedly, compared to subjective trust, it is much more difficult to 
operationalize and analyze trust networks. The question that future studies would be 
asking is, how can we empirically explore the roles of trust networks in determining 
people's economic and political activities? 
Second, further studies are needed in order to explore the roles of social trust in 
more "contentious" politics in non-democracies. As the empirical analysis of this study 
implies, social trust might help ordinary Chinese villagers to overcome collective action 
problem associated with public goods provision. To take this one step further, future 
researchers of social trust in non-democratic countries might ask: Can social trust help to 
solve collective action problems other than public goods provision, such as public 
protests? The future studies on this question will not only advance our understanding of 
the nature of social trust, but also help us understand the roles of social trust in the 
process of democratization. 
15
 For a recent discussion on the studies of trust networks, see David A. Siegel, "Social Networks and 
Collective Action," American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 1 (2009). 
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